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ABSTRACT 
When he was asked where he came from, Diogenes of Sinope (404 - 323 B.C.) famously 
declared: “I am a citizen of the world.”1 The Cynic’s declaration resonates with our 
intensively and extensively globalised world. Just as it was important whether a person sees 
him/herself as primarily a citizen of a particular polis or a citizen of the universal cosmopolis 
during the Cynic’s time,  so also it is important – if not even more important – whether we 
see ourselves as primarily members of a state or the global society today. 
This dissertation is aimed at delving into the debate on global justice. There are many ways to 
deal with the issue of global justice. I have chosen one way; to focus on cosmopolitanism 
contra statism in relation to resource curse with a view of arriving at a fusion of horizons. 
Essentially, cosmopolitanism and statism are attempts by political philosophers to set moral 
standards for our world. In our world today, there is need to set standards of behaviour in 
certain essential aspects of life. Standards are indispensable because the consequences of lack 
of standards are frighteningly negative.   
Imagine a world without standards. I am of the opinion that a world without standards will 
end up in self-destruction. Without standards we will not be able to live together in harmony 
since there will be no common ground for the harmonization of our interests. Consequently, 
to use Hobbes’ nuance, we will go back to the state of nature where it is the war of all against 
all. But it is not enough to have standards; those standards have to be just. For unjust 
standards could as well pitch us against one another thereby we will find ourselves yet in 
some form of state of nature.  
So, if standards are indispensable, just standards are even more indispensable. Just standards, 
supposedly, will make the world a peaceful place and the earth a better place for its 
inhabitants. This is why I am delving into the subject matter of this dissertation. For me, this 
is an endeavour to look at some aspects of global justice in terms of what they are and then 
proffer solutions as to what they ought to be. What I hope to achieve with this dissertation is 
to convince some of my readers that whether we are cosmopolitans or statists, it is possible 
for us to be globally just at least to some reasonable extent. 
This dissertation is divided into an introduction, six chapters which are further divided into 
sub-chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction introduces the subject matter of the 
                                                             
1 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Ed. R.D. Hicks, 1972:  Book VI (Chapter 2), p. 63. 
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dissertation and presents my position on the subject matter. The first chapter discusses the 
theoretical and conceptual differences between cosmopolitanism and statism, and discusses 
the methodological approach that will be used in the dissertation.  
The second chapter is divided into six sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter presents an 
overview of cosmopolitanism and statism. The second and third sub-chapters discuss the 
views of two statists namely John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The third and fourth sub-
chapters discuss the views of two cosmopolitans namely Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. 
While the sixth sub-chapter discusses Sebastiano Maffettone’s intermediary position between 
the cosmopolitan and the statist views.  
The third chapter focuses on resource curse. It presents a descriptive analysis of resource 
curse in general, and then contextualises it in sub-Saharan Africa paying particular attention 
to the cases of Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The fourth chapter, 
relying on the descriptive analysis in the third chapter, provides a preliminary prescriptive 
analysis of resource curse. Then the fifth chapter extends the prescriptive analysis by 
examining the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in 
the context of resource curse.   
The sixth chapter examines possible arguments against my attempt to fuse the horizons of 
cosmopolitanism and statism. It reviews my hypothesis, recapitulates the key issues in the 
dissertation and then summarises the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and 
statism. Finally, the concluding part of the dissertation disclaims the notion that my adopted 
fusion of horizons is a negation of cosmopolitanism and statism, and then reiterates my 
position on the subject matter of the dissertation. 
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Abstract 
Als er gefragt wurde, woher er käme, erklärte Diogenes of Sinope (404-323 v.Chr.): „Ich bin 
ein Weltenbürger.“ Des Zynikers Erklärung lässt sich gut mit unserer heutigen globalisierten 
Welt in Einklang bringen. So wie es damals wichtig gewesen ist, ob sich eine Person in erster 
Linie als Bürger einer bestimmten Polis oder als ein Weltenbürger verstand, so ist es auch 
heute wichtig - wenn nicht sogar noch wichtiger geworden - ob wir uns selbst als Mitglieder 
eines bestimmten Staates oder einer globalen Gesellschaft verstehen.  
Diese Dissertation setzt sich mit der Debatte über globale Gerechtigkeit auseinander. Es gibt 
mehrere Arten oder Methoden, mit denen man das Thema von globaler Gerechtigkeit 
bearbeiten kann. Ich werde mich auf den Kosmopilitismus und den Etatismus im Bezug auf 
den Ressourcenfluch konzentrieren, um zu einer Horizontverschmelzung beider zu gelangen. 
Wesentlich für den Kosmopilitismus und Etatismus sind die Herangehensweisen der 
politischen Philosophie, damit sie moralische Maßnahmen für die eine Welt andenken 
können. In der heutigen Welt gibt es einen großen Bedarf, Verhaltensnormen in einigen 
wesentlichen Aspekten des Lebens zu setzen. Bestimmte Standards sind unverzichtbar, weil 
die Folgen von mangelhaften Standards erschrekend negativ sind. 
Stellen Sie sich eine Welt ohne Normen vor. Ich bin der Meinung, dass eine Welt ohne 
Normen zu ihrer Selbstzerstörung führen würde. Ohne Normen können wir nicht miteinander 
in Harmonie leben, denn es würde keine Harmonisierung unserer unterschiedlichen 
Interessen möglich sein. Dementsprechend, um auch Hobbes mit einzubeziehen, werden wir 
zum Naturzustand zurückkommen müssen,  in dem es zum Krieg aller gegen alle kommt. 
Allerdings reicht es nicht aus, Normen zu haben, da diese Normen zudem auch gerecht sein 
müssen. Eine ungerechte Norm kann vielmehr dazu führen, uns gegeneinander zu stellen, 
was wiederum erneut zum Naturzustand führen würde. 
Also, wenn Normen unentbehrlich sind, sind gerechte Standards umso wichtiger. Gerechte 
Normen werden die Welt angeblich zu einem friedlicheren Ort machen und sie in einen 
besseren Ort für all ihre Bewohner verwandeln. Deshalb möchte ich mich mit diesem Thema 
in meiner Dissertation beschäftigen. Für mich ist es eine Bestrebung, ein paar Aspekte einer 
globalen Gerechtigkeit darzustellen und dessen Ermöglichungsansätze aufzuzeigen. Mit 
dieser Dissertation hoffe ich, meine Leser davon überzeugen zu können, dass egal, ob wir 
Kosmopolitaner oder Bürger eines Staates sind, es für uns möglich ist, globale Gerechtigkeit 
in einem guten Ausmaß herzustellen.  
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Die Dissertation selbst ist unterteilt in einer kurzen Einführung, sechs Hauptkapitel die 
wiederum in mehrere Unterkapitel aufgeteilt sind, und letzlich einen Schluss. In der 
Einführung stelle ich sowohl das Thema der Dissertation als auch meine eigene Position dar. 
Beim ersten Kapitel geht es dann in der Folge um den theoretischen und begrifflichen 
Unterschied zwischen Kosmopolitismus und Etatismus. Zudem stelle ich hierin das 
methodologische Verfahren, das in der Dissertation verwendet wird, dar. 
Das zweite Kapitel wird in sechs Unterkapitel unterteilt sein. Das erste Unterkapitel stellt 
einen Überblick über den Kosmopolitanismus und Etatismus dar. Bei dem zweiten und 
dritten Unterkapitel geht es um die Ansicht zweier Vertreter der Staatsbürger- Perspektive. 
Namentlich, John Rawls und Thomas Nagel. Im dritten und vierten Unterkapitel behandele 
ich zwei Kosmopolitaner: Charles Beitz und Thomas Pogge. Das sechste Unterkapitel 
diskutiert daraufhin Sabastiano Maffettones vermittelnde Ansicht zwischen 
kosmopolitanischer und staatsbürgerlicher Ansicht. 
Das dritte Kapitel stellt sich dem Thema des Ressourcenfluchs. Es stellt eine allgemeine 
Analyse des Selbigen vor und kontextualisiert sie im Gebiet der Sub-Sahara in Afrika. 
Genauer hin in Bezug auf Nigeria, Angola, und die demokratische Republick Kongo. Das 
vierte Kapitel basiert auf den deskriptiven Analysen des dritten Kapitels, um eine vorläufige 
präskriptive Analyse des Ressourcenfluchs darzustellen. Beim fünften Kapitel handelt es sich 
um eine Erweiterung dieser präskriptiven Analyse durch eine Überprüfung des moralischen 
Zusammenhangs zwischen Kausalität und Verantwortlichkeit auf verschiedenen Ebenen im 
Rahmen dieses Ressourcenfluchs. 
Das sechste Kapitel untersucht mögliche Argumente gegen meinen Versuch, 
Kosmopolitanismus und Etatismus zusammen zu denken. Es überprüft meine Hypothese, 
rekapituliert die Hauptthemen in der Dissertation und fasst den möglichen Gewinn dieser 
Horizontsverschmelzung von Kosmopolitanismus und Etatismus zusammen. Letztlich stellt 
der Schluß der Dissertation eine Abgrenzung dar. Und zwar, dass meine angenommene 
Horizontsverschmelzung eine neue Perspektive der globalen Gerechtigkeit sei, dass 
zunichtemachen Kosmopolitanismus und Etatismus. Und letztlich stellt der Schluß der 
Dissertation betont meine eigene Position dieser Dissertation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Long before Rawls’ Justice as Fairness, justice has almost always been associated with 
fairness. From Plato’s Republic and On Justice to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and 
Politics, justice is generally seen as doing what is fair or dealing with people in a fair manner. 
Even in legal parlance where justice is categorized into procedural and substantive justice we 
often hear of fair and unfair trials and fair or just laws and unfair or unjust laws. Procedural 
justice, as the name suggests, has to do with consistently and impartially applying principles 
of law, following legal procedures or due process in the course of trials. Even if the 
principles, procedures or processes were in themselves unjust or unfair, as long as they are 
followed, then procedural justice is achieved.  But substantive justice, in jurisprudence, goes 
beyond mere principles, procedures or processes to deal with the legitimacy of judgements 
and what is morally due to individuals or what they can morally ask of others or society. Such 
demands are basically the freedoms of the individuals whether those freedoms are negative, 
positive or republican.  
 
Justice can also be divided into distributive justice, corrective justice, commutative justice, 
retributive justice, etc. The concept of justice is a multifaceted one. But it can still be dealt 
with as that one holistic concept called justice.  In this discussion, my intention is not to deal 
with the various categories of justice or to deal with justice as a holistic concept. I shall be 
dealing with only one category or some particular type of justice in that the focus of this 
discussion shall be on global justice which falls under distributive justice albeit ‘global’ 
distributive justice rather than ‘domestic’ distributive justice.  
 
My concern is not with individual states, I am concerned with the world as a whole. I will see 
the primary subject of justice as how the world is structured. Taking a cue from John Rawls’s 
definition of domestic distributive justice
2
, global justice can be construed as the way in 
which fundamental rights and duties are distributed globally and how the division of 
advantages (and disadvantages) from global ‘cooperation,’ ‘competition,’ ‘engagements,’ and 
‘activities,’ ‘events’ and ‘conditions’ (institutional and interactional) are determined. 
 
By virtue of the above construal, global justice is at the centre of the debate between 
cosmopolitans (those on the side of cosmopolitanism) and statists (those on the side of 
                                                             
2 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999: p. 6. 
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statism). Given the various strands and tenets of cosmopolitanism and statism, attempting to 
provide super-definitions for cosmopolitanism and statism is always problematic. The best 
approach is to explicate cosmopolitanism and statism such that the various strands and tenets 
will be covered by the explications. These explications of cosmopolitanism and statism are 
general construal rather than super-definitions! 
 
Summing up the various strands and tenets (which will be discussed in sub-chapter 1.1 and 
chapter 2), generally cosmopolitanism can be construed as a perspective on global justice 
which says that “all persons stand in certain moral relations to one another; we are required to 
respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral concern.”3  The crust of this construal 
is that all persons have equal moral worth and deserve equal moral consideration no matter 
their geographical location, political constituency or social affiliation and otherwise.  
 
Although cosmopolitanism can be conceived as relational cosmopolitanism or non-relational 
cosmopolitanism, legal cosmopolitanism or moral cosmopolitanism, and interactional moral 
cosmopolitanism or institutional moral cosmopolitanism,
4
 the elements in the above construal 
are the core that makes a cosmopolitan strand or variant cosmopolitan. This construal is 
merely an operational construal! At this introductory stage of this dissertation, this 
operational construal is meant to give us an insight into what cosmopolitanism entails. The 
proper explication of the cosmopolitan perspective will be done in the extensive discussions 
in sub-chapter 1.1 and chapter 2.  
 
On statism, first and foremost let us note that a certain conception of statism which says the 
running of socio-economic and politico-economic affairs of the state should be left to the 
government is not what I am concerned with here. Rather, I am concerned with statism as 
understood in political philosophy. Secondly, I note that there are strands of statism such as: 
the Hobbesian one which says justice is totally inapplicable to the international realm; the 
Rawlsian one which sees justice at the international realm as only existing between peoples;
5
 
Nagel who says we can only plausibly talk about and practically have charity rather than 
                                                             
3 Pogge, Thomas. “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics, Vol. 103. No.1. (1992): p. 49. 
4
 Pogge, Thomas. “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” The Cosmopolitan Reader. Eds. Garrett Wallace Brown 
and David Held. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010: pp. 114-115. 
5 Here, ‘peoples’ is understood as John Rawls used it in The Law of Peoples. 
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justice on the international level; and there are other conceptions of statism, too. Despite the 
variants and strands, statism is generally based on the following construal. 
 
Summing up the various strands and tenets (which will be discussed in sub-chapter 1.1 and 
chapter 2), generally statism can be construed as a perspective on global justice which on the 
one hand says that in the nation state, justice is at once intellectually plausible, practically 
realisable and in fact a necessary element. But on the other hand and more crucially, 
conversely holds that: either justice is at once intellectually implausible, practically 
unrealisable and in fact not an element in the global system; or justice is only partially 
intellectually plausible, partially realisable and in fact only partially an element in the global 
system. While some statists hold the first, strong or radical view, others hold the second, 
weak or moderate view.  
 
What I said about the construal of cosmopolitanism in the penultimate paragraph is entirely 
true of this construal of statism. This construal is merely an operational construal! At this 
introductory stage of this dissertation, this operational construal is meant to give us an insight 
into what statism entails. The proper explication of the statist perspective will be done in the 
extensive discussions in sub-chapter 1.1 and chapter 2.  
 
The two distinction lines
6
 or major perspectives on global justice are cosmopolitanism and 
statism. Although global justice can be looked at from other lenses apart from the 
cosmopolitan and statist lenses, these other lenses are not major perspectives per se. 
Cosmopolitanism and statism are considered to be the two major perspectives on global 
justice because, at least since the past four decades, it is based on the principles of 
cosmopolitanism and statism that global justice is studied. Whatever other lenses that there 
are, although they might be considered as minor perspectives on global justice, they do not 
qualify as major perspectives because global justice is not studied, at least generally, based on 
the principles of such minor perspectives. 
One thing should be noted here; the list of perspectives that can be employed to look at issues 
of global justice can be very extensive and I cannot exhaust it here. The list can contain 
perspectives from philosophy, political science, economics, development studies, 
                                                             
6
 For the use of the term ‘distinction lines’, I credit Professor Dr. Andreas Vasilache for his very helpful insights. 
I am using the term ‘distinction lines’ rather than ‘theories’, because it is a better fit for the title and objective 
of the dissertation. 
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international law, history, sociology, human geography, etc. But I shall only deal with 
cosmopolitanism and statism because I am concerned with perspectives on global justice 
within the subfield of political philosophy, rather than perspectives from other fields.  
My focus is on political philosophy. I am focusing on political philosophy because intuitively 
whenever and wherever issues of global justice are discussed they are (almost) always 
discussed as moral issues. And whenever and wherever solutions are proffered to problems of 
global justice, they are (almost) always construed as morally just and fair solutions to moral 
problems whether the problems are economic, political, cultural, sociological or even legal 
and otherwise. In a nutshell, theories from other fields, at best, will be ‘applied theories’, 
rather than major or original perspectives on global justice.  
Given that cosmopolitanism and statism are not theories of International Relations (IR), the 
question is: Why use cosmopolitanism and statism, rather than IR theories, to analyse 
international or global issues? The answer is not far-fetched. While IR theories are mainly 
descriptive rather than prescriptive, cosmopolitanism and statism are mainly prescriptive 
rather than descriptive.  Our subject matter, global justice, is not a descriptive one, it is rather 
prescriptive; hence the aptness of opting for cosmopolitanism and statism rather than IR 
theories.  
One might even go further to ask, for instance, why not use: anthropological, psychological 
or sociological theories for the analysis of global justice issues which have to do with 
individuals and collectives; economic, business or commercial law theories for the analysis of 
global justice issues which have to do with corporations or firms; so on and so forth. Again, 
all these theories are mainly, like IR theories, descriptive. So I opted not to use them for the 
same reason I opted not to use IR theories. 
Since the creation of the academic sub-sub-field of global justice within the sub-field of 
political philosophy in the 1970s,
7
 it has been dominated by cosmopolitanism and statism. 
Many cosmopolitans and statists on either side of the debate on global justice see their 
perspective as the only plausible perspective on global justice. They only look at global 
justice from their own perspective. But given that many issues of global justice are complex 
rather than simple, looking at such issues from only one perspective seems inadequate. Hence 
                                                             
7
 Issues of global justice have been discussed at least since the time of Diogenes. Nevertheless, global justice 
was not robustly discussed in the academia before the 1970s; it was only sparingly and marginally discussed. It 
was only in the 1970s that the discussion flourished and took the shape of a sub-sub-discipline. 
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it is fast becoming clear to neutrals that no singular perspective is adequate to deal with 
global justice.  
One way to tackle the complexity of global justice is to opt for the fusion of horizons 
between statism and cosmopolitanism. But the question is: can there be a plausible fusion of 
horizons between statism and cosmopolitanism? I shall answer this question in the 
affirmative. While many statists and cosmopolitans may argue that such fusion of horizons is 
implausible, I shall argue that such fusion of horizons is at once necessary and plausible. 
There might be particular and simple cases of global justice in which cosmopolitanism or 
statism alone might just be at once necessary and sufficient. Nevertheless, generally cases of 
global justice are usually complex, and in these cases none of the perspectives is at once 
necessary and sufficient. Therefore, having a simple case in which one perspective is at once 
necessary and sufficient is an exception rather than the norm. While having complex cases in 
which none of the perspectives is at once necessary and sufficient is the norm rather than the 
exception. So, when we talk about the necessity and sufficiency of perspectives on global 
justice, we are talking about them in relation to the norm, rather than in relation to an 
exception, in global justice.  
The subject matter of the dissertation or the main question the dissertation shall be wrestling 
with is: Is there any one perspective that is at once necessary and sufficient for dealing with 
global justice? In responding to the question I shall be working with the following 
hypotheses. First, there is no one perspective that is at once necessary and sufficient. While 
each perspective is necessary, none is sufficient. Second, consequently we should neither 
jettison any one perspective nor totally accept any one perspective. Third, then we should 
adopt a multifaceted approach in which we use the different perspectives as lenses to see the 
different facets of global justice in terms of ascertaining causality and assigning responsibility 
to parties involved in a case of global justice or perhaps more accurately a case of global 
injustice which reflects the absence of global justice within some specific spatio-temporal 
circumstances and events.  
The case of the Lernaean Hydra
8
 called resource curse or paradox of plenty is a typical 
complex case of global justice or global injustice which reflects the absence of global justice 
within some specific spatio-temporal circumstances and events.  So in a bid to narrow down 
                                                             
8 In Greek mythology, the Hydra of Lerna is a multi-headed dangerous serpent. 
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the scope of the debate on our subject matter and to contextualize it, I shall focus on resource 
curse in general and the resource-cursed Sub-Saharan Africa in particular. My focus on Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole shall be an overview while there will be special focus on Nigeria, 
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  
I am focusing on Nigeria because apart from being the largest economy in Africa, it used to 
be the largest oil producer and exporter in Africa. It is currently the second largest oil 
producer and exporter in Africa. Since Nigeria has become infamous for its Niger Delta 
phenomenon, my focus on Nigeria shall be laden with special emphasis on the Niger Delta – 
a place known for crude oil, natural gas, environmental pollution, injustice, conflicts, poverty, 
petro-dollars and petro-naira. It can be called a dialectical Delta or a place of contradictions. 
It is a place of riches and poverty at their extremes, and a place of human rights activists and 
perpetrators of injustice too. 
 
I am focusing on Angola because the Southern African country has surpassed Nigeria as the 
largest petroleum producer and exporter in Africa. Also, I am focusing on the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) because more than even Nigeria and Angola, the Central African 
country has epitomized resource curse. More than Nigeria and Angola, in Africa the situation 
in the DRC is the epitome of what is that ought not to be. 
 
There are many ways to narrow down this debate. But I have chosen to focus on resource 
curse for four reasons. Firstly, resource curse cases are neither purely due to domestic factors 
nor purely due to global factors. They are always due to both domestic and global factors. 
Hence they are cases of global justice that allow us to do a multi-dimensional analysis. 
Secondly, resource curse cases are always products of multi-agencies rather than a single 
agency. Hence they are cases of global justice that allow us to do a multi-level analysis. 
Thirdly, global justice is mainly global economic or distributive justice.
9
 When those who are 
resource-rich - who could have been called upon to help those who are not resource-rich or  
the less resource-rich - are yet poor despite their resources, one wonders whether it is morally 
justified to ask others – most of whom are not resource-rich and less resource-rich – to come 
to their aid.  
                                                             
9
 We can also talk about global justice in terms of armed conflicts, humanitarian intervention, etc. Many of 
these other areas are traditionally looked at legally within the purview of international law and international 
justice, but can also, and are actually sometimes looked at morally within the purview of international ethics or 
global justice. 
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Fourthly, given the number of people living in resource cursed-countries, the numerous lives 
lost and the amount of resources wasted during conflicts because of resource curse, the lives 
at stake due to poverty which is caused by resource curse and the amount of money involved 
in resource curse, solving the problem of resource curse, surely, will help alleviate global 
poverty. Solving the problem of resource curse will not eradicate the problems of global 
poverty and injustice. However, it will go a long way to alleviate them. 
 
At this juncture let us pause to ask whether there is any critical need to be discussing global 
justice. Rather than answer this question by mere affirmation or negation, I will present an 
overview of the key issues that make global justice contentious. In our world today, we have 
made some progress in lifting many people out of poverty. If we accept the United Nations 
(UN)’s threshold of US$2 per day as the threshold for poverty, that is, anyone who can afford 
to live on US$2 (subject to Purchasing Power Parity – PPP) is not poor, we will have to 
accept that the end of last century and the beginning of this century have witnessed improved 
economic conditions and the vanquishing of poverty for hundreds of millions of people. 
 
The economic progress is even more manifested if we accept the UN’s threshold of US$1.25 
per day as the threshold for abject poverty, that is, anyone who can afford not to live below 
US$1.25 (subject to PPP) per day is not abjectly poor. We only need to look at the BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) to see how relatively fast they have moved hundreds of 
millions out of poverty, especially abject poverty. Even if we look at China alone, given 
China’s population we will have to accept that our world has taken some giant strides in 
fighting poverty. Like China, India too, given its population, is a testament that poverty is not 
invincible. 
 
If we add other countries that have been said to be making progress to the BRIC, for instance 
see the BRIC as BRICS - as it is now known by adding South Africa - and adding the 
economic progress of all the other emerging markets and growth economies, we might be 
persuaded to believe that we are witnessing the end of poverty and poverty is being made 
history in our time.
10
  
                                                             
10
 For details of the significance of this sentence, see Sachs, Jeffery D. The End of Poverty: Economic 
Possibilities for Our Time. London: The Penguin Press, 2005. Also, see the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaigns 
which are organised by the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (GCAP). 
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Terence James O’Neill (Jim O’Neill), the economist who coined the acronym BRIC to show 
how economic power is shifting from developed to developing countries
11
 also coined the 
acronyms MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) and MIST, also known as MIKT 
(Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) to show how some developing countries are 
the next emerging markets and growth economies the world should expect to progress rapidly 
and tremendously.
12
  With the memories of the East Asian miracle still fresh, there was 
euphoria over the aforementioned acronyms and the expected wonders emerging markets and 
growth economies will perform.  
 
However, poverty has not been made history and there are very strong indications that 
poverty will not be made history in our time.
13
 All over the world, especially in low income 
economies or developing countries, there are still hundreds of millions of people living below 
the UN’s poverty and abject poverty thresholds. These are the people Paul Collier calls the 
‘bottom billion.’14 
 
A cogent moral approach to the aforementioned economic issues is to adopt distributive 
justice, that is, adopt normative principles which will guide us in “the allocation of the 
benefits and burdens of economic activity.”15 The limitation of this approach is that it only 
focuses on the economic aspect of life or it considers other crucial aspects of life to be 
economic. The contention is that “it might exclude some ‘goods’ which are important to us 
but which are not usually considered part of economic life (such as education and health 
care).”16 Since, other things equal, the economic status of persons determine the sort of 
education and health care they can have asses to, perhaps the above approach is not too 
imperfect. Even in countries where education and health care are free, it is because the 
governments of such countries have infused distributive justice principles into their public 
policy, in this case, education policy and health policy.   
 
                                                             
11 O’Neill, Jim. “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, No. 66, 30th 
November, 2011.  
12 O’Neill, Jim. “Who You Calling a BRIC?”, BloombergView, 12th November, 2013. 
13 For the indications, see Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
14
 Collier, Paul. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Communities are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
15
 Lamont, Julian, and Christi Favor. “Distributive Justice”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 22nd 
September, 1996: p. 1. 
16 Armstrong, Chris. Global Distributive Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: p. 16. 
Page 17 of 252 
 
In both relative and absolute terms, some people are well-off while others are worse-off. 
Distributive justice is not only concerned with both relative and absolute ‘well-offness’ and 
‘worse-offness.’ Also, it is crucially concerned with ‘worst-off’ persons. While, within the 
structures of the state, assisting the worst-off is not always contentious, assisting the ‘merely’ 
worse-off is very contentious. Even more contentious is assisting the ‘merely’ global worse-
off. Although assisting the global worst-off is not as contentious as assisting the ‘merely’ 
global worse-off, by a very big margin it is more contentious than assisting the ‘merely’ 
worse-off with the structures of the state. This is because while (domestic) distributive justice 
is faced with only two critical central contentions, global distributive justice is faced with 
three critical central contentions. 
For (domestic) distributive justice, the two critical central contentions are whether principles 
of distributive justice are justifiable and, if they are justifiable, to what extent are they 
justifiable. Here, I use ‘to what extent’ to refer to relative and absolute worse-off scenarios. 
For global distributive justice, the first and second critical central contentions are same as 
those of (domestic) distributive justice. But the third critical central contention, accepting that 
principles of distributive justice are justifiable, goes on to contend whether they are justifiable 
globally. It is this third critical central contention that ‘mainly’ separates statists from 
cosmopolitans. I use the term ‘mainly’ because the ‘to what extent’ term also separates some 
cosmopolitans from some statists, and even separates some statists from other statists, and 
some cosmopolitans from other cosmopolitans. These separations and divides will be 
discussed in detail in due course. 
To say that morally the worst-off or the worse-off ought to be assisted implies that they are 
‘entitled to assistance’, and correspondingly there are those whose ‘duties’ are to provide 
such assistance. Extending principles of distributive justice to the global arena, “global 
distributive justice ... suggests that there are some entitlements of justice which have global 
scope and which also suggests that there are some duties of justice which have global 
scope”17 (emphasis is original). Although Samuel Freeman asserts that global distributive 
justice requires the distribution of every available good to everyone
18
, global distributive 
justice does not necessarily suggest that every principle of distributive justice is valid 
                                                             
17
 Ibid. p. 17. 
18
 Freeman, Samuel. “Distributive Justice and the Law of Peoples.” Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? 
Rex Martin and David Reidy, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006; pp. 243 – 260; p. 34. 
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globally. But it suggests that at least some principles of distributive justice are valid 
globally.
19
 
If it is accepted that the worse-off and the worst-off are entitled to assistance, does the 
corresponding duty of assistance lie with individuals, collectives, states, or some other 
entities, and what sort of duty should it be?
20
 No matter the entity the duty lies with, is it a 
duty of justice or a duty of charity? Comparatively, duties of justice are more demanding 
while duties of charity or humanitarian duties are less demanding. Duties of justice “are more 
fundamental in their objective”21 (emphasis is original) because they deal with the most 
pertinent issues such as the causal roles of moral agents and their corresponding 
responsibility, the justice-relationship between the haves and the have-nots and between the 
well-off and the worse-off.  
Unlike duties of justice, humanitarian duties are superficial because they posit that the well-
off should help the worse-off not based on any justice-relationship but simply because both of 
them share a common humanity.
22
 This infers that the well-off cannot be said to have played 
any role in the conditions that make the worse-off poor or even abjectly poor. More crucially 
it implies that the well-off are only moved ‘voluntarily’ by ‘compassion’ to do the worse-off 
a ‘favour.’ For these reasons, it can be argued that humanitarian duties attempt to address 
global distributive justice problems without dealing with the ‘how’ and ‘why’ the problems 
originated.
23
 
Nevertheless, that duties of justice are fundamental while humanitarian duties are superficial 
might not be the most helpful way to distinguish between the two. Arguably, the most helpful 
ways to distinguish between the two are that humanitarian duties are less stringent than duties 
of justice, and duties of justice are enforceable while humanitarian duties are not.
24
 Duties of 
justice are more stringent to the extent that they can be enforced while humanitarian duties 
are less stringent to the extent that they cannot be enforced. Here, stringency refers to the 
firmness of duties and the difficulty in avoiding such firm duties.
25
 While enforceability 
refers to the justifiability of compelling moral agents to perform certain duties in case the 
                                                             
19 Armstrong, Chris. Global Distributive Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: p. 18. 
20 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. p. 19. 
22
 Ibid. p. 20. 
23
 Tan, Kok-Chor. Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004: p. 21. 
24
 Armstrong, Chris. Global Distributive Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: p. 21. 
25 Ibid. 
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agents are unwilling to perform such duties.
26
 So, moral agents would be required to perform 
their duties of justice even if they have to pay a high price for the performance.
27
 
Assuming that the question of duties of justice versus humanitarian duties has been 
successfully resolved favouring either duties of justice or humanitarian duties, another ‘what 
sort of duties’ question arises: are they positive or negative duties?28 Positive duties are duties 
“to do something good” while negative duties are duties “not to do something that is bad.”29 
Negative duties are easier to justify than positive duties. Negative duties ‘simply’ demand 
that we refrain from harming others. Although determining what constitutes ‘harming others’ 
is contentious. Also contentious is to what extent actions performed by moral agents 
‘indirectly’ harm others. 
Positive duties are not necessarily dependent on the failure previously to respect negative 
duties. But to some extent in the global justice discourse, positive duties are based on the fact 
that some moral agents have previously failed to respect their negative duties. Because such 
agents failed not to do harm to others, consequently they have the duty to rectify their harm. 
If positive duties are only about rectifying the failure of negative duties, positive duties will 
not be very contentious. They are very contentious because they go further to argue that the 
well-off should assist the worse-off whether or not the well-off are responsible for the 
conditions that make the worse-off poor or abjectly poor.  
Assume we have accepted that principles of distributive justice are justifiable. Assume we 
have also accepted that principles of global distributive justice are justifiable. In other words, 
assume we have accepted that there are negative and positive duties which are not merely 
humanitarian duties but are duties of justice, and these duties of justice are global. At this 
juncture, the pertinent question will be; why is global distributive justice justifiable, that is, 
on what grounds is global distributive justice based? In dealing with this question, some 
political philosophers base their arguments on realities of our world while others base their 
arguments on realities of human nature.
30
 
Arguments based on realities of our world, on one side, say the fact that we share certain 
institutions globally or are in certain ways bounded together globally means global 
                                                             
26
 Ibid. p. 22. 
27
 Miller, David. National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: p. 248. 
28
 Armstrong, Chris. Global Distributive Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: p. 23. 
29
 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971: p. 114. 
30 Armstrong, Chris. Global Distributive Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: p. 25. 
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distributive justice is justifiable. Arguments based on realities of our world, on the other side, 
say the fact that we do not share certain institutions globally or are not in certain ways 
bounded together globally means that global justice is unjustifiable. These realities-of-our-
world arguments are referred to as relational approaches.
31
   
The arguments which are based on realities of human nature say that global distributive 
justice is justifiable because of “what we share simply by virtue of being humans.”32 While 
the realities-of-the-world arguments are referred to as relational approaches, the human-
nature arguments in contrast are referred to as non-relational approaches.
33
 
Onora Oneill argues that insofar our decisions and actions affect other people; there is a 
connection between us that should be governed by duties of justice, especial principles of 
distributive justice.
34
 Nevertheless, while our negative duties to refrain from harming the poor 
may be readily accepted as duties of justice, it is not readily admissible that positive duties to 
the poor are duties of justice.
35
  
But Simon Caney argues that global distributive justice can be justified on the same 
fundamental grounds which domestic distributive justice is justified. For Caney, domestic 
distributive justice rejects discrimination against fellow citizens not merely because they are 
fellow citizens but fundamentally because they are fellow humans and it is wrong to 
discriminate against fellow humans. Since both citizens and non-citizens are all humans, and 
fellow humans, the standard justifications of domestic distributive justice principles can 
equally serve as the standard justifications of global distributive justice principles.
36
 
For Samuel Black, to deny the above claim is to commit “the fallacy of restricted 
universalism”  because an argument for distributive justice “that ascribes rights and claims 
on the basis of certain universal attributes of persons, cannot at the same time restrict the 
grounds for those claims to a person’s membership or status within a given society”37 
                                                             
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33
 Sangiovanni, Andrea. “Global Justice, Reciprocity and the State”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(2007): pp. 3 – 39. 
34 Oneill, Onora. Faces of Hunger. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. 
35
 Gilabert, P. “The Duty to Eradicate Global Poverty: Positive or Negative?” Ethical Theory and Moral practice, 
Vol. 7, No. 4 (2005): pp. 537 – 550. 
36
 Caney, Simon. Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: p. 
107. 
37
 Black, Samuel. “Individualism at an Impasse”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21/3 (1991): pp. 347 – 377; p. 
357. 
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(emphasis is original). But even among political philosophers who argue for global 
distributive justice, there is a perennial contention regarding the extent to which principles of 
distributive justice should be applied in terms of positive duties.  
Some political philosophers, the minimalists, argue that principles of global distributive 
justice should be applied to meeting the basic needs and rights of the worse-off.
38
 Once the 
basic needs and rights of the worse-off are satisfied, the remainder inequalities between the 
worse-off and the well-off are morally permissible. But other political philosophers, the 
egalitarians, argue that it is not enough to satisfy the basic needs and rights of the worse-off. 
Since most of the remainder inequalities are liable to moral objection,
39
 justice demands that 
such inequalities are eradicated.  
In effect, the egalitarian argument is that inequalities are only permissible if they are not 
morally objectionable, and since most inequalities are morally objectionable, therefore most 
inequalities are not permissible. In critique of the egalitarian approach and in defence of the 
minimalist approach, David Miller argues that what matters is that there is a fair basis for 
global cooperation and that the global institutional order ensures that every society has 
enough opportunities to be able to develop.
40
 
In the foregoing introductory discussion, I presented an overview of the global justice debate. 
This is an introduction of the key issues that were presented such as whether principles of 
(domestic) distributive justice should be applicable to the global realm, the global 
justifiability of duties of justice, the sufficiency and appropriateness of humanitarian duties 
instead of duties of justice, minimalist and egalitarian arguments for global distributive 
justice, the contentions concerning positive and negative duties, and the justifiability and un-
justifiability of principles of global distributive justice in view of arguments based on realities 
of our world and realities of our human nature.  
This introduction was aimed at giving us an overview of the global justice debate; it 
overviews the contentious arguments which will be dealt with in detail in the rest of the 
discussion. It is in the remainder of the discussion that how the issues discussed in this 
introduction fit into statism and cosmopolitanism will be evident, and it is in the remainder of 
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 Armstrong, Chris. Global Distributive Justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: p. 34. 
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the discussion that I will show how statists and cosmopolitans use such issues to argue for 
one perspective and against the other perspective.  
In view of the above statement, in the following part of our discussion (chapter 1) I will 
preliminarily, but vitally, juxtapose statism with cosmopolitanism. The juxtaposition will be 
dealt with exhaustively in chapter 2 and finalised in subsequent chapters. Alongside the 
preliminary juxtaposition of statism with cosmopolitanism in the following first chapter, I 
shall present my methodological approach which will explain the kind of normative and 
theoretical analysis our discussion will be hinged on. 
This dissertation is divided into an introduction, six chapters which are further divided into 
sub-chapters, and a conclusion. The introduction introduces the subject matter of the 
dissertation and presents my position on the subject matter. The first chapter discusses the 
theoretical and conceptual differences between cosmopolitanism and statism, and discusses 
the methodological approach that will be used in the dissertation.  
The second chapter is divided into six sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter presents an 
overview of cosmopolitanism and statism. The second and third sub-chapters discuss the 
views of two statists namely John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The third and fourth sub-
chapters discuss the views of two cosmopolitans namely Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. 
While the sixth sub-chapter discusses Sebastiano Maffettone’s intermediary position between 
the cosmopolitan and the statist views.  
The third chapter focuses on resource curse. It presents a descriptive analysis of resource 
curse in general, and then contextualises it in sub-Saharan Africa paying particular attention 
to the cases of Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The fourth chapter, 
relying on the descriptive analysis in the third chapter, provides a preliminary prescriptive 
analysis of resource curse. Then the fifth chapter extends the prescriptive analysis by 
examining the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in 
the context of resource curse.   
The sixth chapter examines possible arguments against my attempt to fuse the horizons of 
cosmopolitanism and statism. It reviews my hypothesis, recapitulates the key issues in the 
dissertation and then summarises the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and 
statism. Finally, the concluding part of the dissertation disclaims the notion that my adopted 
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fusion of horizons is a negation of cosmopolitanism and statism, and then reiterates my 
position on the subject matter of the dissertation. 
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1.0.                      PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 
1.1.                       Cosmopolitanism contra Statism 
Robert Nozick, admitting the revolutionising effect of A Theory of Justice, says political 
philosophers will have to work within Rawls’ framework or they will have to explain why 
they choose not to work within the framework.
41
 Just as A Theory of Justice revolutionises 
how political philosophers think about (domestic) distributive justice, so also (although to a 
lesser extent) The Law of Peoples revolutionises how political philosophers think about 
global justice. However, The Law of Peoples is an elaboration of Rawls’ view on global 
justice which he first expressed in A Theory of Justice. 
Rawls says we can call many things just or unjust. Just as we  can call laws, institutions or 
social systems just or unjust, so also we can call certain actions of different kinds, be they 
decisions, judgements or imputations, just or unjust. Also we can call persons themselves, 
including their attitudes or dispositions, just or unjust. However, for him, “the primary 
subject of justice is the basic structure of society...the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social cooperation.”42 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls is not only concerned with social 
justice, but he is particularly concerned with social justice in the domestic society. Hence he 
prescribes certain principles of justice which he thinks will ensure a just basic structure which 
will in turn ensure a just domestic society. 
To attain a just basic structure, domestic societies are to be guided by justice as fairness. In 
justice as fairness, individuals sitting in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance, 
choose Rawls’ two principles of justice. The first principle is the liberty principle and the 
second principle is the equality principle. The second principle is further divided into two 
principles namely the difference principle and the fair equality of opportunity principle. 
“First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second, social and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to 
everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”43 Despite Rawls’ 
intention to limit the application of these principles to domestic societies, the principles 
contributed immensely to charting the course of the debate on global justice. 
                                                             
41 Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999; p.183. 
42
 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999: p. 6. 
43 Ibid. p. 53. 
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Two facts made Rawls’ principles of justice the centrality of the global justice debate.44 The 
first is that Rawls argued that his principles are for domestic societies and are not for the 
global society. Except few remarks like the ones made in paragraph 58 of A Theory of Justice 
(Revised edition), Rawls did not concern himself with global justice. When Rawls finally 
concerned himself with global justice in The Law of Peoples, he seemed to be almost 
negligent of the inequality he made central focus in domestic distributive justice. Second, 
Rawls’ principles, especially the difference principle, reinvigorated or even determined the 
course of the global justice debate. In their first forays into the global justice debate, Charles 
Beitz and Thomas Pogge - two leading authorities in the global justice debate - merely 
extended Rawls’ principles of justice, especially the difference principle, from domestic 
society to the global society. Therefore, arguably, Rawls can be seen as originating the 
contemporary debate on global justice
45
 which has pitched statists against cosmopolitans. 
Although each cosmopolitan and statist has his/her specific arguments for supporting 
cosmopolitanism or statism, such particular arguments are derivatives of the general 
arguments that divide cosmopolitanism and statism. Statism is based on special relationship 
and the basic structure. It is apt to say it is firstly based on the special relationship and 
secondly on the basic structure. On the one hand, and more importantly, it is based on the 
vertical relationship that exists between the state (sovereign) and the citizens. On the other 
hand it is based on the horizontal relationship among the citizens. Combining both 
relationships, statism is based on the relationship that exists within the state among the 
members (including the sovereign) of the state. 
This special relationship, in other words, is the special and primary cooperation within a state 
that separates a state and its members from any other special and primary cooperation of 
other states and their members, and the general and secondary cooperation that might exist on 
one level among states and on another level among different members of different states. It is 
the special and primary cooperation that necessitates the basic structure.  
Hence it is also said that statism is based on the basic structure that exists within the state and 
which helps the state to determine the just and fair distribution of the rights and obligations 
and the advantages and disadvantages within the aforementioned cooperation. In other words, 
the state is seen as a vehicle of social cooperation whereas the world as a whole lacks this 
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 Blake, Michael, and Patrick Taylor Smith. “International Distributive Justice”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, 24 October, 2013. 
45 Ibid. 
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characteristic. In this Rawlsian basic structure, in order to protect the inviolability of persons, 
the state has mechanisms which ensure that the separatedness of individuals is respected and 
the advantages and disadvantages resulting from the social cooperation of persons are fairly 
distributed.
46
 
For statists, the vertical relationship between the state and citizens and the horizontal 
relationships among citizens are unique and essential thereby making states the prominent 
institutions. They see the socio-political structures and conditions of the state as different 
from those that obtain on the global level. Hence they conclude that the moral requirements 
that ‘should’ be demanded within the state are different from any moral requirements, if at all 
there is any, that ‘may’ be demanded on the global level.  
However, cosmopolitans reject the above argument. They deny the prominence of the state. 
They argue that the so-called prominence of the state is a mere description of ‘what is’ rather 
than a moral prescription of ‘what ought to be.’ For them, our relationships as humans should 
have precedence over our relationships as citizens. Furthermore, they argue that the 
conditions that obtain within the state also obtain to a large extent on the global level. Thus 
moral demands and requirements applicable within the state should also be applicable to the 
global level. 
Statism maintains the special nature of the state among human associations and on such basis 
regards citizenship or membership of state as the only, or at least the major, important 
relation. For statists, it is only states that have this sort of special relation. To argue for this 
position, statists rely on different arguments such as the coercion argument, the reciprocity 
argument, and the framing argument.
47
 
 
Many statists argue for their position on the grounds of coercion and cooperation. While 
some statists base their arguments on cooperation or the horizontal relationship among 
citizens, others base their arguments on coercion or the vertical relationship between the state 
and citizens.
48
 Those who argue on the ground of coercion understand the basic structure as a 
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coercive apparatus, while those who argue on the ground of cooperation understand the basic 
structure as a cooperative apparatus.
49
  
 
For statists like John Rawls, Michael Blake, Thomas Nagel, Samuel Freeman and Mathias 
Risse, that political-legal coercion is present within the state but absent on the global level 
makes principles of distributive justice “more demanding requirements within the state.”50 
Although this does not mean that there can be no principles of global distributive justice, it 
means that such principles will be ‘less demanding requirements’ and secondary. Such 
principles will be akin to those Rawls argued for in The Law of Peoples, for instance duty of 
assistance to burdened societies, remedying cases of severe poverty and gross violation of 
human rights.
51
 While for Rawls, Blake, Risse and Freeman this will count as a duty of 
justice, for Nagel it is a mere humanitarian duty or duty of charity.
52
  
 
Cosmopolitans have also adopted the coercive and cooperative apparatuses arguments to 
argue for their position. But unlike the statists who tend to stress the coercive apparatus 
argument more than the cooperative apparatus argument, the cosmopolitans tend to stress the 
cooperative apparatus argument more than the coercive apparatus argument.
53
 Some 
cosmopolitans argue that the mechanism of coercion is not exclusive to the domestic realm. 
Some cosmopolitans argue that coercion also comes in other forms such as when states, 
through immigration policies, restrict non-citizens from entry,
54
 and when powerful states 
interfere in the internal affairs of less powerful states through military, political, economic, 
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covert or overt operations.
55
 They argue that even if the form and extent of coercion at the 
global realm is somewhat different from that of the domestic realm, there is enough coercion 
at the global realm to warrant global distributive justice.  
 
Arguing that the sort of cooperation (horizontal relationship) among citizens within the state 
also exists on the global level, cosmopolitans frequently cite globalisation, especially the 
intensity and extensity of cross-border economic activities such as trade, as representing such 
cooperation. But Brian Barry argues that such trade is merely economically beneficial to the 
trading partners rather than creating a single cooperative unit which necessitates the sort of 
cooperating relationship within the state.
56
 The implication of the cosmopolitan argument is 
that inasmuch as some statists argue for domestic distributive justice and argue against global 
distributive justice on the ground of coercion, if it can be shown that there is coercion at the 
global realm therefore there should be global distributive justice.  
To exemplify the above claim, Joshua Cohen and Charles Sable argue that: states cooperated 
to form the World Trade Organisation (WTO); the WTO  acts in the name of states; the 
activities of the WTO are those of the states; the WTO coerces its members and failure to 
comply with such coercion leads to terrible economic consequences
57
 (emphasis is mine). For 
Cohen and Sable, since leaving is not a practical option for its members, and since remaining 
in it means its members are under coercion, consequently there is a direct relationship of 
coercion between the WTO and citizens of member states. This also applies to the 
relationships between other similar international organisations and citizens of member 
states.
58
 
There are other variants of both statist and cosmopolitan arguments. Among others, such 
variants include Andrea Sangiovanni’s, Darrel Mollendorf’s, Amartya Sen’s, Peter Singer’s, 
egalitarian cosmopolitans’, etc. Sangiovanni argues that reciprocity gives rise to legitimate 
demand for the principles of distributive justice, and consequently distributive justice duties. 
For Sangiovanni, as long as individuals are involved in the collective provision of goods and 
services, they are owed the duty of reciprocity in order for them to benefit from the goods and 
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services which they are involved in providing. So, to the extent and in the aspects that global 
economic activities are a collective provision of goods and services, it is to that extent and in 
those aspects that principles of global distributive justice are applicable.
59
 Consequently, 
individuals are globally owed the duty of reciprocity to the extent and in the aspects they 
contribute to global economic activities that are collective provision of goods and services.  
 
Mollendorf, in what he terms the principle of associational justice, argues that: as long as 
individuals are co-members of an association that is relatively strong and largely non-
voluntary; and if this association is part of the foundational rules that determine how the 
members publicly relate to one another; and the rules governing the association can be 
controlled by persons; then, this association is subject to the principles of distributive 
justice.
60
 For Mollendorf, as long as and to the extent that the international system resembles 
this association, there can be global distributive justice.
61
 
 
For Sen, there are two main reasons for arguing that distributive justice should not be limited 
to the state. The first reason is that in order to avoid bias and be fair to others, we have to 
consider the interests of other people as relevant as our own interests.  The second reason is 
that in order to avoid a narrow mindset that is focused on a local area, and in order to widen 
the scope of what we consider to be relevant principles of distributive justice, we need to 
consider other people’s perspectives as relevant.62 
 
In domestic distributive justice, egalitarian cosmopolitans argue that it is unjust for a person’s 
life prospects to be substantially affected by the circumstances – class, religion, ethnicity, etc. 
- into which he or she is born. Extending this argument to global distributive justice, 
egalitarian cosmopolitans argue “that it is unjust for a person’s life prospects to be 
substantially affected by the country into which he or she is born.”63 For egalitarian 
cosmopolitans, a person’s circumstances of birth, whether socio-economic class or country, is 
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simply an accident, hence should not be allowed to determine the life prospects of that 
person.  
 
My construal of cosmopolitanism, as shown in the introductory part of this dissertation, is 
neither utilitarian nor in line with Peter Singer’s. But while the utilitarian or Singer’s 
conception of cosmopolitanism seems far from mainstream cosmopolitanism, it is still worth 
considering. Singer, being a utilitarian, based his cosmopolitan global justice argument on the 
principle of utility. His concern is how to maximise utility. In other words, he is concerned 
with how to maximise ‘pleasure’ and minimise ‘pain.’   
 
For Singer, it does not matter whether persons are members of the same state or not, whether 
they are party to the same basic structure or not, whether they are under the same coercive 
apparatus or not, and whether they are part of the same cooperative apparatus or not. For him, 
the well-off anywhere have a duty of global distributive justice to the worse-off anywhere. 
Because if we can prevent any morally bad thing from happening without sacrificing 
anything that is of equal moral importance to what we are preventing, then we have the moral 
duty to prevent such bad thing from happening.
64
  
 
In consideration of counter-cosmopolitan arguments, cosmopolitanism as a perspective on 
global justice does not only have its main opponent in statism, but also in nationalism which 
is akin to statism in that sometimes their arguments are the same and at other times they are at 
least related. For this reason, the hurdle of nationalism is one that cosmopolitanism must 
cross alongside the hurdle of statism.  
 
Putting all of the nationalist arguments together, the crux of the nationalist arguments is that 
the national unit is special and therefore deserves special treatment.
65
 The consequence is that 
while it is logical and appropriate to have domestic distributive justice, the same cannot be 
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said of global distributive justice.
66
 In other words, shared national relationships make 
domestic distributive justice practical and possible. But global distributive justice, as 
conceived by cosmopolitans, is not rooted in any such relationship. Hence, it is merely 
theoretical.
67
 
 
Generally, the differences between statists and cosmopolitans are as follow. They do not 
agree on which institutions and established rules and practices give rise to distributive 
justice.
68
 They do not agree on when exactly principles of distributive justice should be 
activated given particular institutions and established rules and practices. They do not agree 
on which particular principles of justice should be activated given certain institutions and 
established rules and practices. They do not agree on the nature of relevant principles of 
distributive justice given certain institutions and established rules and practices.  Finally, they 
do not agree on the extent of applicable principles of distributive justice given certain 
institutions and established rules and practices.  
 
Despite the differences between statists and cosmopolitans, there are some similarities 
between statists and cosmopolitans in a general sense. Both statists and cosmopolitans agree 
that institutions, and established rules and practices emanating from them, give rise to both 
legitimate demand for distributive justice and consequently duties of distributive justice.
69
 
Both statists and cosmopolitans agree that the mutual or collective participation of people in 
institutions and established rules and practices that are distribution-related automatically 
triggers principles of distributive justice.
70
 Consequently, generally, both statists and 
cosmopolitans agree that: the presence of a basic structure triggers distributive justice; the 
absence of a basic structure nullifies distributive justice; the nature of a basic structure 
determines the nature of the principles of distributive justice that will be relevant; and the 
extent of a basic structure determines the extent of applicable principles of distributive 
justice.
71
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In view of the above differences, but also the similarities, between the cosmopolitan 
perspective and the statist perspective, there are various ways to seek a resolution of the 
dilemma the two perspectives present us with. We can opt for an extreme position in which 
we say the cosmopolitan perspective is totally right while the statist perspective is totally 
wrong. Or we can opt for another extreme position in which we say the statist perspective is 
totally right while the cosmopolitan perspective is totally wrong. These two positions have 
some elements of contradiction within them. To say that cosmopolitanism is totally wrong 
while statism is totally right, or that cosmopolitanism is totally right while statism is totally 
wrong, is contradictory because of the similarities between the two perspectives. So to hold 
any of the above positions is to deny that there are any similarities between the two 
perspectives.  
An even more extreme position is to argue that both the cosmopolitan and the statist 
perspectives are totally wrong. For anyone who argues in this manner, the onus will be on 
him/her to present a perspective on global justice that will be totally different from both the 
cosmopolitan and the statist perspectives and yet be plausible and practicable. Surely, this is 
more than a Herculean task! The reverse position is to argue that both the cosmopolitan and 
the statist perspectives are totally right. This is sheer relativism! Another way to argue for the 
relativism position is to say that the cosmopolitan perspective is neither necessarily right nor 
necessarily wrong; it depends on what we say it is. And the statist perspective is neither 
necessarily right, nor necessarily wrong; it depends on what we say it is. This is based on the 
argument that global justice ‘is what we make of it.’ If we say the cosmopolitan perspective 
is right, then it is right. If we say it is wrong, then it is wrong. And if we say the statist 
perspective is right, then it is right. If we say it is wrong, then it is wrong.  
There is a position which says that the cosmopolitan perspective is totally right while the 
statist perspective is only partially right and partially wrong. This position says the statist 
perspective is right to the extent it is similar to the cosmopolitan perspective, and the statist 
perspective is wrong to the extent it differs from the cosmopolitan perspective. The reverse of 
this position says the statist perspective is totally right while the cosmopolitan perspective is 
only partially right and partially wrong. This argument says the cosmopolitan perspective is 
right to the extent it is similar to the statist perspective, and the cosmopolitan perspective is 
wrong to the extent it differs from the statist perspective. 
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The reverses of the above two positions are, firstly, to say that the cosmopolitan perspective 
is totally wrong while the statist perspective is only partially wrong and partially right. The 
statist perspective is only wrong to the extent it is similar to the cosmopolitan perspective, 
and the statist perspective is right to the extent it differs from the cosmopolitan perspective. 
Secondly, the reverse position is to say that the statist perspective is totally wrong while the 
cosmopolitan perspective is only partially wrong and partially right. The cosmopolitan 
perspective is only wrong to the extent it is similar to the statist perspective, and the 
cosmopolitan perspective is right to the extent it differs from the statist perspective.  
Among the above positions, cosmopolitans have opted for mixed-positions. They all argue 
that cosmopolitanism is totally right. But some argue that statism is totally wrong while 
others argue that statism is only partially right and partially wrong. The former argue that 
statist is totally wrong because they see no similarities between statism and cosmopolitanism. 
But the latter, who see both similarities and differences between statism and 
cosmopolitanism, argue that statism is only right to the extent it is similar to 
cosmopolitanism, and statism is wrong to the extent it differs from cosmopolitanism. 
Like the cosmopolitans, statists have also opted for mixed-positions among the above 
positions. All statists argue that statism is totally right. But some argue that cosmopolitanism 
is totally wrong while others argue that cosmopolitanism is only partially right and partially 
wrong. The former argue that cosmopolitanism is totally wrong because they see no 
similarities between cosmopolitanism and statism. But the latter, who see both similarities 
and differences between cosmopolitanism and statism, argue that cosmopolitanism is only 
right to the extent it is similar to statism, and cosmopolitanism is wrong to the extent it differs 
from statism. 
My position is that neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is totally right or totally wrong. I will 
argue that both are partially right and partially wrong. Their rightness and wrongness should 
not be based on how similar to and different from each other they are. Rather, their rightness 
and wrongness should be based on how helpful or unhelpful they are in our quest to 
understand global justice and resolve global justice issues, especially complex cases of global 
justice such as resource curse. I base this argument on the grounds that the essence of 
cosmopolitanism and statism, as perspectives on global justice, is to help us understand 
global justice and resolve issues and cases of global justice.  
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Therefore, I will argue for a position in which, given the strengths and weaknesses of both 
cosmopolitanism and statism, the horizons of the two perspectives will be fused in order to 
have a better understanding of global justice and a better solution to issues of global justice 
especially complex cases of global justice such as resource curse. In this fusion of horizons, I 
will use the strengths of cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism and 
use the strengths of statism to compensate for the weaknesses of cosmopolitanism. 
 
1.2.0.    Non-ideal Theory, Moral Analysis, Levels of Analysis and Fusion of Horizons. 
My methodological approach shall be theoretical and normative. I shall go through the 
following process. First and foremost, I will engage some key texts that have dealt with 
global justice in general and cosmopolitanism and statism in particular. These texts include 
Charles Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations, Thomas Pogge’s 
‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’, John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples, Thomas Nagel’s ‘The 
Problem of Global Justice’, Sebastiano Maffettone’s ‘Normative Approaches to Global 
Justice’, etc.  
 
I am using these texts not only because they are some of the most valuable literature in the 
global justice debate. But also, and more importantly, Beitz and Pogge on the 
cosmopolitanism side, and Rawls and Nagel on the statism side, bring to fore the dichotomy 
between the two distinction lines in global justice. On his part, Maffettone forges the bridging 
of that dichotomy by arguing for ‘reconciliation’ of both sides in order to arrive at a neutral 
position. I shall use these texts to analyse cosmopolitanism and statism. In my analysis of 
cosmopolitanism and statism, I shall show how and why they are both individually necessary 
but insufficient distinction lines in global justice.  
 
Secondly, I will deal with literature on resource curse. I will use literature on resource curse 
to show the merits and limitations of cosmopolitanism and statism when they are applied to 
complex cases of global justice. So, my analysis of resource curse will be a means to show 
that despite the limitations of cosmopolitanism and statism, which will be revealed in the 
analysis of resource curse, a fusion of horizons rather than mutual exclusivity is a viable way 
to use cosmopolitanism and statism when dealing with complex cases of global justice such 
as resource curse.  
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Thirdly, my approach shall consist of non-ideal theoretical analysis rather than ideal 
theoretical analysis, a combination of interactional moral analysis and institutional moral 
analysis, different levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility and fusion of 
horizons. Moreover, the combination of cosmopolitanism and statism is well served by the 
levels of analysis, or more accurately, levels of causality and responsibility, which are; the 
individual level, the collective level, the corporate level, the state level, and the global 
institutional order level.   
Finally, logical analysis will be heavily relied upon throughout our discussion - although it is 
only in subchapters 5.1 and 6.1 that logical analysis resembling logical models will be used. 
A very helpful way to check the validity of arguments made in natural language is to 
summarise them in the formal language of logic. Normally, especially in classical logic, “a 
logic consists of a formal or informal language together with a deductive system and/or a 
model-theoretic semantics. The language has components that correspond to a part of a 
natural language like English or Greek. The deductive system is to capture, codify, or simply 
record arguments that are valid for the given language, and the semantics is to capture, 
codify, or record the meanings, or truth-conditions for at least part of the language”72 
(emphasis is original). Hence I will rely on logical analysis to prove the validity of my 
arguments, and it is for this reason that logical analysis will be heavily relied upon throughout 
our discussion.               
 
1.2.1.          The Ideal Theory/Non-ideal Theory Distinction  
Max Weber’s ideaI type heralds Rawls’ ideal theory.  According to Weber, “An ideal type is 
formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a 
great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual 
phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a 
unified analytical construct.”73 It is essentially, wholly and only a depiction of a model-
phenomenon that is not only imaginable but also adequately representative of the realities it 
depicts. Although it is not necessarily realistic, it is to it that the realities it represents or real 
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cases are to be approximated. But it neither stands for ‘perfection’ nor is it the ‘average’ of 
what it represents.
74
  
Like the ideal type, the ideal theory neither stands for perfection nor is it the average of what 
it represents. Nevertheless, while the ideal type does not necessarily denote or connote what 
morally ought to be, the ideal theory denotes or connotes what morally ought to be. 
Furthermore, while the ideal type is a social science analytical tool, the ideal theory is a 
particular way of reasoning about or dealing with justice or theorising about justice in 
political philosophy. 
In Rawls’ view, there are two ways of reasoning about or dealing with justice or two ways of 
theorising about justice. As he opines, the theory of justice is intuitively divided into two 
parts. The first part or the ideal part is popularly known as ideal theory, while the second part 
or the non-ideal part is popularly known as non-ideal theory.
75
 Since Rawls, in A Theory of 
Justice, first introduced the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory as two ways of 
dealing with theory of justice, there are now different formulations of, and different names 
for, ideal theory and non-ideal theory. Nevertheless, I shall focus on Rawls’ formulation and 
distinction. Apart from being original and vanguard, Rawls’ formulation and distinction is 
adequate for my methodological purpose. 
On the one hand, ideal theory, first of all, “assumes strict compliance and works out the 
principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favourable circumstances.”76 Then it 
prescribes for us “a conception of a just society that we are to achieve if we can.”77 Finally, it 
posits that we are to judge our existing institutions in accordance with the prescribed 
conception.
78
   
On the other hand, non-ideal theory is aimed at realising the conception of a just society in 
the ideal theory. Hence, it “asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked 
toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for courses of action that are morally permissible 
and politically possible as well as likely to be effective.”79  By virtue of this conception, non-
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ideal theory assumes that ideal theory is already present. Except the ideal theory is present, 
non-ideal theory has no frame of reference or lacks any objective which it can approximate 
to.
80
  
A key characteristic of ideal theory is that it is a realistic utopia. It is realistic in that it 
accommodates the real situation of our world, it deals with people, institutions and the world 
as they are, and it is actually practicable or can be applied to the domestic or global political 
structures of our world. It is also utopian because it points to what domestic or global 
political arrangements ought to be.  
 
In Rawls’s words, the ideal theory as described in The Law of Peoples, is realistic because “it 
could and may exist. I say it is also utopian and highly desirable because it joins 
reasonableness and justice with conditions enabling citizens to realize their fundamental 
interests.”81 In order to formulate the principles of the ideal theory, “taking men as they are 
and laws as they might be”82 - borrowing the words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau - “We ask 
what could come into existence as a result of our choices, given the limits set by our moral 
and psychological natures and by facts about social institutions and how humans can live 
under them.”83 Consequently, relying on conjectures and speculations to determine what is 
practically possible,
84
 we use ideal theory to explore boundaries of “practicable political 
possibility,”85 although bearing in mind that “what counts as practically possible may be in 
certain respects historically relative.”86 Nevertheless, in order to avoid unrealistic utopia, our 
aim in the ideal theory is to make assumptions that are realistic.
87
 
 
The ideal theory is arrived at in the original position. There are two original positions; the 
first original position as postulated in A Theory of Justice and the second original position as 
postulated in The Law of Peoples. While individuals are the subject of the first original 
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position, peoples are the subject of the second original position - albeit peoples are 
represented by their representatives who of course are individuals.  Also while the first 
original position is in the domestic context, the second original position is in the international 
context.   
 
In the first or domestic original position, rational and reasonable individuals who are 
impartial - representing members of the society – choose the principles of justice that will 
determine and regulate the basic structure of society. In order to ensure fairness, the 
representatives in the original position are to choose the principles of justice behind the veil 
of ignorance. Behind the veil of ignorance, the representatives neither know their place in 
society, they do not know their “class position or social status,” nor do they know their 
“fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities”, including their “intelligence and 
strength, and the like."
88
 This first original position which is modelled for a closed-up liberal 
democracy, and the resultant principles of justice chosen in it, make up the first part of the 
ideal theory.
89
  
 
In the second part of the ideal theory, Rawls extended his liberal conception of justice in 
domestic liberal society to the international arena. By so doing, according to Rawls, an ideal 
theory – in this case the Law of Peoples – is conceptualised for well-ordered peoples to guide 
how they design mutually benefitting institutions, how they relate with one another, and how 
they relate with outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms. 
90
   
 
As John Simmons points out, the two parts of the ideal theory as presented above can be said 
to, correspondingly, have their own non-ideal theory each. The first or domestic part of the 
ideal theory can be said to have a corresponding non-ideal theory that deals “with failures of 
domestic institutions to live up to the requirements of domestic ideal theory.”91 While the 
second or international part of the ideal theory can be said to have a corresponding non-ideal 
theory that deals “with failures of societies to live up to the requirements of international 
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ideal theory.”92 However, a less well-known element of the ideal theory, according to 
Simmons, is that although Rawls only divides the ideal theory into two parts, it has a third 
part which evidently entails a corresponding third part of non-ideal theory.  
 
The third part of the ideal theory is a group of principles that are meant to regulate the 
conducts of individuals. These principles are drawn independently from both the principles of 
domestic justice and the principles guiding the conducts and relationships of peoples in a just 
global order. The principles in the third part of the ideal theory are: principles of fairness, 
which apply to obligations; principles of natural duty, which apply to the basic structure of 
the domestic society
93
; and principles of global justice, which apply to international law.
94
 
 
The non-ideal theory as postulated by Rawls in The Law of Peoples is divided into two types. 
The first type is what can be called non-compliance non-ideal theory while the second type is 
what can be called unfavourable condition non-ideal theory. On the one hand, the non-
compliance non-ideal theory deals with noncompliance conditions which are conditions 
whereby some governments, outlaw states, decline to comply with the Law of Peoples in 
spite of the reasonableness of the Law of Peoples.
95
 On the other hand, the unfavourable 
condition non-ideal theory deals with unfavourable conditions which are conditions whereby 
due to certain historical factors, social problems and economic situations, it is difficult or 
even impossible for certain governments, burdened societies, to have well-ordered 
governments.
96
  
 
The Ideal theory, for Rawls, is the appropriate starting point in political philosophy when 
theorising about justice. It is the ideal theory that spells out for us how we should formulate 
or create the basic structure of our society. To know whether our society is structurally just or 
unjust, or to know to what extent our society is structurally just or unjust, we only need to 
look at how far away or close the basic structure of our society is from or to the principles of 
the ideal theory. If the basic structure of society conforms to the principles spelt out by the 
                                                             
92
 Ibid. 
93 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999: pp. 109, 115. 
94 Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Ed. Erin Kelly.  Cambrdige, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001: p.11;   
Simmons, John A. “Ideal Theory and Nonideal Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 38. No. 1. (2010): p. 
11. 
95
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999: p. 90. 
96 Ibid. 
Page 40 of 252 
 
ideal theory, we have a structurally just society. But if the basic structure does not conform to 
the principles spelt out by the ideal theory, then we have a structurally unjust society.  
 
The centrality of the ideal theory is perfect or strict compliance. In ideal theory, it is assumed 
that all subjects and agents of justice will perfectly comply with the principles formulated, 
and that all the necessary and sufficient conditions to enable all subjects and agents of justice 
to comply perfectly are present. For Rawls, the ideal theory is the primary or fundamental 
part of theory of justice, while the non-ideal theory is the secondary part. According to 
Rawls, “the nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part of justice.”97 
Therefore, for Rawls, we need the ideal theory “to formulate a reasonable conception of 
justice for the basic structure of society,” and when this is done, the residual predicament of 
justice will become easier to deal with.
98
  
 
Amartya Sen calls the ideal theory transcendental institutionalism and calls non-ideal theory 
realisation-focused comparison.
99
 He criticises the ideal theory based on three desiderata. The 
first desideratum is that the sole purpose of the ideal theory is to prescribe for us perfectly 
just societies, and it does not tell us how to minimise injustice or pursue justice in our 
societies. Hence, ultimately, we cannot use the ideal theory as our basis of any practical 
reasoning.
100
 For Sen, although there may be a motivational link between the ideal theory and 
non-ideal theory, there is no analytic connection between the former and the latter, and we 
will be wrong to assume – as Rawls does - that we cannot do non-ideal theory without first 
having an ideal theory to guide us or to aim at.
101
  
 
The second desideratum is given that the ideal theory only focuses on the creation of a perfect 
society, it does not help us in comparing different societies as to how relatively just or unjust 
they are.
102
 Furthermore, Sen says rather than focusing on the relative comparisons of justice 
and injustice, the ideal theory focuses on perfect justice and attempts only to discover social 
features that we cannot transcend in the context of justice. Thus the ideal theory does not 
focus on comparing realistic societies which may not have the features of a perfect society. 
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For the ideal theory, the identification of the nature of ‘the just’ is what matters rather than 
searching for certain standards to determine how some alternative societies can be either less 
unjust, less just, more unjust or more just than others.
103
  
 
To illustrate his argument Sen relies on Social Choice Theory and performs a thought 
experiment in which two persons rank alternatives A, B and C according to their preferences. 
In one person’s scale of preference or order of ranking, A is ranked as first choice, B is the 
second choice and C is the third or last choice. In the other person’s scale of preference or 
order of ranking, A is also the first choice, but C is the second choice while B is the third or 
last choice. Aggregating the choices of the two persons given their orders of ranking, we only 
know that alternative A is preferable to both alternatives B and C. But their orders of ranking 
do not tell us whether B is preferable to C or vice versa.  
 
So Sen analogously says that “the fact that a person regards the Mona Lisa as the best picture 
in the world does not reveal how she would rank a Picasso against a van Gogh.”104 For Sen, it 
is neither sufficient nor helpful “to know that the Mona Lisa is the most perfect picture in the 
world when the choice is actually between a Dali and a Picasso.”105 In order words, no matter 
our conception of transcendence, whether as “the graded best” or “the gradeless right,” 
transcendental justice will still not help us in doing comparisons. Because in judging between 
two available alternatives there is no reason for us to have recourse to a totally different 
alternative as the “best” or “right” alternative.106 
 
The third desideratum is that the ideal theory focuses only on creating just institutions and 
totally neglects how individuals actually behave. So the ideal theory is unhelpful because “the 
presence of remediable injustice may well be connected with behavioural transgressions 
rather than with institutional short-comings....Justice is ultimately connected with the way 
peoples’ lives go, and not merely with the nature of the institutions surrounding them.”107 
Furthermore, Sen argues, given that it is not only institutions, but also non-institutional 
features such as the way people actually behave and their interaction with one another, which 
shape or determine the sort of society that will emerge from any institutional arrangements, 
                                                             
103
 Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2009: pp. 5-6. 
104
 Ibid. p. 101. 
105
 Ibid. p. 16. 
106
 Ibid. p. 101. 
107 Ibid. p. X. 
Page 42 of 252 
 
the ideal theory is wrong to be solely focused on creating just institutions without focusing 
directly on the actual societies that will ultimately result from those institutions.
108
  
 
Sen summed up the three desiderata as the feasibility and redundancy problems, and a need 
for a departure from an arrangement-focused approach to a realization-focused approach.
109
 
The arrangement-focused approach which Sen also refers to as transcendental institutionalism 
or niti is the ideal theory, while the realization-focussed approach which Sen also refers to as 
realization-focused comparison or nyaya is non-ideal theory.
110
   
 
The feasibility problem means that the ideal theory is infeasible because “there may be no 
reasoned agreement at all, even under strict conditions of impartiality and open-minded 
scrutiny...on the nature of the ‘just society.’”111 So, rather than focusing on ‘just society,’ the 
focus should be on how to compare relatively just or unjust societies which are the only 
alternatives we have. Consequently, the redundancy problem by which Sen means that ideal 
theory is redundant because by focusing on perfect justice and attempting only to discover 
social features that we cannot transcend in the context of justice, it does not help us to do 
relative comparisons of justice and injustice, and thus cannot help us to choose among 
realistic alternative societies.
112
 
 
The departure from an arrangement-focused approach to a realization-focused approach, for 
Sen, is necessary because we “need to focus on actual realizations and accomplishments of 
what are identified as the right institutions and rules.”113  Re-echoing his Capability 
Approach, Sen asks rhetorically, must our analysis of justice “be so confined to getting the 
basic institutions and general rules right? Should we not also have to examine what emerges 
in the society, including the kind of lives that people can actually lead, given the institutions 
and rules, but also other influences, including actual behaviour, that would inescapably affect 
human lives?”114 Of course we know what Sen’s answer to this rhetorical question is! 
                                                             
108
 Ibid. p. 6. 
109 Ibid. pp. 9-10. 
110 Nyaya, alongside niti, are classical Sanskrit terms for justice. “Among the principal uses of the term niti are 
organizational propriety and behavioural correctness. In contrast with niti, the term nyaya stands for a 
comprehensive concept of realized justice.” Ibid. p. 20. 
111
 Ibid. p. 9. 
112
 Ibid. 
113
 Ibid. p. 10. 
114 Ibid. 
Page 43 of 252 
 
The lynchpin of Sen’s argument is that while the ideal theory lacks the above desiderata, 
faces the feasibility and redundancy problems, and is merely an arrangement-focused 
approach, non-ideal theory has the desiderata, does not face the feasibility and redundancy 
problems and is a realization-focused approach. Hence, non-ideal theory, rather than the ideal 
theory, should be the proper approach to the theory of justice.  
My approach shall be non-ideal theory rather than the ideal theory. It is not because I think 
the ideal theory is so limited that it has no methodological importance or usability. Rather, it 
is because resource curse is necessarily, or by definition, or analytically, a case of non-
compliance or partial compliance, hence a problem for non-ideal theory. What non-ideal 
theory will help us do is to determine the causality of resource curse and assign responsibility 
to the causal agents. This I shall do on the different levels of analysis or on the different 
levels of causality and responsibility. 
 
1.2.2.  Interactional Moral Analysis and Institutional Moral Analysis 
According to Thomas Pogge, we have two distinct ways of analysing the social affairs or 
occurrences of our world. In the first way, we see the social affairs or occurrences 
“interactionally: as actions, and effects of actions performed by individual and collective 
agents.”115 In the second way, we see the social affairs or occurrences “institutionally: as 
effects of how our social world is structured and organized – of our laws and conventions, 
practices and social institutions.”116 Furthermore, Pogge argues, the above two ways of social 
analysis “entail different descriptions and explanations of social phenomena, and they also 
lead to two distinct kinds of moral analysis or moral diagnostics”117 referred to as, in the first 
way, interactional moral analysis, and in the second way, institutional moral analysis.
118
 
 
Before proceeding, let us note that interactional moral analysis and institutional moral 
analysis in moral philosophy, political philosophy or social philosophy, are not the same as 
process tracing per se especially as it is understood in political science in particular and social 
science in general. Although interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis 
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involve process tracing, the emphasis is not on the mere evidential, descriptive and sequential 
nature of the independent, dependent and intervening variables involved in the process. 
Rather the emphasis is on the moral nature of the evidence, description and sequence of the 
independent, dependent and intervening variables. This difference is shown below in the 
explication of process tracing and international moral analysis and institutional moral 
analysis. 
 
Process tracing, according to David Collier, is “the systematic examination of diagnostic 
evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator.”119 In other words, it “is an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal 
inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence— often understood as part of a temporal 
sequence of events or phenomena.”120 Process tracing has what may be called three corner-
stones, namely; evidence, description and sequencing. First, in terms of evidence, the sort of 
evidence that process tracing is concerned with is causal-process observations (CPO) which 
underlines the difference between qualitative research’s empirical foundation and quantitative 
research’s data-set observations, i.e., data matrices.121  
 
Second, in terms of description, “Process tracing inherently analyzes trajectories of change 
and causation, but the analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory 
are not adequately described. Hence, what in a sense is ‘static’ description is a crucial 
building block in analysing the process being studied.”122 Thirdly, in terms of sequencing, 
process tracing is especially attentive to the sequences of independent variables, dependent 
variables and intervening variables.
123
 
 
The main reason for doing process tracing is to ascertain whether some causal inference(s) 
can be said to be historically at once necessary and sufficient, necessary but insufficient, 
unnecessary but sufficient, or at once unnecessary and insufficient condition(s) for some 
certain event(s), occurrence(s) or situation(s). On these grounds, process tracing is subjected 
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to four empirical tests namely the straw-in-the-wind test, the hoop test, the smoking-gun test 
and the doubly decisive test.  
 
When a particular “hypothesis passes a straw-in-the-wind test, it only slightly weakens rival 
hypotheses; with hoop tests it somewhat weakens them; with smoking-gun tests it 
substantially weakens them; and with doubly decisive tests passing eliminates them.”124  
Nevertheless, since in social sciences it is frequently difficult to definitively eliminate a 
hypothesis,
125
  when doing process tracing we should always be conscious of the caveat that 
social science is not physical science and conclusions of process tracing are not mathematical 
certainties.  
 
In interactional moral analysis, rather than relying on the straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-
gun and doubly decisive tests to judge whether our causal inference is historically at once 
necessary and sufficient, necessary but insufficient, unnecessary but sufficient, or at once 
unnecessary and insufficient for certain event(s), occurrence(s) or situation(s), we focus on 
the morality, immorality or amorality of the actions and omissions of certain individual(s) or 
collectives in light of a given event, occurrence or situation. This event, occurrence, or 
situation might be a moral good, a moral bad, or a moral neutral, or might be harmful or not 
harmful. Often, the focus of interactional moral analysis is on harms done. So let us focus on 
harmful incidents for the purpose of illustration.  
We can trace a harmful incident to the action or omission of certain individuals or collectives. 
Even if these individuals or collectives are the sufferers of the harmful incident, we can still 
trace it back to them just as we can trace back the harmful incidents to other individuals or 
collectives who are not the sufferers of the harmful incident. Then, we make counterfactual 
assertions, or hypothesise, about whether the harmful incident would have occurred if 
particular individual(s) or certain collective(s) had not acted the way they did, or had not 
failed to act.  
In the next step, we analyse our hypothetical scenarios, hypothesis or counterfactual 
assertions to ascertain when any individual or collective agents ought not to have acted the 
way they did or ought to have acted when they failed to act. “This will involve us in 
examining whether any such agents could have foreseen that their conduct would lead to the 
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regrettable event and could also reasonably have averted the harm without causing substantial 
costs to themselves or to third parties.”126 Based on this analysis, we can determine whether 
any of the causally relevant agents is fully or only partially, and to what extent, responsible 
for the harmful incident.
127
  
This individual level of analysis (i.e. analysing the individual and collective agents) is not 
methodological individualism which says “social phenomena must be explained by showing 
how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to 
the intentional states that motivated the individual actors.”128 Rather, it is just a level of 
analysis which says while there are other levels of analysis, and there are other ways we can 
analyse social, political and economic activities and domestic and global activities, analysing 
the role of the individual helps in determining to what extent the individual agent qua 
individual agent causes anything or collective agents qua collective agents cause anything 
and to what extent they should be assigned responsibility.  
The method of analysis of institutional moral analysis is same as that of interactional moral 
analysis. The only difference is that the former analyzes institutions while the latter analyzes 
individual or collective agents. In institutional moral analysis, just like in interactional moral 
analysis, rather than relying on the straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking-gun and doubly 
decisive tests to judge whether our causal inference is historically at once necessary and 
sufficient, necessary but insufficient, unnecessary but sufficient, or at once unnecessary and 
insufficient for certain event(s), occurrence(s) or situation(s), we focus on the morality, 
immorality or amorality of the existing features of certain institutions or even the institutions 
themselves qua institutions in light of a given event, occurrence or situation.  
This event, occurrence, or situation might be a moral good, a moral bad, or a moral neutral, or 
might be harmful or not harmful. Like the interactional moral analysis, the focus of 
institutional moral analysis is often on harms done. So, just as we did in the case of 
interactional moral analysis, let us focus on harmful incidents for the purpose of illustration.  
We can trace a harmful incident to the existing features of certain institutions or the 
institutions themselves qua institutions. Then, we make counterfactual assertions, or 
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hypothesise, about whether the harmful incident would have occurred if particular existing 
features of certain institutions were different or if the institutions themselves qua institutions 
were differently shaped or formed. In the next step, we analyse our hypothetical scenarios, 
hypothesis or counterfactual assertions to ascertain whether any existing features of certain 
institutions ought to have been different or whether certain institutions ought to have been 
differently shaped or formed.  
 
Based on this analysis, we can determine whether any of the causally relevant features of the 
institutions or the institutions themselves qua institutions are fully or only partially, and to 
what extent, responsible for the harmful incident. To do this, we will have to examine 
“whether those responsible for the design of the relevant rules ... could have foreseen that 
these rules would lead to harm and could reasonably have formulated them differently 
without causing substantial harm elsewhere.”129 Based on this analysis, we can ascertain 
whether any of the causally relevant rules should have been different and whether any agent 
is responsible for the flaws in these rules that fully or only partially cause the deplorable 
incidents. Finally, we will then be able to determine the extent to which any agent is 
responsible for the deplorable incidents.
130
 
 
I will employ interactional moral analysis and institutional moral analysis in order to find out 
how and why Sub-Saharan Africa in general and Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) in particular are resource-cursed. This analysis of the moral and 
historical factors responsible for resource curse in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Nigeria, 
Angola and DRC, will show us how individual agents, collective agents, multinational 
corporations, governments or the state, and the global institutional order cause, engender, 
exacerbate or contribute to resource curse.  
 
1.2.3.  Levels of Analysis and Levels of Causality and Responsibility 
The two terminologies ‘levels of analysis’ and ‘levels of causality and responsibility’ have 
the same meaning and usage in this discussion. I am using the terminology ‘levels of 
causality and responsibility’ as a substitute for ‘levels of analysis.’ My preference lies in the 
former rather than the latter because the former has moral connotations and denotations while 
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the latter does not. In the course of our discussion, I shall be arguing that any actor or agent 
that contributes to causing resource curse is morally responsible on the ‘level’, and to the 
extent, the actor or agent contributes to causing resource curse.  
As shall be seen in the course of this discussion, the relevant actors or agents are individuals, 
collectives, corporations, the state and the global institutional order. Given that these actors or 
agents are not only morally responsible to the extent they contribute to causing resource 
curse, but are also morally responsible on the ‘analytic level’ they contribute to causing 
resource curse, my usage of levels of analysis is not value-neutral but laden with moral 
connotations and denotations. Hence, my substitution of the terminology ‘levels of analysis’ 
with ‘levels of causality and responsibility.’  
In the above vein, the individual, who might be working for a corporation or the state, is said 
to have a causal role and a corresponding moral responsibility when his/her actions and 
omissions are analysed as the actions and omissions of an individual rather than  as the 
actions and omissions of a corporation or the state. So also a corporation that is staffed and 
managed by individuals is said to have a causal role and a corresponding moral responsibility 
when its actions and omissions are analysed as actions and omissions of a corporation rather 
than as actions and omissions of individuals who acted or failed to act in the name of the 
corporation. The same analysis applies to collectives, the state and the global institutional 
order. 
As we shall see in chapters three, four and five, there are different factors and agents involved 
in causing resource curse. There is no one simple or single factor or agent that can be said to 
be the cause of resource curse; every single factor or agent is a contributing factor or 
contributing agent to causing resource curse. It is the combination of these contributors that 
result in resource curse. In spite of the complex and multiple nature of the cause of resource 
curse, it is still possible to understand what role different factors or agents play. Lumping all 
the factors and agents together and dealing with them merely as complex factors or seeing 
them only as multiple agents will not allow us to properly ascertain the causal role played by 
different agents and to assign responsibility to different agents based on their causal roles. It 
is for this reason that I shall analyse resource curse on different levels. Thus the levels of 
analysis or levels of causality and responsibility approach. 
Moreover, the levels of analysis, or levels of causality and responsibility, approach is not a 
misnomer. Social scientists are used to analysing various levels in order to ascertain 
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correlation or attribute causality to such levels. For instance, as Kenneth Waltz shows in 
Man, the State and War, this approach can be used to analyse the individual level (First 
Image) as classical realists have done, it can be used to analyse the role of the state (Second 
Image), and  can also be used to analyse the role of the international system (Third Image). 
Waltz himself did all the above analyses although he favours the international system (Third 
Image) analysis. So also I am dealing with different levels of analysis or different levels of 
causality and responsibility. 
Also, I am applying the notion of moral responsibility to corporations, the state and the global 
institutional order as if they were moral agents. One might argue that this sort of extension of 
the notion of moral responsibility is implausible, incorrect or even out-rightly wrong on the 
ground that corporations, the state and the global institutional order are not persons and it is 
only persons who can be moral agents. Nevertheless, before the notion of moral 
responsibility was applied to corporations, the state and the global institutional order, they 
were personified, i.e., seen as persons. Hence it was possible and plausible to treat them as 
moral agents.  
This personification of corporations, the state and the global institutional order is not out of 
place. Political realists treat states as rational actors in the international arena, and economists 
treat firms as rational actors in the market. Prima facie, states and firms are not persons, it is 
only persons that are rational, and so states and firms cannot be rational. Political realists and 
economists know this. But for theoretical purposes they treat states and firms as if they were 
persons and ascribe rationality to them. So also for theoretical purposes I treat corporations, 
the state and the global institutional order as if they were persons, and ascribe moral 
responsibility to them. 
As already mentioned, the different levels I shall be dealing with are the individual, the 
collective, the corporate, the state and the global institutional order. The analysis in the above 
levels will be used to show that neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is enough to understand 
and deal with the problem of resource curse. Consequently, this approach will justify our 
need of fusion of horizons; fusing the horizons of the two perspectives together in order to be 
able to understand and deal with the problem of resource curse. 
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1.2.4.     Fusion of Horizons 
Evidently, the concept of fusion of horizons has two key words; fusion and horizon. On the 
one hand, horizon can be understood as the point beyond which we cannot see.  On the other 
hand, fusion can be understood as the combination or joining together of two or more things. 
The above definitions have some connotations in the way I will employ the concept of fusion 
of horizons. However, I am not employing the concept in the above ordinary language sense 
of it. Rather I am employing it technically. So let us turn to Hans-Georg Gadamer, who, 
although did not originate the concept and its technical use, but is rightly notable for his use 
of the concept as the pivot of his hermeneutics. 
Gadamer’s notion of fusion of horizons is derived from his account of dialogue. According to 
this account, it is possible for a reader to have a dialogue with the text he or she reads; 
dialogue represents an active language or a language in action; and the fusion of horizons is 
the end-result of any successful dialogue.
131
 Building his hermeneutics on the foundation laid 
by Edmund Husserl’s and Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology, Gadamer sees fusion of 
horizons as the ideal way to conduct a dialogue. While Husserl focused on perception, 
Gadamer focused on linguistics. Hence the latter’s concern with dialogue.132 
Husserl opines that “Perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of perception, as 
perceptions we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception otherwise: if, for 
example, we turned our eyes that way instead of this, or if we were to step forward or to one 
side, and so forth.”133 Furthermore, he argues that there are three types of horizons, namely; 
internal horizon, external horizon and temporal horizon.   
 
Internal horizons are those characteristics that an object necessarily has because they are in 
the nature of the object. External horizons are those horizons that establish the relationship 
between an object and its environment. Temporal horizons denote the temporal nature or 
circumstances of the object. In other words, the internal horizon denotes the existence of the 
object - its nature. The external horizon denotes the special relations of the object to the 
environment. While the temporal horizon, cum the internal and external horizons, denote the 
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spatio-temporal nature of the object and its relations to time, space, other objects and its 
environment.
134
  
The temporal horizon, for Husserl, is more important than the internal and external horizons. 
He sees it to be the most important horizon because we see all objects as temporal objects, as 
objects that are not only extended in space but also in time.  Given that the inner horizon is 
made known to us by our common expectations of future disclosures about the object, and 
given that the outer horizon is made known to us as how the object relates to its surroundings, 
therefore temporality is the vital link between objects and other horizons. Furthermore, he 
argues that future disclosures and relations, including the history of the object that made the 
object the sort of object that it is and put it in the place where it is, are in essence temporal. 
Hence he argues that it is temporal horizon that makes other horizons possible.
135
   
In the vein of Husserl’s temporal horizon, Heidegger argues that time is “the possible horizon 
for any understanding of being.”136  Heidegger defines horizon as “that towards which each 
ecstasis
137
 is intrinsically open in a specific way…the open expanse towards which remotion 
itself is outside itself”138 (italics are original). But Gadamer would later argue, thirty-seven 
years after Truth and Method was first published, that the argument for the importance of 
temporal distance was not helpful in talking about the importance of “the otherness of the 
other” and the essential role that language plays as conversation.139 For him, interpretive 
distance needs not always be a historical distance, and it is not always temporal distance that 
helps us defeat erroneous memories and images and their resonance and warped uses. But 
temporal distance is still very helpful because it is only through temporal distance that certain 
changes are made apparent to us and certain differences become observable.
140
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Horizon, according to Gadamer, is “the range of vision that includes everything that can be 
seen from a particular vantage point.”141 While it is important to have a horizon, according to 
Gadamer, because “A person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence 
overvalues what is nearest to him,”142 it is not enough to have a horizon. It is even more 
important to fuse one’s horizon with other horizons. As Gadamer says, “Every finite present 
has its limitations. We define the concept of ‘situation’ by saying that it represents a 
standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of a situation is 
the concept of a ‘horizon.’”143 So the merely changing of stand points entails the possibility 
of having different horizons and the mere stepping out of our horizons entails the possibility 
of having broader horizons.  
It is apt to say that the technical sense of horizon entails the possibility of the gradual 
expansion of our range of vision. Consequently, it helps us not to be “limited by what is 
nearby, but to see beyond it.”144 After all, flexibility rather than rigidity is the defining 
characteristic of horizon. As Gadamer succinctly puts it, rather than being a non-shifting 
border line horizon actually shifts with us and encourages us to go forward.
145
   
Ultimately, Gadamer argues that “the historical movement of human life consists in the fact 
that it is never absolutely bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly 
closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with 
us. Horizons change for someone who is moving.”146 In a nutshell, fusion of horizons at once 
rejects objectivism and universalism. It rejects objectivism whereby we objectify the other’s 
horizon and discount ours or at the expense of ours. It rejects universalism whereby a singular 
horizon is the sole holder of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the whole truth. 
Consequently, it asserts that we are not closed-up in a closed horizon.
147
  
Fusion of horizons is not Hegelian dialectics of, say, being + nothingness = becoming or 
thesis + antithesis = synthesis which itself becomes a new thesis.  Nevertheless, fusion of 
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horizons occurs when individuals understand that the context of their discourse can be seen 
from a different perspective in order to reach a new conclusion.
148
  
The acquisition of novel information, or the development of a novel perception of the 
existing information, makes individuals revaluate their previous conclusions, make 
individuals aware of the limitations of their previous conclusions, help individuals gain novel 
understanding of their discourse, and supposedly leads to a fusion of the horizons of the 
individuals who are involved in the discourse.
149
 Hence the limitations of the previous 
conclusions are at least minimised, previous understanding is improved, new perspectives are 
formed and the formerly limited horizon becomes a broadened horizon.
150
  
For Gadamer, “it requires a special effort to acquire a historical horizon.”151 So, fusion of 
horizons is not a simple task. Naturally, given our high valuation of our stance, we would like 
to hold on to our stance even when rigorously challenged. It is only when we humbly realize 
that our stance is not, or should not be, absolute that we begin to entertain the possibility of 
fusion of horizons.  
Just as our stance is not or should not be absolute, so also the other stance is not or should not 
be absolute. So we are not invited to jettison our stance for the other stance, just as we are not 
asked to jettison the other stance for ours. We are only asked to fuse the two stances. Here it 
is assumed that both stances are not so absurd that they are worthless. They are assumed to be 
reasonable to the extent that there are plausible and positive elements within them that are 
worthwhile fusing.  
Eric Donald Hirsch, Jr. arguably poses the strongest criticism
152
 against the Gadamerian 
concept of fusion of horizons. He argues that the Gadamerian concept of horizon negates the 
possibility of any fusion of horizons. According to Hirsch, it is impossible for a person to 
fuse his or her own horizon and that of the text together. For such a fusion to happen, one 
must have understood the original perspective of the text and integrate it into one’s own 
perspective. Given that fusion of horizons cannot happen without one understanding the 
original perspective of the text, and given that once one understands the original perspective 
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of the text it is  automatically no longer beyond one’s horizon, then fusion of horizons is 
impossible.  
As Hirsch puts it, if the original perspective of the text is beyond our horizon, then we cannot 
understand the text. If this is the case, then fusion of horizons is impossible. As long as we 
are limited by our own horizon, then we cannot break the barrier of this limitedness in order 
to fuse our horizon with that of the text. Saying that we can break the barrier of this 
limitedness in order to fuse our horizon with the text is tantamount to saying that we were not 
in the first place limited at all. If so, then there was no horizon in the first place.
153
  
Hirsch would be right if Gadamer used horizon in the ordinary language sense of the word. 
But, like Husserl
154
 did in his phenomenology, Gadamer reconceptualises horizon to play a 
technical role in his hermeneutics. Like Husserl, Gadamer does not lay emphasis on the 
meaning of horizon as a limit.  Rather, he emphasizes horizon as that which we can enlarge,  
as that which gives us pointers to something else and somewhere else and as that which we 
can go outside of in order to reach some new place. Moreover: 
the ‘horizon’ is the larger context of meaning in which any particular meaningful 
presentation is situated. Inasmuch as understanding is taken to involve a ‘fusion of 
horizons’, then so it always involves the formation of a new context of meaning that 
enables integration of what is otherwise unfamiliar, strange or anomalous. In this 
respect, all understanding involves a process of mediation and dialogue between what 
is familiar and what is alien in which neither remains unaffected.
155
  
So, while horizon designates our particular limit at a particular time and place, it does not 
confine us to that limit. It leaves us the opportunity to walk ahead and see further.
156
  
Finally, as earlier noted, in my application of fusion of horizons to global justice, I am not 
employing the concept in the ordinary language sense of it. Rather I am employing it 
technically. I must also say that I am not following Gadamer dogmatically. It will be clear in 
the course of this dissertation that I am only using fusion of horizons to use the strengths of 
cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism and vice versa. In this case, 
although my use of the concept is an extension of Gadamer’s, the proper way to understand 
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my use of the concept is to take it as a flexible rather than a rigid, an adaptation rather than 
the original, and most of all, an application rather that a transfer or transposition, and a 
conversion rather than a transportation, of Gadamer’s fusion of horizons to global justice.  
For the purpose of my applied use, Gadamer’s fusion of horizons will be tilted from 
hermeneutics to global justice in the following two ways. Firstly, rather than use it as a mere 
value-neutral hermeneutic methodology for the interpretation of texts, my usage of it will be 
moral laden because global justice is inherently a moral issue. Secondly, I will not be using it 
as a mere hermeneutic theory of interpretation which is primarily aimed at helping us conduct 
dialogues and which sees a ‘successful’ dialogue as an end in itself. Consequently, the fusion 
of the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism will not be an end in itself but a means to 
determining or ascertaining causal roles and assigning moral responsibilities in complex 
cases of global justice.  
            
*** 
In this chapter I engaged in two kinds of discussion. In the first kind of discussion, I 
discussed the theoretical and conceptual differences between cosmopolitanism and statism. I 
preliminarily, but vitally, juxtaposed cosmopolitanism with statism. This was meant to 
achieve two objectives. First, it was aimed at giving us an overview of the various arguments 
cosmopolitans and statists use in defence of their perspectives. Second, it was aimed at 
showing us the large extent to which cosmopolitanism and statism are different, and the less 
extent to which they are similar.  
The second kind of discussion was aimed at discussing the methodological approach on 
which the rest of the discussion (the remaining chapters) will be hinged. In this discussion, 
firstly, I presented the distinction between Ideal Theory and Non-Ideal theory, and then 
showed why Non-Ideal Theory, rather than Ideal Theory, is more appropriate for our justice-
analysis in this dissertation. Secondly, Interactional Moral Analysis and Institutional Moral 
Analysis were explained. Then I showed why the two analyses, rather than one or none of 
them, will be used in our moral analysis in this dissertation. Thirdly, I discussed Levels of 
Analysis and explained why in the context of this dissertation I prefer to refer to it as Levels 
of Causality and Responsibility. Finally, I discussed Fusion of Horizons, explained my 
adoption of it from Hans-Georg Gadamer, and gave reasons for the adoption. 
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The juxtaposition of cosmopolitanism with statism in this chapter shall be continued in the 
next chapter. While the juxtaposition in this chapter is preliminary, the juxtaposition in the 
next chapter shall be detailed. In other words, while this chapter gave us insights into the 
cosmopolitan and statist discourse, the next chapter will elucidate those insights in detail. The 
next chapter is divided into six sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter presents an overview of 
cosmopolitanism and statism. The second and third sub-chapters discuss the views of two 
statists namely John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. The fourth and fifth sub-chapters discuss the 
views of two cosmopolitans namely Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. While the sixth sub-
chapter discusses Sebastiano Maffettone’s intermediary position between the cosmopolitan 
and the statist views.  
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2.0. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS IN DEFENCE OF COSMOPOLITANISM AND STATISM 
2.1.   Cosmopolitanism and Statism 
According to Sebastiano Maffettone, there are two ways of dividing or distinguishing 
between (normative) distinction lines of, or perspectives on, global justice. The first division 
or distinction, which is about the desideratum or desiderata on which justice is based (‘the 
grounds of justice’), is that between the relational and the non-relational.157 While the second 
division or distinction which is based on ‘the scope of justice’ is that between 
cosmopolitanism and statism.
158
  
The relational approach, as the name suggests, lays emphasis on the common relationships 
that link or bind subjects and agents of justice together.
159
 In other words, to use Maffettone’s 
terms, it is associative, it is a member-based approach.
160
 In its crudest
161
 sense, the relational 
approach can be described as follows. On the one hand, any subject and agent of justice that 
is not part of the aforementioned relationship, and any subject and agent that is not linked to 
the subjects and agents that are part of that relationship, such subject and agent has neither 
obligation nor right per se within the confines or jurisdiction of that relationship.  
On the other hand, any subject or agent of justice that is within that relationship, that is bound 
to that relationship, and that is linked to other subjects and agents in that relationship, has 
obligations and rights within the confines or jurisdiction of that relationship. Consequently, 
within the relationship, the subjects and agents who are related have duties toward one 
another and right-claims against one another; but have neither duty toward nor right-claims 
against the non-related. On the other hand, outside the relationship, the non-related have 
neither duties toward nor right-claims against the related.  
For the non-relational approach, unlike the relational approach, the conception of justice is 
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not dependent on any relationship between the subjects and agents of justice.
162
 Here, to say 
that the conception of justice is not based on any relationship means that it is not based on 
any special relationship such as compatriotism, citizenship, etc.
163
 The non-relational 
approach can base the conception of justice on humanity, (basic) human needs, natural 
prerogatives and sufferance, etc.
164
 According to Maffettone, while the non-relational 
approach is always cosmopolitan, the relational approach can be cosmopolitan, and can be 
statist.  
 
Non-relational cosmopolitanism asserts the global moral obligations of the subjects and 
agents of justice. While relational cosmopolitanism argues that inequality ought to be dealt 
with on the individual level on the grounds that injustice has to do with the relationships that 
bind together individual persons who are the inhabitants of the world. For the relational 
cosmopolitans, since injustice has to do with the relationship among individuals globally, the 
problem of inequality should be dealt with from the individual’s point of view.165  
 
Rejecting statism and arguing that the domestic basic structure is similar to the global basic 
structure, relational cosmopolitanism is hinged on the institutional argument “that there is a 
network of global structures which are able to create obligations for people and that are not so 
different from the obligations whose nature we usually associate with the State.”166 While 
statism, or relational statism, is not sanguine about global justice although it accepts the 
validity of certain human rights and the plausibility of humanitarian reasons to aid the worst-
off of the world.
167
 For the (relational) statists, it is erroneous to think of international 
relations as dealing with relationships among individuals rather than states. Since states are 
the predominant institutions of our world, we must focus on states if we want to discuss 
justice or injustice in our world.
168
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Apart from the above distinction (a distinction that is based on the grounds of justice) 
between relational cosmopolitanism and non-relational cosmopolitanism, there is a 
distinction between legal and moral cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism, on the one 
hand, defends “a concrete political ideal of a global order in which all persons have 
equivalent legal rights and duties, that is, are fellow citizens of a universal republic.”169 Moral 
cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, asserts “that all persons stand in certain moral relations 
to one another; we are required to respect one another’s status as ultimate units of moral 
concern.”170   
 
I shall concentrate on moral cosmopolitanism rather than legal cosmopolitanism for reasons I 
shall outline below. The major criticism levelled at legal cosmopolitanism is that it is 
committed to a universal republic – a world government which ‘‘would either be a global 
despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various 
regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy.’’171 For this reason, 
legal cosmopolitanism is seen as unrealistically utopian, intellectually implausible and 
practically unfeasible.  
 
Although in international law and political science legal cosmopolitanism is not utopian 
because it is not committed to a world government. The international law version of legal 
cosmopolitanism is different from the political philosophy one. But here, I am dealing with 
the political philosophy version rather than the international law version of legal 
cosmopolitanism. In a strict sense, legal cosmopolitanism is utopian as long as it is the 
political philosophy version.
172
  
 
Alongside the above criticism, another problem is that, as we know, that which is legal is not 
always necessarily morally right and that which is morally right is not always necessarily 
legal. For instance, in legal parlance, when that which is legal, say a judgement, is not 
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morally right, it is said to be procedural justice and not substantive justice. During the 
holocaust in Nazi-ruled Germany it was legal for Nazis to kill Jews but immoral. While it 
was legal to own slaves and sell slaves, and even abuse slaves – after all, slavery itself is an 
abuse, the very nature of slavery is inherently dehumanising in many ways and in many cases 
– today it is widely accepted that slavery is immoral.  
 
Also, apartheid in South Africa, racial segregation in the United States of America, etc. were 
legal but today widely accepted as immoral. In view of resource curse, the main problem 
concerning oil extraction and trade is not illegality but immorality. Many condemnable 
practices and activities in the extraction and trade are very legal but are very deplorable too. 
The conception of cosmopolitanism as legal cosmopolitanism will rather help justify such 
practices.  
 
Moral cosmopolitanism itself is divided into interactional moral cosmopolitanism and 
institutional moral cosmopolitanism. According to Pogge, institutional moral 
cosmopolitanism allocates indirect responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to 
institutional schemes while interactional moral cosmopolitanism allocates “direct 
responsibility for the fulfilment of human rights to other individual or collective agents.”173  
In other words, on the one hand the former postulates certain second-order fundamental 
principles of justice which apply to institutional schemes; “standards for assessing the ground 
rules and practices that regulate human interactions.”174 While on the other hand the latter put 
forward certain first-order fundamental normative principles which bypasses states and 
directly applies to the actions and omissions of persons and groups.
175
  
 
In the frame of interactional cosmopolitanism the obligors of duties will all be humans and 
must be in a position to be able to carry out the duties. Correspondingly, “human right(s) 
...will be right(s) whose beneficiaries are all humans and whose obligors are all humans in a 
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position to effect the right(s).”176 Furthermore, in the frame of interactional cosmopolitanism, 
“human rights impose constraints on conducts” while in the frame of institutional 
cosmopolitanism, human rights “impose constraints upon shared practices.”177 Despite the 
difference between institutional and interactional cosmopolitanism, Pogge says they are not 
mutually exclusive hence it is possible to combine the two.  
 
As an example of the successful combination of institutional and interactional 
cosmopolitanism, Pogge refers to the work of Rawls – although Rawls is by no means a 
cosmopolitan. Starting with what Pogge deems institutional cosmopolitan arguments, Rawls 
defends “a natural duty to uphold and promote just institutions.”178 Then, combining this with 
what Pogge deems interactional cosmopolitan argument, Rawls also defends different types 
of natural duties which are not dependent on shared institutions. These natural duties include 
the duty of mutual assistance, the duty of the avoidance of harm and brutality, the duty of the 
establishment of just institutions where they are lacking, etc.
179
   
 
In view of the foregoing discussion my focus shall not be on the categorization of 
perspectives on global justice as relational and non-relational approaches. Rather, my focus is 
on the other categorization of perspectives on global justice as cosmopolitanism and statism. 
Although there are different strands of statism, I shall deal with statism holistically. As 
already mentioned, although there are legal cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism, my 
focus shall be on the latter rather than the former or rather than both. And although there are 
interactional moral cosmopolitanism and institutional moral cosmopolitanism, I shall deal 
with moral cosmopolitanism holistically.  
 
On statism, I will focus on two thinkers namely John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. I shall focus 
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on Rawls because his The Law of Peoples is arguably the most important work on statism in 
the last century. One might contend that Rawls is not a statist, but I hold a contrary view. 
Samuel Freeman argues that “Rawls’s recognition of the duty to assist burdened 
peoples...renders his Law of Peoples a so-called ‘weak’ cosmopolitan position.”180 When 
taken sui generis, read in isolation or understood out of context, the duty of assistance can 
easily make one think that Rawls is a weak cosmopolitan. However, looking at the following 
reasons I give for arguing that Rawls is a statist, one will realize that in the context of The 
Law of Peoples what the duty of assistance makes Rawls is not a weak cosmopolitan but 
rather a weak statist.  
 
Firstly, according to Rawls himself, the difference between cosmopolitanism and the Law of 
Peoples is that cosmopolitanism, rather than being concerned with whether societies are just 
or unjust, is ultimately concerned with individuals’ well-being and consequently how to make 
the lives of the worst-off individuals in the world better-off. But the Law of Peoples, unlike 
cosmopolitanism, is not concerned with individuals. It is rather concerned with the justice 
and order of well-ordered peoples.
181
  
 
Secondly, as Beitz says, Rawls’ Law of Peoples is the most sophisticated thesis on the side of 
social liberalism in the global justice debate. 
182
 By social liberalism Beitz simply means 
statism – although he did not use the term ‘statism.’ After all, the term ‘social liberalism’ was 
only used by Bietz ‘for want of a better term.’  His definition, or rather description, of social 
liberalism reveals that it is synonymous with statism. He says social liberalism holds the view 
that the international system is populated by states, that international relations principles only 
apply to states, and that international relations principles are justified only by the 
consideration of the interests of states.
183
  
 
Then Beitz goes on to say that cosmopolitan liberalism is the most famous alternative view to 
social liberalism. Of course by cosmopolitan liberalism he means cosmopolitanism. He says 
while the cosmopolitan view - like social liberalism - is logically consistent with a world that 
is populated by domestic societies or states, but - unlike social liberalism - it does not grant 
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domestic societies or states any moral privilege over persons or individuals.  The logical 
consistency of the cosmopolitan view with a world populated by domestic societies is only at 
face value. Because, for the cosmopolitan view, our social world is not composed of peoples 
as Rawls would have it; it is rather composed of persons.
184
 Consequently, cosmopolitanism, 
unlike Rawls’ Law of Peoples, holds the view that international relations principles should 
apply to persons and be justified based on the consideration of the interests of persons.
185
  
 
Thirdly, Beitz also says that the major theoretical difference between Rawls’ Law of Peoples 
and cosmopolitanism is that, unlike the latter, the former is inclined towards regarding 
peoples as independent moral agents.
186
 For cosmopolitanism, it is only individuals, and not 
domestic societies, who are moral agents in their own right.  
 
Fourthly, Nagel says, “If Rawls is right, perhaps there can be something that might be called 
justice or injustice in the relations between states, but it bears only a distant relation to the 
evaluation of societies themselves as just or unjust: for the most part, the idea of a just world 
for Rawls would have to be the idea of a world of internally just states.”187 In other words, 
unlike cosmopolitans who recognise individuals, Rawls only recognises ‘peoples’ and not 
individuals in his global justice discourse. 
 
Fifthly, and finally, Nagel also says there are two conceptions of global justice; the one or 
first conception is cosmopolitanism while the other or second conception is the political 
conception – by which he means statism. “Unlike cosmopolitanism, the second 
conception...is exemplified by Rawls’ view,” and in this conception the existence of 
sovereign states “is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting the 
fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of 
humanity.”188 Hence Nagel concludes that this conception reaches the same conclusion as 
Hobbes: justice is only applicable within the state; outside the state there is no justice.
189
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Nagel is the second statist I shall focus on because of the sheer influence which his article, 
“The Problem of Global Justice”, has had on the discourse on statism in particular and the 
debate on global justice in general. Given that he is the founder of statism, Thomas Hobbes’ 
idea shall permeate this focus although I will not particularly focus on him. Mentioning 
Hobbes echoes (political) realism. Although political realism and statism have a great deal of 
similarity, they are not quite the same.  
 
The obvious similarities are that both are state-centric and deny the existence of justice at the 
international or global arena. Also the obvious difference is that while statism is a perspective 
on global justice, realism is an IR theory. Cosmopolitanism is the main opponent of statism, 
while liberalism (an IR theory) is the main opponent of realism. Given the close resemblance 
statism shares with realism, they are easily - albeit erroneously - taken to be the same thing. 
But they are not. Hence, here, statism should not be misconstrued for realism.  
 
On cosmopolitanism, I will focus on two thinkers namely Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. I 
will focus on Beitz because his very influential Political Theory and International Relations, 
arguably, contributed to the establishment of the sub-sub-discipline of global justice in 
particular and the sub-discipline of international political philosophy in general. Furthermore, 
he was one of the first to globalize Rawls’ theory of justice.  
 
I will focus on Pogge not just because he also globalized Rawls’ theory of justice, but more 
importantly because he is one of the finest cosmopolitans and global justice thinkers today. 
Arguably relational cosmopolitanism is more prominent than non-relational cosmopolitanism 
on the cosmopolitan side of the debate on global distributive justice. “Charles Beitz and 
Thomas Pogge are the most well-known authors of relational cosmopolitanism.”190 For this 
key reason, alongside the above reasons, my discussion on cosmopolitanism shall dwell on 
Beitz and Pogge rather than other cosmopolitans.  
 
For Beitz and Pogge (at least in Political Theory and International Relations in the case of 
the former, and in Realizing Rawls and “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples” in the case of the 
latter), just as the state is a vehicle for social cooperation so also the international system is a 
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vehicle for social cooperation due to the extent of globalization and interconnectivity. More 
importantly, for them, the basic structure does not only exist on the domestic level, it also 
exists on the global level. Hence just as the domestic basic structure ensures that the 
inviolability of persons is respected domestically, so also the global basic structure should 
ensure that the inviolability of persons is respected globally.  
Following the above line of argument perhaps it will not be far-fetched to say that for Beitz 
and Pogge cosmopolitanism would see the whole world as a global basic structure. According 
to Pogge, all cosmopolitan positions have three elements in common namely individualism, 
universality and generality.
191
 Individualism posits that “the ultimate units of concern are 
human beings or persons”192 (emphasis is original). Universality posits that “the status of 
ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally”193 (emphasis is 
original). While generality posits that everyone is an ultimate unit of concern for everyone.
194
  
In conclusion, Beitz and Pogge on the cosmopolitanism side, and Rawls and Nagel on the 
statism side, bring to fore the dichotomy between the two distinction-lines in global justice. 
Hence focusing on the four of them gives us a two-fold advantage. First, it helps us deal with 
some of the most original and salient arguments in the global justice debate. Second, it helps 
us create a balance in terms of juxtaposing cosmopolitanism with statism. On his part, 
Sebastiano Maffettone forges the bridging of that dichotomy by arguing for ‘reconciliation’ 
of both sides in order to arrive at a neutral and an intermediary position. So an extra focus on 
Maffettone will be an added advantage.  
 
2.2.    John Rawls’ Law of Peoples 
To understand properly The Law of Peoples it is pertinent that one studies or reads A Theory 
of Justice and Political Liberalism. This is because The Law of Peoples is, more or less, a 
sequel to A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. While A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism can be studied independently of the The Law of Peoples, I opine that The 
Law of Peoples may not be studied independently of A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism because as Rawls says, The Law of Peoples is “the culmination of my reflections 
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on how reasonable citizens and peoples might live together peacefully in a just world.”195  
Nevertheless, having already summarily discussed the relationship between A Theory of 
Justice and The Law of Peoples in chapter 1.1, I will not give any further overview or 
background of A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. I will confidently assume that 
my readers are familiar with the books and the debates they have generated.  
 
A key characteristic of the Law of Peoples is that it is a realistic utopia. In Rawls’s words, the 
scenario described in The Law of Peoples is realistic because “it could and may exist. I say it 
is also utopian and highly desirable because it joins reasonableness and justice with 
conditions enabling citizens to realize their fundamental interests.”196 In other words, it is 
realistic in that it accommodates the real situation of our world, it deals with people, 
institutions and the world as they are, and it is actually practicable or can be applied to 
international political structures of our world. It is also utopian because it points to what 
international political arrangements ought to be.  
 
The Law of Peoples is geared towards showing “how a world society of liberal and decent 
peoples might be possible.”197 In other words, The Law of Peoples is geared towards the 
formulation of the framework of the foreign policy of well-ordered peoples. So it is no 
surprise that the model, in terms of methodology, Rawls uses in The Law of Peoples is the 
one he first used in Political Liberalism.
198
 The difference is that while in Political 
Liberalism the model is used for domestic liberal democracies, in The Law of Peoples the 
model is used in the international relations of well-ordered societies.  
 
The Law of Peoples is divided into four parts. The first and second parts deal with the ideal 
theory. The third part deals with non-ideal theory. The fourth part is the conclusion. Also, to 
the book itself - The Law of Peoples - rather than to the principles, Law of Peoples, Rawls 
added another part titled “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” In terms of methodological 
procedure, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls started from the ideal theory and then proceeded to 
non-ideal theory. The ideal theory explicates the principles of the Law of Peoples. While the 
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non-ideal theory deals with just war doctrine (jus ad bellum and jus in bello), outlaw states, 
burdened societies and global distributive justice. 
 
According to Rawls, “By the ‘Law of Peoples’ I mean a particular political conception of 
right and justice that applies to the principles of right and justice and norms of international 
law and practice.”199 Rawls distinguishes among reasonable liberal people, decent people, 
outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms. Reasonable liberal people and 
decent people are referred to as well-ordered peoples.
200
 But outlaw states, burdened societies 
and benevolent absolutisms lack the moral characteristics of well-ordered peoples, hence they 
are not well-ordered.  
 
By definition or description, reasonable liberal people are liberal democracies. Decent people 
are people who, although do not qualify as liberal people, are externally neither aggressive 
nor expansionist, and internally respect human rights.
201
  Outlaw states are expansionist and 
aggressive, internally they meet no requirements of well-ordered peoples and externally they 
threaten the peace of others. Burdened societies, unlike outlaw states, are neither expansionist 
nor aggressive. Nevertheless, they lack the means to be well-ordered due to unfavourable 
historical, social, cultural, political and economic factors.
202
  While benevolent absolutisms 
respect most human rights but do not allow their members any significant participation in the 
process of political decision making. Hence they are not well-ordered.
203
   
 
Rawls’ focus was on liberal people. So, compared to how he dealt with liberal people, he 
sparingly dealt with other categories. Although Rawls devotes a reasonable amount of time to 
dealing with decent people, he mainly does so to show how liberal people should relate to 
decent people. To show how such relationship should be, Kazanistan, a decent hierarchical 
people, is given as an example of decent people.  
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Even outlaw states were only sparingly dealt with.
204
 He mainly dealt with outlaw states in 
terms of the grounds on which liberal and decent peoples should intervene in outlaw states. 
Furthermore, he mainly dealt with burdened societies in terms of the grounds on which they 
should be helped by liberal and decent peoples. Finally, apart from telling us what benevolent 
absolutisms are, he did not go into details to deal with them. 
 
To liberal peoples Rawls assigns three fundamental characteristics namely: they have “a 
reasonably just constitutional democratic government”; they are “citizens united by common 
sympathies”; and they have “a moral nature.”205 Although decent peoples are considered to 
be well-ordered, they are still not (thoroughly) liberal because they fail to guarantee all, but 
only guarantee some, of the human rights that liberal people guarantee.
206
 Internationally they 
are neither aggressive nor expansionist, and domestically they “respect human rights and 
impose certain moral duties on all individuals through a system that, being governed 
according to a broadly shared conception of the good, administers justice in a reasonable 
egalitarian way.”207 While the above qualities qualify decent peoples to be called decent, yet 
they are not qualified to be called liberal.  
 
The enforcement of rights is not only what makes liberal peoples distinctive. They only go to 
war in extreme or ‘urgent’ cases (particularly against out-law states), for example, in cases of 
self-defence and extreme violation of human rights and principles. And they have a duty of 
assistance to burdened societies. Rawls does not consider burdened societies to be outlaw 
states because they are neither aggressive nor expansionist. However, since they lack the 
necessary conditions to become well-ordered, well-ordered people have a duty of assistance 
to assist them in order for them to be well-ordered. In other words, burdened societies are to 
be helped by liberal and decent peoples in providing the necessary conditions that will help 
them qualify to be part of well-ordered peoples.
208
  
 
Finally, the ultimate goal or the long-term project of the Law of Peoples is to eliminate such 
evils as unjust wars, genocide, mass extermination, starvation, abject poverty, religious 
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bigotry, violation of liberty of conscience and all forms of oppression.
209
 For Rawls, since 
these evils are products of political injustice, the elimination of political injustice – especially 
the worst forms of political justice – will help in eliminating these evils.  
 
But for political injustice to be eliminated, just social policies, or decent social policies at 
least, must be followed and just social institutions, or decent social institutions at least, must 
be established.
210
  The foreign policy of liberal people ensures that they follow just social 
policies and establish just social institutions. While the foreign policy of decent people 
ensures that they at least follow decent social policies and establish decent social institutions. 
Hence liberal people and decent people are committed to eliminating political injustice and 
ultimately the aforementioned evils.
211
 
 
Given that The Law of Peoples is not about outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent 
absolutisms, but rather about well-ordered people especially liberal people, with the 
particular aim of the derivation of principles that will guide their international affairs 
especially the foreign policy of liberal people, Rawls’ first focus was on liberal peoples. To 
derive the principles that will determine or guide the international relations of liberal people, 
Rawls had recourse to his notion of the original position. Albeit in this case he has two 
original positions rather than one. The first is the familiar one which is applicable to domestic 
democratic liberal societies. In this first original position, representatives of individuals or 
citizens behind the veil of ignorance choose impartial principles that will govern the affairs of 
their domestic liberal people.
212
  
 
In the second original position, as postulated in The Law of Peoples, the representatives of 
peoples stand behind a veil of ignorance to choose the principles that will govern foreign 
relations, and to choose the organizations that will facilitate different aspects of foreign 
relations. Furthermore, Rawls argued that decent people would choose the same principles 
and organizations chosen by liberal peoples. Hence the third original position in which 
representatives of decent people stand behind a veil of ignorance to choose the principles that 
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will govern their foreign relations and to choose the organizations that will facilitate different 
aspects of foreign relations. 
 
In summary, there are three original positions. The first original position is the domestic one 
for liberal democratic people in which individuals or citizens are represented. The second 
original position is the international one for liberal peoples in which peoples, rather than 
individuals or citizens, are represented. While the third original position is the international 
one in which decent peoples are represented. Rawls refers to the first original position as the 
‘first use’ of the original position while he refers to the second original position as the 
‘second use’ of the original position.213 Given that the third original position or the ‘third use’ 
is merely an extension of the second original position or the ‘second use,’ Rawls would 
continue to refer to the first and second original positions or the first and second uses without 
reference to the third original position or the third use. So, hereafter, I shall do likewise. 
 
In establishing the Law of Peoples, Rawls says we start “with principles of political justice 
for the basic structure of a closed and self-contained liberal democratic society. We then 
model the parties in a second but appropriate original position in which, as representatives of 
equal peoples, they select the principles of the law of peoples for the society of well-ordered 
peoples.”214 In this second original position, Rawls argued that both liberal and decent 
peoples would accept the same Law of Peoples. But some differences between the first and 
second uses of the original position are glaring.  
 
While individuals are the subject of the first use of the original position, peoples are the 
subject of the second use of the original position - albeit peoples are represented by their 
representatives who of course are individuals.  Also while the first use of the original position 
is in the domestic context, the second use of the original position is in the international 
context. More importantly, as Rawls notes, there are three key differences between the first 
and second uses of the original position: 
(1)             A people of a constitutional democracy has, as a liberal people, no 
comprehensive doctrine of the good...whereas individual citizens within a 
liberal domestic society do have such conceptions, and to deal with their needs 
as citizens, the idea of primary goods is used. 
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(2)             A peoples’ fundamental interests as a people are specified by its political 
conception of justice and the principles in the light of which they agree to the 
Law of Peoples, whereas citizens’ fundamental interests are given by their 
conception of the good and their realizing to an adequate degree their two 
moral powers. 
(3)             The parties in the second original position select among different formulations 
or interpretations of the eight principles of the Law of Peoples as illustrated 
for the restrictions of the two powers of sovereignty.
215
 
 
Consequently, on the one hand the first original position allows room for individuals to 
choose from alternative principles of justice in which justice as fairness is an alternative. On 
the other hand, the second original position does not present representatives of peoples with 
different alternatives to choose from apart from different formulations of the Law of 
Peoples.
216
 Furthermore, just as Rawls rejects utilitarianism in the first original position, so 
also he rejects utilitarianism in the second original position. While he argues that individuals 
in the first original position will choose justice as fairness rather than utilitarianism or any 
other principle of justice, he does not present utilitarianism as an alternative - not even as an 
implausible, irrational or unreasonable alternative - to the eight principles of the Law of 
Peoples.
217
  
 
Although Rawls allows that some other principles can be added to the eight principles which 
he said will be chosen in the second use of the original position, he holds that his eight 
principles will be chosen. In deriving the principles, just as “in examining the distributive 
principles in justice as fairness we begin with the baseline of equality,” in examining the 
principles of Law of Peoples we also begin with equality but “the equality of and the equal 
rights of all peoples.”218 The principles are: 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be  
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
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5. Peoples have the right to self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other  
than self-defence. 
6. Peoples are to honour human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war 
8. Peoples have the duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that  
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
219
  
 
Since I am dealing with global distributive justice rather than other sorts of global justice, 
rather than focus on other aspects of The Law of Peoples I shall focus on the eighth principle 
namely: “Peoples have the duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions 
that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime”;220 or in short the ‘duty 
of assistance.’221  
Rawls says following a principle of distributive justice to address social and economic 
inequalities in societies is not necessarily the only way or even the best option to choose 
when well-ordered peoples are carrying out their duty of assistance towards burdened 
societies. For Rawls, the problem with principles of distributive justice is that most of them 
do not have a particular aim or threshold at which assistance will stop.
222
 Remember the 
reason for assistance is that burdened societies lack the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
be well-ordered, and well ordered people are to help provide those conditions. So once those 
conditions are met, the assistance should stop. According to Rawls, on the contrast between 
cosmopolitanism and the Law of Peoples, it is this threshold that differentiates the Law of 
Peoples from cosmopolitanism.
223
  
To illustrate the problem with cosmopolitan principles of global distributive justice, Rawls 
imagines two hypothetical scenarios. In the first hypothetical scenario, two societies, say, 
society A and society B started off with the same amount of resources or wealth at the same 
threshold. Since societies A and B are either liberal or decent, they are both well-governed. 
Society A industrializes and maximizes its savings, but society B remains agrarian and 
engages in a life of leisure. Hence, after some decades, society A’s wealth doubles that of 
society B.  
                                                             
219
 Ibid. p. 37. 
220
 Ibid. 
221
 Ibid. p. 106. 
222
 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. p. 120. 
Page 73 of 252 
 
According to Rawls, global distributive justice or cosmopolitanism would demand that 
society A should be redistributing its wealth to society B until society B becomes as wealthy 
as society A.
224
  For Rawls, this is wrong. Hence, the Law of Peoples, rather than 
cosmopolitanism, should be opted for. In other words, the eighth principle or duty of 
assistance, rather than global distributive justice, should be opted for.  
In the second hypothetical scenario, two societies, say, society A and society B started off 
with the same amount of resources or wealth at the same threshold. Since societies A and B 
are either liberal or decent, they are both well-governed. Both societies have rather high 
population growth. And both societies respect the human rights of women or provide the 
elements of equal justice for them. Society A stresses these human rights or elements of 
justice so that its women flourish economically and politically. This leads to lower birth rate 
per woman which in turn drives the population growth to zero. Hence Society A is able to 
increase its level of wealth in the long run.  
But Society B’s population growth was not reduced because its women cherish certain 
religious beliefs and social values which encourage high birth rate. So, after some decades, 
society A’s wealth doubles that of society B.225 According to Rawls, global distributive 
justice or cosmopolitanism would demand that society A should be redistributing its wealth 
to society B until society B becomes as wealthy as society A.
226
  Again, for Rawls, this is 
wrong. Hence, the Law of Peoples, rather than cosmopolitanism, should be opted for. In other 
words, the eighth principle or duty of assistance, rather than global distributive justice, should 
be opted for.  
The Rawlsian illustrations above are quite comprehensible if we consider the three guidelines 
Rawls says should be followed in carrying out the duty of assistance. The first guideline 
reveals the similarities between the principle or duty of just savings in domestic liberal 
societies in A Theory of Justice and the duty of assistance in The Law of Peoples.
227
 The 
guideline is to note that a society does not have to be wealthy in order to be well-ordered.
228
 
Rawls believes that “A society with few natural resources and little wealth can be well-
ordered if its political traditions, law, and property and class structure with their underlying 
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religious and moral beliefs and culture are such as to sustain a liberal or decent society.”229 
Although some societies are wealthier than others, it is not the aim of the duty of assistance to 
redistribute wealth in order to increase or maximize the wealth of burdened societies or 
equalize wealth among societies. After all, just as it is not all well-ordered peoples that are 
wealthy, so also it is not all burdened societies that are poor. Rawls argues that except in very 
few cases, generally there is no society that will not be well-ordered if it is well-governed.
230
 
The second guideline is to note that the political culture of a society determines its poverty or 
wealth level or status. Rawls famously asserts “that the causes of the wealth of a people and 
the form it takes lies in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral 
traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in 
the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political 
virtues.”231 So, well-ordered peoples have no easy way or formula to change the socio-
political culture of burdened societies.  
Given that the economic status or condition of a society is dependent on its political culture, 
foreign aid in form of fund dispensation will not help change the economic condition of a 
society because a mere dispensation of fund cannot change a society’s political culture.232 But 
emphasising on human rights could change the behaviour of the rulers which will in turn 
make them considerate of their people’s well-being.233  
The third and final guideline is to note that the duty of assistance is meant “to help burdened 
societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to 
become members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”234 This is what Rawls refers to as 
‘the target of assistance’; when reached, assistance is to be stopped even if the formerly 
burdened society (now well-ordered) is still relatively economically poor.
235
 So, when 
carrying out the duty of assistance, the well-ordered people must not treat burdened societies 
paternalistically but rather respect their freedom and equality which are the ultimate goals of 
the duty of assistance.
236
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Due to the ‘target of assistance’ argument, many criticisms have been levelled at Rawls’ Law 
of Peoples. But it is not only because of the ‘target of assistance’ that Rawls’ Law of Peoples 
has been criticised. Also, due to the other assertions in the previous paragraphs, there have 
been many criticisms levelled at The Law of Peoples. I will not attempt to consider all of the 
criticisms here, but I will dwell on the most salient ones.  
(i) 
Critics have argued that Rawls’ dependence on the traditional Westphalian notion of states 
and international relations is problematic and even the notion is somewhat out of tune with 
current global realities. Andrew Hurrell and others have argued that given the level of 
globalization and other forms of integration in our world today, international factors in many 
ways affect the way a society is shaped. So to talk of peoples as if they were a distinctively 
separate state does not reflect the situation of our world.
237
  
Certainly, a look at regional organizations, especially the European Union, and a look at other 
organizations or institutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, African Union, etc. will reveal to us that apart from globalization - which has clearly 
figuratively removed boundaries of state - such institutions and organizations as mentioned 
above have made states figuratively less sovereign and more confederated.  
However, Rex Martin and David Reidy contend that although The Law of Peoples’ view of 
international relations is Westphalian, it is not merely Westphalian, it also goes beyond the 
Westphalian view. In other words, although Rawls starts with the Westphalian view of 
international relations, he goes beyond that view.
238
 Rawls contends that peoples are different 
from states in that while states are seen as merely rational, peoples are at once rational and 
reasonable. Hence while states do not respect the priority of rights, on the contrary peoples 
respect the priority of rights.
239
  
Nevertheless, as Sebastiano Maffettone notes, the notion of peoples is closer to the notion of 
states than to the notion of individuals. While political realists prefer the notion of states, 
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cosmopolitans prefer the notion of individuals.
240
 Hence, we can deduce that Rawls is closer 
to political realists than cosmopolitans. In support of Rawls, Samuel Freeman argues that The 
Law of Peoples is not meant to address issues of global justice. Rather it is meant to 
formulate a foreign policy for liberal democracies that will guide them in their relationships 
with one another and with non-liberal democracies.  
Also, Joseph Heath argues that The Law of Peoples is an attempt to counter political realism 
which is inclined to discounting moral principles from international relations, and not an 
attempt to formulate principles for global justice. Hence, Freeman and Heath opine that the 
criticisms that Rawls gives no consideration to issues of justice are misplaced.
241
  
(ii) 
Thomas Pogge and Andrew Kuper have argued that Rawls’ conception of peoples and the 
way he attempted to use it in The Law of Peoples is flawed. It is common knowledge that 
most countries in the world are populated by more than one ‘people’, and it is also 
abundantly evident that many people have different affiliations and identities.
242
  
      (iii) 
In the second original position well-ordered peoples are free and equal. The principle of 
reciprocity guides the relationships of well-ordered peoples. Accordingly, peoples have the 
duty to respect one another’s interests concerning their choice to remain independent and to 
have the benefit of self-respect.
243
 Andrew Kuper, among others, argues that peoples have all 
sorts of citizens with different beliefs and political leanings. So in decent hierarchical 
peoples, there will be citizens who have liberal ideas but will be suppressed by the peoples.  
If as Rawls says, that decent peoples should be tolerated and not interfered with, then this will 
have to be done to the detriment of liberal values because liberal peoples will be tolerating 
decent hierarchical peoples who are suppressing liberal values and the individuals who hold 
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such values. In other words, Rawls is in a way granting to illiberal peoples the right to 
suppress its citizens who are liberal. Even when the liberal citizens are the majority, the 
decent hierarchical people has thus been given the legitimacy to oppress or suppress them.  
It is on the above note that Darrel Mollendorf argues that in a bid to get foreign policy that 
favours almost every people, Rawls readily sacrifices justice.
244
 While Bruce Ackerman 
argues that The Law of Peoples is merely nothing but a modus vivendi between liberal 
democracies and illiberal regimes.
245
   However, Leif Wenar argues that Rawls is much more 
concerned with the legitimacy of liberal people using their coercive apparatus to deal with 
other peoples rather than concerned with ideas such as human rights, justice, etc.
246
  
The logic of Wenar’s argument is that in the international system a peaceful and stable 
environment is a precondition for justice. To think that justice can flourish in the international 
system in the absence of peace is not to know the value of peace and stability. It can be safe 
to say that peace and stability are prior to justice, and if so, Rawls is right to focus on peace 
and stability rather than justice.
247
 The stability envisioned by the Law of Peoples is different 
from that of political realists. While political realists’ model of stability is based on balance 
of power or modus vivendi, the model of stability envisioned by the Law of Peoples is based 
on the respect of principles,
248
 namely the principle of independence (non-intervention except 
in ‘urgent’ cases) and the principle of self-respect.  
(iv) 
Pogge, contra Rawls, is of the view that although the life style of citizens and especially the 
political culture of a people contribute to the economic conditions of a people, they are not 
the sole factors. Sometimes and in some cases, perhaps even in many cases, they are not the 
most important factors. The most important factors are international and external. Hence 
Rawls is mistaking when he thinks the economic condition of a people is solely based on the 
people, and to see a people in Westphalian terms as utterly independent of other peoples is 
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mistaking. This argument of Pogge is based on what he refers to as international borrowing 
privilege and international resource privilege
249
 
To illustrate how developed countries determine the economic conditions of poor countries to 
a large extent, Pogge employed the notions of international borrowing privilege and 
international resource privilege
250
 which can be explained in the following way. The 
international community often pays no attention to the fact that a leadership of a poor country 
is corrupt, dictatorial, etc. As long as the leadership is in charge of the state, it is recognized 
and accepted by the international community as having the legitimate authority at once to sell 
the resources of the state and to borrow on behalf of the state.  
As usually happens with poor states with corrupt leaders, a huge part of the funds realized 
from the selling of the resources goes into the private pockets of the corrupt leaders and so 
also a huge percentage of any money borrowed goes into their private pockets at the expense 
of the people. These two situations worsen the conditions of poor states, encourage rogues to 
want to come to power because of the benefits, and even when a democratic leader does 
eventually come to power, s/he will be left with a huge debt to pay and sometimes depleted 
resources.  
Given the above scenario, the poor state in question cannot be said to have been insulated 
from the wealthy states and the wealthy states do not have the moral justification to insulate 
or isolate themselves from the problems of the poor state. In this case, the Westphalian notion 
of state, which Rawls adopted, fails to capture the interdependence of states. Rawls, having 
adopted that notion, is also guilty of turning a blind eye to this interdependence.
251
 However, 
Samuel Freeman argues that actually the sort of countries described by Pogge which stand in 
a position of oppressors in the international system are the sort of states that are referred to as 
out-law states in The Law of Peoples, and as such, liberal peoples are not to extend their 
policy of tolerance to them.
252
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(v) 
Kok-Chor Tan and Darrel Mollendorf have argued along the following line. Rawls has no 
logical basis upon which to argue that while the parties in the first original position will be 
interested in socio-economic equality for all in the domestic liberal society, those in the 
second original position will not be interested in socio-economic equality for all 
internationally.
253
  
If the parties in the first original position are interested in socio-economic equality because 
they care for themselves (because they would prefer a well-off life to a worse-off one), and 
care about fellow citizens (because their common institutions - especially the political - 
which they share, create enough grounds for this); the second parties logically will also care 
about themselves because they prefer a well-off life to a worse-off one, also the common 
institutions and integrations which bind peoples together in our current world are likewise 
enough grounds for them to care about the socio-economic well being of all. 
However, Joseph Heath argues that the international system neither has strong enough global 
structures nor has enough global basic structures. The rule of law is the basic instrument in 
the domestic society that facilitates political justice and given that the rule of law is absent at 
the international level, there is more or less nothing to facilitate political justice on the 
international level.
254
 
 In addition, David Reidy argues that persons do not share any global self-understanding in 
which persons are understood as morally and politically free and equal persons.
255
 On his 
part, Wenar argues that international relations are not interpersonal but international. Persons 
are not the subject of international relations. Rather, states are the subject of international 
relations. Therefore, Rawls is right to make peoples, rather than persons, the subject of the 
Law of Peoples.
256
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(vi) 
Rawls’ list of human rights is limited due to his fixation on the eight principles which would 
be chosen by well-ordered peoples in the second original position and his quest to respect 
plurality as a liberal.
257
 Pogge argues that Rawls offers no convincing arguments why well-
ordered people will restrict themselves to the eight principles or rights which Rawls says they 
will choose in the second original position. Furthermore, he says Rawls does not even 
convincingly argue why they will choose those principles or rights instead of some other 
principles or rights.
258
  
Also, Andrew Kuper has argued that Rawls made a serious blunder when he failed or decided 
not to include democratic rights in the rights well-ordered people would choose in the second 
original position.
259
 In the same vein, Amartya Sen argues that it is known that authoritarian 
or non-democratic governments are a strong factor which threatens and in fact negatively 
affects the well-being and lives of peoples and even abuse their human rights.
260
 Hence, to 
neglect to consider democratic rights as Rawls did is a weakness of The Law of Peoples.  
However, some proponents argue that Rawls’ list of human rights is by no means limited, at 
least, as limited as critics think. According to Reidy, Rawls’ basic rights are at the moral 
heart of the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
261
 Furthermore, 
he argues that Rawls does not actually claim that his basic rights are the only basic rights, but 
rather implies that they are among other basic rights which can be chosen. He adds that a 
closer look at The Law of Peoples will reveal that Rawls even included alongside his basic 
rights some Universal Declaration of Human Rights articles such as articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17.
262
     
(vii) 
Andrew Kuper and some other critics argue that The Law of Peoples is not adequately a 
realistic utopia as Rawls claims it is. They argue that since it fails to give consideration to 
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every substantial reality such as globalization, global interdependence and global domination 
of some countries by others, it cannot be adequately realistic. Also since it fails to depart 
from the Westphalian notion of states and the traditional international law and international 
relations, it cannot be said to be a utopia.
263
  
On the criticism that The Law of Peoples is not utopian enough, a counter argument is that 
Rawls, although aims at utopia, tries hard to keep The Law of Peoples real. It is for this 
reason that The Law of Peoples might be seen as not utopian enough. If this ‘not utopian 
enough’ is due to The Law of Peoples being realistic, then it cannot be seen as a weakness.264 
Furthermore, on the argument that The Law of Peoples is not realistic enough, a counter 
argument is that Rawls does not consider factors of global interdependence which might lead 
to oppression because his focus was not on the formulation of principles that will lead to a 
just society. Rather he was concerned with formulating principles that will help us realize a 
peaceful or stable society.
265
 
 
2.3.   Thomas Nagel’s Problem of Global Justice 
In 2005, nine years ago, Thomas Nagel started his influential article, “The Problem of Global 
Justice”, with the concession that our world is unjust. But this concession is followed with a 
qualification that we do not have a comprehensible view on what international or global 
justice might mean and what its requirements might be or what its principles might entail.
266
   
Nevertheless, Nagel goes on to mention that international or global justice is concerned with 
war and human rights. For war, the issue is whether it is justified for one nation to wage war 
against another and whether the war is justly executed; in other words, jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello. And for human rights, international or global justice concerns itself with only the 
most basic of human rights. Since Nagel does not give us a list of the most basic human 
rights, we do not know the limit of the list although intuitively we know at least some of the 
rights such a list should entail.  
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Nagel says his focus is solely on socio-economic justice and whether it can possibly mean 
anything on the global level.
267
 To deal with the above issue, he approaches it by “focusing 
on the application to the world as a whole of two central issues of traditional political theory; 
the relation between justice and sovereignty, and the scope and limits of equality as a demand 
of justice.”268 For Nagel the two issues are necessarily related when we talk about justice on 
the global level.
269
  
After reminding his readers that the justice/sovereignty issue was first dealt with by Thomas 
Hobbes, Nagel goes on to present Hobbes’ formulation of the issue. For Hobbes, while it is 
possible for us to “discover true principles of justice by moral reasoning alone, we can only 
get real justice in a sovereign state.”270 Since justice and injustice have to do chiefly with the 
interactions among persons, a sovereign government is needed to bring about justice and 
injustice. At the international arena, where there is no such sovereign government to bring 
justice about, states are constantly at potential war with one another, hence their situation is 
some sort of state of nature.
271
  
In Hobbes’ view, principles of justice are nothing but a set of rules, when if adhered to by 
everyone, will be advantageous to everyone. No one would want to adhere to these rules 
except he or she is certain that everyone else will also adhere to the rules. Hence everyone 
needs a sovereign who will assure him or her that everyone else will adhere to the rules. 
Furthermore, in conjunction with the belief that everyone else will adhere to the rules, the 
fear of sanction from the sovereign forces everyone to adhere to the rules.  
No matter how strong the common interest of the individuals might be, without the assurance 
that everyone else will adhere to the rules and without the fear of the sanction of the 
sovereign, people are bound not to obey the rules.
272
 Although individuals crave for peace 
and justice, in the absence of a sovereign - who alone can guarantee peace and justice - 
individuals, in order to preserve their lives, will have to resort to self-defence. Hence they 
find themselves in a state of nature where everyone stands in a posture of war against 
everyone else.
273
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According to Nagel, Hobbes’ assertion, as discussed above, is also true of conceptions of 
justice that are hinged on the interests of other persons. Nagel, like Hobbes, argues that 
except there is a government that ensures that just institutions are stable, individuals - no 
matter how high their moral motivation is - can only aspire for justice in theory but cannot 
have it in practice.  
In the above scenario, the best practical expression of justice individuals will have will be 
their readiness to help sustain just institutions if such institutions exist. Conceptions of justice 
that are hinged on the interests of other persons promote obedience to just institutions when 
there are just institutions.  But when the facilitating factors for just institutions do not exist, 
such conceptions of justice fail to offer helpful guidance. For Nagel, this scenario is the case 
with our entire world.
274
  
Having presented Hobbes’ case on sovereignty and justice, Nagel goes on to present Rawls’ 
case on equality as a demand of justice. In Nagel’s reading of Rawls: 
the liberal requirements of justice include a strong component of equality among 
citizens, but...this is a specifically political demand, which applies to the basic 
structure of a unified nation state. It does not apply to the personal (non-political) 
choices of individuals living in such a society, nor does it apply to the relations 
between one society and another, or between the members of different societies. 
Egalitarian justice is a requirement on the internal political, economic, and social 
structure of nation states and cannot be extrapolated to different contexts, which 
require different standards.
275
  
 
Nagel’s presentation of the institutional argument or, put more accurately, institutional 
defence of Rawls, is well summarised by Maffettone. He says due to the fact that domestic 
institutions are different from international institutions, their practices are different. Since 
Rawlsian principles of justice are not applicable to members of different political entities, we 
cannot arrive at global justice principles by the simple extension of (Rawlsian) domestic 
justice principles to the global level.
276
  
For Nagel, the sort of special association or the sort of special associative relationship we 
have within the state is not found outside the state. Therefore, justice is only found within the 
state and not outside the state. “Justice is something we owe through our shared institutions 
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only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation. It is, in the standard 
terminology, an associative obligation.”277 A unique characteristic of this special relationship 
is; through state institutions, vertically the state makes special claims on the will of citizens 
and horizontally citizens make special claims on the will of one another.
278
 These special 
claims generate special duties of justice namely positive duties of justice. These special duties 
or positive duties of justice start and stop where the special claims that generate them start 
and stop.
279
  
The actions of the state are seen as the general will of the citizens. Since the state “exercises 
sovereign power over its citizens and in their name, those citizens have a duty of justice 
toward one another through the legal, social, and economic institutions that sovereign power 
makes possible. This duty is sui generis, and is not owed to everyone in the world, nor is it an 
indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to everyone in the world, such as a 
duty of humanity.”280 Hence, while in the relationship or interaction on the one hand between 
citizens and on the other hand between the citizens and the state duties and rights of justice 
are involved, this is not the case outside the state or globally. 
Nagel, following Hobbes and Rawls, asserts that we can only properly talk about justice 
within the nation state because it is in the nation state that political legitimacy is located. But 
on the global level, since we have no structure or entity to play the role of the nation state, 
there is no similar political legitimacy.
281
  As Nagel puts it: 
Without being given a choice, we are assigned a role in the collective life of a 
particular society. The society makes us responsible for its acts, which are taken in 
our name....thereby supporting the institutions through which advantages and 
disadvantages are created and distributed. Insofar as those institutions admit arbitrary 
inequality...we therefore have standing to ask why we should accept them. This 
request for justification has moral weight even if we have in practice no choice but to 
live under the existing regime. The reason is that its requirements claim our active 
cooperation.
282
  
So, for Nagel, a crucial distinction between our relationship with national institutions and 
global institutions is that while our relationship with the formal is involuntary, our 
relationship with the latter is voluntary. This voluntariness is why we cannot have global 
justice because justice is not a matter of voluntariness. It is a matter of responsibility that can 
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be enforced only through coercive apparatus which is present in the state but absent globally. 
As Nagel himself mentions, the statists’ coercion argument was first propounded by Michael 
Blake but adopted and adapted by Nagel.
283
   
However, given the terrible level of poverty and other preventable terrible conditions in 
which most people live globally, Nagel admits that it is plausible to think the well-off should 
come to the aid of the worse-off; that this disparity in well-being and the disastrous 
consequences it has for the worse-off should be a genuine concern for the well-off. 
Nevertheless, it is not that the well-off have an obligation to help the worse-off or that the 
worse-off have a right to be helped by the well-off. It is merely a matter of charity; the worse-
off need humanitarian assistance and the well-off who are in a position to assist 
humanitarianly can help to alleviate global poverty.
284
 Hence what we can plausibly argue for 
on the global level is not global justice but humanitarian assistance. 
In summary, Nagel’s thesis is as follows in a manner of syllogism. Firstly, Nagel agrees with 
Hobbes that there can be no justice without a sovereign government. Thus, for Nagel - just as 
for Hobbes - since the world has no sovereign government, the idea of global justice is 
implausible. Secondly, Nagel agrees with Rawls that equality is a demand of justice. Equality 
only exists among members of a state and between states. Thus we can only talk about justice 
on the one hand among individuals within a state, and on the other hand between states - for 
instance Italy and Germany. But we cannot talk about justice among individuals across states 
or globally. 
Consequently, and thirdly, according to Nagel, “If Hobbes is right, the idea of global justice 
without a world government is a chimera. If Rawls is right, perhaps there can be something 
that might be called justice or injustice in the relations between states, but it bears only a 
distant relation to the evaluation of societies themselves as just or unjust: for the most part, 
the idea of a just world for Rawls would have to be the idea of a world of internally just 
states.”285  Although this statement seems to suggest that Nagel is sitting on the fence 
between Hobbes and Rawls, what he does in the entire article is a synthesis of both Hobbes 
and Rawls. But he seems to lean more towards Hobbes than Rawls. His synthesis, arguably, 
is more reliant on Hobbes than Rawls. 
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In conclusion, Nagel’s thesis makes him closer to Hobbes than Rawls, and his conclusion 
makes him a strong statist while Rawls is a weak statist. At least Rawls, in The Law of 
Peoples, argues for duty of assistance to burdened societies, the duty to remedy cases of 
severe poverty and the duty to remedy gross violation of human rights.
286
 While for Rawls 
these will count as duties of justice, for Nagel they are mere humanitarian duties or mere 
duties of charity.
287
  
 
2.4.   Charles Beitz’s Cosmopolitan Liberalism 
Charles Beitz, in Political Theory and International Relations (1979), extended Rawls’ 
theory of justice - as conceptualized in A Theory of Justice meant for domestic societies - to 
the global arena as a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice. Beitz propounded two 
cosmopolitan principles of global justice, namely; the resource redistribution principle and 
global distribution principle.  
In the resource redistribution principle, he hypothetically imagines a scenario in which each 
state is self-sufficient, each absolutely depends on its own resources and labour and does not 
trade with any country. Furthermore, some states are well resource-endowed and manage 
their resource-endowment very well. But other states are not resource-endowed and this lack 
of resource-endowment negates all the positive efforts they make to be reasonably well-off.  
In view of the resource redistribution principle, the resource-endowed and well-off states are 
to aid, that is, redistribute part of their resources, to the non-resource-endowed and worse-off 
states in order for the latter to be able to put in place the necessary political and economic 
structure to guarantee the well-being of their citizenry vis-à-vis to meet their basic human 
needs.
288
 Thus the resource redistribution principle assures individuals in societies that are 
not resource-endowed that their unfavourable fate will not be a hindrance to their realization 
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of economic conditions that will be enough for the sustainability of just social institutions and 
the protection of human rights.
289
  
In the hypothetical scenario in the global distribution principle, like the hypothetical scenario 
in the resource redistribution principle, some states are well resource-endowed while others 
are not. The resource-endowed states are well-off because of their resources while the non-
resource-endowed states are worse-off because of their lack of resources. But unlike the 
hypothetical scenario in the resource redistribution principle, these states are not self-
sufficient, they are not closed-up and they engage in international trade. Given that this 
international or global connectivity and interaction entails international or global cooperation, 
this is a ground to argue for global distributive justice, namely global difference principle 
similar to the Rawlsian difference principle for domestic liberal societies.  
Moreover, presumably, the well-off states are well-off at least partly because of the benefits 
they derive from being part of the international or global cooperation (although this is not 
Beitz’s explicit ground for global distributive justice or global difference principle). Hence, 
adopting and globalizing Rawls’ difference principle, Beitz argues that the resources or 
wealth of the well-off states should be redistributed to assist the worse-off states.
290
  
Nevertheless, in 1999, in the “Afterword” to the second edition of Political Theory and 
International Relations, Beitz adopts a moderate position which I shall present as follows. He 
argues for what he refers to as ‘a cosmopolitan theory of international distributive justice.’291 
He posits that there are two ways to argue for his position. The first way he calls the strong 
thesis and the second way he calls the weak thesis. The theses draw an analogy between 
domestic society and international relations and hold that the structures and factors that make 
distributive justice morally justifiable on the domestic level are analogously present on the 
global level.   
The weak thesis posits merely that since international relations resemble domestic societies in 
terms of their basic structures; international distributive justice morally applies to 
international relations. While the strong thesis posits that the particular moral principles that 
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international relations should be subject to are internationalized Rawlsian principles of 
distributive justice as formulated in A Theory of Justice.
292
  
For Beitz, given philosophical and practical considerations, the weak thesis seems more 
essential.
293
 The weak thesis neither concerns itself with the most excellent or finest 
institutional structure that should obtain in international politics nor does it concern itself 
with how individuals ought to conceive their identities or how to identify themselves and 
their loyalties or who they ought to be loyal to. Rather, it concerns itself with the grounds on 
which we should justify or criticise institutions and practices.
294
  
Beitz terms the weak thesis moral cosmopolitanism according to Thomas Pogge’s 
understanding of the term which says that every person “has a global stature as the ultimate 
unit of moral concern.”295 The crust of the weak thesis or moral cosmopolitanism, according 
to Beitz, is that the unbiased consideration of the stance or argument of everyone that will be 
affected by institutions and policies determine our decisions regarding the sort of institutions 
we ought to create and the policies we should choose.
296
 
Beitz divides his arguments for the weak thesis into three categories. In the first category, he 
contrasts the global society with domestic society. Under this category, he explains that in 
order to formulate principles of justice for domestic society, Rawls bases his baseline for 
gauging fair cooperation in the society on equality. Likewise, it might seem plausible to judge 
the logic of global justice based on the equality baseline.
297
  
He goes on to say that to have a proper conception of distributive justice on the global level, 
we acknowledge that there are certain basic structures that are necessary due to the nature and 
extent of socio-economic integration, and then try to establish moral principles which are 
requirements that must be met by these structures in order for equal persons who are at once 
free and moral to accept the principles.  According to Beitz, our current situation is far from 
this ideal.
298
 Because on different levels of political associations in our world there are 
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institution and norms that people are subjected to, for the most part, without them consenting, 
and their life prospects can be radically controlled by these institutions and norms.
299
 
Beitz termed his second category of arguments ‘determinants of the political and economic 
development of societies.’300 In this category, he says it is possible at once to accept in 
principle that moral principles demand that there is an economic threshold on the global level 
below which will be unjust for persons to live, and to accept that it is impossible, practically, 
to ensure this threshold globally.
301
 This is based on Rawls’ argument that the social and 
economic development of a society is based on its social and political culture rather than on 
the amount of natural resources it is endowed with or on how it is affected by international 
politics or international economy.
302
 Following this argument, then the responsibility to 
rectify socio-economic or politico-economic injustice in a society is that of the society itself 
rather than that of other societies.
303
  
Beitz argues that we cannot confidently conclude that the presence or absence of natural 
resources necessarily leads to the development of a state or its underdevelopment given that 
our current state of knowledge of the correlation between natural resources endowment and 
development is poor or uncertain. Furthermore, he posits that we cannot argue plausibly that 
the development of a state depends on its socio-political or socio-economic culture rather 
than on its position in global political economy. This is because it is practically unfeasible to 
separate international influence from domestic influence – both are intertwined – in the 
development of a society.  
Also the international politico-economic structures, institutions and organizations that 
regulate world economy impact poor countries negatively and contribute to shaping the 
domestic structures of these countries to a large extent. These countries have to be part of 
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these structures which are essentially meant to benefit the wealthy.
304
 Hence, Beitz asserts 
that even if domestic circumstances and issues crucially determine the socio-economic 
development or under-development of a state, they may be considered to be necessary 
condition rather than sufficient condition for the development or under-development of a 
state.
305
  
Beitz terms the third category of arguments ‘the claims of compatriots.’306 In this category, 
although one might hold that cosmopolitan moral principles should guide international 
relations, however one can, at the same time, hold that whenever there is a conflict between 
the interests of compatriots and others, one should always give preference to compatriots.
307
 
Since giving preference to compatriots might lead one to prioritize ‘the less urgent needs of 
compatriots’ over ‘the more urgent needs of others,’ this is inconsistent with 
cosmopolitanism because it violates the core principle of cosmopolitanism – the principle of 
equality which says that everyone, irrespective of affiliations, should be treated equally.
308
  
According to Beitz, any justifiable form of the priority argument will have to be weakened to 
become different from what it already looks like in our common morality and be redefined to 
create room for global distributive justice. Therefore, even if we grant that the interests of 
compatriots should be given preference, this will not be mutually exclusive with accepting 
the weak thesis on global distributive justice.
309
  
In the first edition of Political Theory and International Relations, Beitz considered the 
disagreement between the morality of states and cosmopolitan morality as the most important 
and productive theoretical issue in international political theory.
310
 Unlike cosmopolitan 
morality, the morality of states upholds the sovereignty of states, the principle of non-
intervention and preference for the needs of compatriots.
311
 Contrary to his earlier view, in 
the “Afterword” to the second edition Beitz thinks the resolution of the tension between 
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social liberalism and cosmopolitan liberalism is the major issue that international political 
theory has to deal with.
312
  
The international community is understood by social liberalism to be a community populated 
by domestic societies. On the one hand, the duty of the domestic societies is to ensure the 
welfare and safeguard the interests of their citizens. On the other hand, the duty of the 
international community is to ensure a milieu where domestic societies will thrive.
313
 For 
social liberalism, international relations principles apply to domestic societies. Since 
international relations principles are only justifiable by the consideration of the primary 
interests of the societies which the principles apply to; international relations principles are 
only justifiable by the consideration of the interests of domestic societies.
314
  
 
Cosmopolitan liberalism, unlike social liberalism, does not grant domestic societies any 
moral privilege over persons or individuals. Because, for the cosmopolitan liberalism, on the 
deepest level our social world is not composed of domestic societies, states, nations, or 
peoples as Rawls would have it; it is rather composed of persons.
315
 Consequently, 
cosmopolitan liberalism holds that international relations principles are only justifiable by 
considering the primary interests of individuals.
316
  
 
In the final analysis, Beitz’s defence of the weak thesis reveals his preference for 
cosmopolitan liberalism over social liberalism. However, it is his shift from defending the 
strong thesis in 1979 to defending the weak thesis in 1999 that also reveals that he became 
somewhat sceptical about cosmopolitanism. No wonder he concedes to political realists that 
“In the application of principles to practice, normative and empirical considerations interact 
in complex ways ....Basing decisions to act on normative principles without paying attention 
to these complexities is certain to yield bad decisions.”317 This statement might leave one 
wondering whether the twenty-year period between 1979 and 1999 has wavered Beitz’s 
commitment to cosmopolitanism.  
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One might even argue that he seemed to drift towards what can be referred to as a weak 
statism. But this will be far too fetched. For what he drifted to is, accurately in his own 
terminology, ‘the weak thesis’ - cosmopolitan morality - which at once: argues for global 
distributive justice in general, but not the globalisation of Rawlsian distributive justice in 
particular; and upholds cosmopolitan liberalism but accepts its limitations. 
 
2.5.    Thomas Pogge’s Negative Duty 
In 1989 (ten years after the publication of Beitz’s Political Theory and International 
Relations) Thomas Pogge, in Realizing Rawls, also extended Rawls’ theory of justice - as 
conceptualized in A Theory of Justice meant for domestic societies - to the global arena as a 
cosmopolitan perspective on global justice. Again, in 1994 in “An Egalitarian Law of 
Peoples,”318 he repeated his globalisation of Rawls’ theory of justice. But, he has since gone 
on to develop some robust defence for cosmopolitan global justice.  
It is Pogge’s original views, rather than his ‘extension’ of Rawlsian principles of justice to 
global justice, that I shall focus on. This is partly because Pogge has abandoned the 
‘extension project’ for his original views and partly because even Rawls did not agree with 
the ‘extension.’ Having already presented Pogge’s conception of cosmopolitanism in the 
foregoing discussion, now I shall go straight to the heart of his argument. 
Pogge blames the global institutional order for injustice on the global level. In what he refers 
to as the international resource privilege and the international borrowing privilege, Pogge 
shows how the global institutional order causes and engenders injustice. He argues that 
regardless of how any group comes to power, how it exercises power and whether the 
citizenry supports or opposes it, as long as such group has the preponderance of the means of 
coercion or near monopoly of force within the state, it is internationally recognized as the 
legitimate government of the state.
319
 Although the nature of such group coming to power, 
the nature of its exercise of power and the opposition of it by the citizenry make it 
illegitimate. By recognizing such group as the legitimate government the international 
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community consequently bestows upon it two crucial privileges namely the international 
borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege.
320
  
As earlier discussed, to illustrate how developed countries determine the economic conditions 
of poor countries to a large extent, Pogge employed the notions of international borrowing 
privilege and international resource privilege
321
 which can be explained in the following way. 
The international community often pays no attention to the fact that a leadership of a poor 
country is corrupt, dictatorial, etc. As long as the leadership is in charge of the state, it is 
recognized and accepted by the international community as having the legitimate authority at 
once to sell the resources of the state (international resource privilege) and to borrow on 
behalf of the state (international borrowing privilege).  
As usually happens in poor states with corrupt leaders, a huge part of the funds realized from 
the selling of the resources goes into the private pockets of the corrupt leaders and so also a 
huge percentage of any money borrowed goes into their private pockets at the expense of the 
people. These two situations worsen the condition of poor states and encourage rogues to 
want to come to power because of the benefits. Even when a democratic leader eventually 
comes to power, s/he will be left with a huge debt to pay and sometimes depleted resources. 
These international privileges are particularly relevant to Sub-Saharan Africa especially 
Nigeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, etc. On the 
international resource privilege which confers the property rights of the resources of a state 
on any regime irrespective of how illegitimately the regime came to power, Sub-Saharan 
African dictators, cronies of dictators, and warlords have capitalised on their resource 
privileges to sustain their regimes, sponsor conflicts and lead lavish lifestyles.  
Joseph Mobuto Sese Seko and Laurent-Désiré Kabila of DRC (former Zaire), Ibrahim 
Babangida and Sanni Abacha of Nigeria, José Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi of 
Angola, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and Teodorin Nguema Obiang Mangue of 
Equatorial Guinea, Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor of Liberia, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and 
Johnny Koroma of Sierra Leone are a few examples of African leaders who epitomised the 
above privileges.  
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Concerning the international borrowing privilege which confers the right to borrow in the 
name of a state and on behalf of its citizens on any regime irrespective of how illegitimately 
the regime came to power, this has terrible consequences for poor countries. This borrowing 
privilege incentivises potential coup plotters and dictators to seize power because they know 
doing so will give them access to huge amounts of money. When in power, illegitimate rulers 
completely control the credit of a country. So these rulers can always borrow money in the 
name of their countries. Although they often embezzle the money they borrow or use it to 
sustain their regimes, it is their countries that are saddled with the responsibility of settling 
the debt.
322
 
In view of the negative effects of the international resource privilege and the international 
borrowing privilege, Pogge asserts that individuals and collectives or institutions globally 
have the negative duty to desist from imposing on the less privileged of the world an 
institutional scheme that is unjust
323
 For Pogge, in a globalised world that is interdependent, 
the global institutional order enormously affects peoples’ lives. In order to safeguard the 
welfare and interests of peoples, there must be a paradigm of human rights that regulates the 
global institutional order and it must be imposed on the global order.
324
 The human rights 
paradigm he advocates is the one that will involve radical institutional reform which will 
result in reconfiguring the current Westphalian system into what he terms dispersion of 
sovereignty. This reform, Pogge argues, will eradicate abject poverty and minimise 
injustice.
325
  
Pogge argues that the current global system – the Westphalian system of nation-states – is a 
contributing factor to the problem of global injustice in our world.
326
 According to Pogge, “A 
global institutional scheme is imposed by all of us on each of us. It is imposed on us in that 
we cannot simply drop out and renounce participation. This fact is most significant in the 
case of the scheme’s most disadvantaged participants, who are literally being forced, 
ultimately with resort to violence, to abide by the going ground rules”327 (emphasis is 
original). Furthermore, he argues that due to the dynamics of the international system in 
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which rich and powerful states are at advantage while poor and non-powerful states are at 
disadvantage, the former and their citizens are part of the cause of global injustice and are 
thus morally responsible for it. Hence they have a duty towards those who are globally 
disadvantaged.
328
  
Since institutions are not natural but social, are brought into existence through our plans and 
actions, we are thus responsible for their existence. And since they have led to dismal 
conditions on the global level, we are also responsible for those dismal conditions. Hence, the 
onus, in moral terms, is on us to remedy those dismal conditions and to desist from causing 
and engendering those dismal conditions.
329
 However, Pogge stresses a negative duty rather 
than a positive duty on the side of the advantaged, and consequently a negative right rather 
than a positive right on the side of the disadvantaged. He stresses that we ought to desist from 
acting the way we act that makes the global order unjust and consequently makes some 
people and parts of the world disadvantaged.
330
  
For Pogge, given the fact that some individuals and parts of the world, namely the developed 
world, are very wealthy and powerful, nearly everything they do impact significantly on 
living conditions of other parts of the world, namely the developing world. And given the fact 
that these individuals and the developed world are very wealthy and powerful, they “are in a 
unique position to take up the theoretical and practical task of institutional reform.”331 
Nevertheless, as individuals, for Pogge, we cannot really do much on our own 
(interactionally) to change the global structure that leads to global disadvantages for the 
worst-off. In other words, the malaise of the global structure cannot be corrected by the direct 
(interactional) effort of individuals or cannot be corrected directly (interactionally) by the 
efforts of individuals. Hence he argues that the task of the individual is to advocate 
institutions - particularly global institutions - that can restructure the global system and help 
correct the problem of global injustice.
332
  
In conclusion, the crust of Pogge’s argument is that there should be a global institutional 
reform of the global institutional order and the onus is on those who perpetrate global 
institutional injustice. These perpetrators of global institutional injustice need to desist from 
perpetrating global institutional injustice; hence their negative duty to stop inflicting injustice 
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on the worse-off and worst-off individuals and on the worse-off and worst-off parts of the 
world. 
 
2.6.     Sebastiano Maffettone’s Liberal Internationalism 
In this sub-chapter I shall present Sebastiano Maffettone’s Liberal Internationalism which 
will help us grasp the salient points in the cosmopolitanism/statism debate and how a neutral 
position can be a vital and viable option. Maffettone says “Liberal Internationalism can be 
seen as an intermediate position between relational and non-relational approaches to global 
justice.”333 Remember that in sub-chapter 2.1. I have already distinguished between relational 
approaches and non-relational approaches as expounded by Maffettone. So I shall not rehash 
that distinction here. Rather, I shall directly focus on cosmopolitanism and statism. 
Maffettone sees his Liberal Internationalism as an intermediary between - on the one side - 
relational approaches and - on the other side - non-relational approaches.
334
 It will be apt to 
say that it is just as well an intermediary between - on the one side - cosmopolitanism and - 
on the other side - statism. Because in order to argue for a neutral position Maffettone 
juxtaposes cosmopolitanism with statism. Then he argues that there is a third way other than 
cosmopolitanism and statism. The third way is Liberal Internationalism which he also refers 
to as liberal international justice.
335
  
Moreover, Liberal Internationalism is more realistic than cosmopolitanism and more utopian 
than statism.
336
 According to Maffettone, it creates a continuum on the spectrum of global 
justice with statism on the 0 global justice end and cosmopolitanism on the 1 global justice 
end.
337
 In order to defend it, firstly he proffers normative regionalism, using the European 
Union (EU) as the key example, which he conceives as a relational institutional argument. 
Secondly, he proffers humanitarian duty of justice which he conceives as a non-relational 
argument.
338
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In their rejection of what they consider to be the cosmopolitans’ utopian view of global 
justice in which the world is populated by directly egalitarian persons, statists argue for a 
minimalist conception of global justice in which the world is populated by “States and 
peoples that all behave in a reasonably fair manner in order to achieve a more egalitarian 
society.”339 While cosmopolitans are sanguine about global justice and total realization of 
socio-economic human rights, on the contrary statists are not sanguine about global justice - 
however, they create room for or accept the plausibility of certain human rights and 
humanitarianism in favour of the globally worst-off.
340
  
Cosmopolitans argue that given the level of globalization and global interdependence, it is 
implausible to argue for the non-existence of global forms of coercion and reciprocity which 
statists see as quintessentially characteristics of the state. The rules made by global 
multilateral institutions “are enacted in the name and on behalf of citizens of the States that 
must accept them. Even if there is a possibility that the citizens of these States find these rules 
wrong or unjust, that does not seem to go against the idea that even in such a case there is a 
sort of co-authorship, as posited by Nagel, however sui generis the co-authorship may be.”341 
The rules made by global multilateral institutions and the regimes put in place and promoted 
by them constrain the state’s power to make and implement policies and impact states 
regardless of boundaries. Given that statists base their plausibility and necessity or 
justifiability of distributive justice within the state on such characteristics as coercion and 
reciprocity, and given that these characteristics also exist globally, therefore global 
distributive justice is also plausible, necessary or justifiable.  
According to Maffettone, although states are intermediaries between their citizens and 
multilateral institutions, these institutions seem to impose their rules coercively on the 
citizens of the states. Nevertheless, he says, statists can argue on two grounds against the 
cosmopolitan claim that multilateral institutions coercively enforce rules on citizens globally. 
The first ground is that of voluntariness while the second is that of arbitrariness.   
On the voluntariness ground, statists can argue that such rules are analogous to rules binding 
voluntary associations. While they entail certain obligations, both individual and collective 
obligations, such obligations are limited and do not cover the entirety of the life of the 
members. They are only meant for specific reasons, times and, if I may add, places.  
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On the ground of arbitrariness, statists can argue that the conditional character of 
international relations negates the possibility of a lasting or continuous cooperation and 
reciprocity in this sort of relationship. Since distributive justice is predicated on such a 
continuous cooperation and reciprocity, therefore we cannot plausibly argue for distributive 
justice within the ephemeral relationships in international relations.
342
 
Against the above objections, (relational) cosmopolitans argue that the above categorization 
of international relations is misleading because continuity, rather than discontinuity, and 
consistency rather than ‘occasionality’, have come to characterize international relations. 
However, it can be argued that while there are discontinuity and ‘occasionality’, they are not 
the order of the day; they are in fact mere exceptions.
343
  
The above-mentioned cosmopolitan claim leaves Nagel with only two alternatives, “either the 
full continuity of political relations in the domestic case, or the dominion of voluntaristic 
arbitrariness in the global case. Relational cosmopolitans invoke a third option where the 
creation of ever more stable and lasting international constraints generates a form of 
embryonic political community where cooperation and reciprocity progressively gain 
ground.”344 Here, I may add that if this third option is successfully argued for by relational 
cosmopolitans, statist claims will be much weakened and principles of global distributive 
justice may become as relevant as principles of domestic distributive justice.  
Maffettone argues that given the trend of regionalization which has led to the formation of 
regional organizations in a few parts of the world, this seems to support the idea of continuity 
rather than discontinuity in the nature of international relations as described above.
345
 
Furthermore, he argues that the special characteristic of the domestic basic structure, “the 
effectiveness of social institutions over time and their ability to create a truly social 
dimension”, is at least in principle attainable on the global level.346  
He says the above argument might be countered in two ways. The first way is to argue that 
regionalization does not equal globalization. One will be apt to say this argument implies 
that; that some parts of the world are regionalized, that is, have formed a regional political 
community, does not mean that the whole world is globalized, that is, the whole world has 
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formed a global political community. Consequently, perhaps the furthest we can go here is to 
talk of regional distributive justice rather than global distributive justice. Nevertheless even 
regional distributive justice seems implausible given that many of the regional organizations 
are not authentic political communities.  
The second way is to argue that although there is less voluntariness and arbitrariness in global 
institutional constraints due to the global trend tending towards more global 
institutionalization, this does not necessarily imply that we currently have every necessary 
condition that permits the globalisation of constraints of normativity among citizens globally. 
However, if we think about how the global society is currently ordered, we may be lured into 
accepting that the relationships between the basic structures of domestic societies and the 
basic structure of the global society will in due course be characterised by continuity instead 
of discontinuity.
347
  Such global organisations as the United Nations,
348
 the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, the International Labour 
Organisation, etc. will suffice as examples of such continuity. 
Statists argue that there is a qualitative difference rather than mere quantitative difference 
between the domestic basic structure and the global basic structure. It is not only that the 
basic structure which cosmopolitans assumed exists on the global level is not quantitatively 
enough to justify the sort of coercion and cooperation that will serve as the source of any 
authentic associative duties.  
The qualitative difference is that unlike the global basic structure, “The domestic basic 
structure corresponds to a genuine political society.”349 The political conception, as viewed 
by Nagel, is that “distributive justice is not an end in itself.... [it]serves a political purpose. It 
may be argued that an excessive income or status difference does not allow for actual 
freedom and equality and, therefore, it is likely to distort the original political relations 
between equality and liberty among fellow citizens within their political community.... since 
there is nothing like a worldwide State...the same type of political argument does not apply to 
a global level.”350 And Nagel asserts crucially, in this vein, while citizens can be said to have 
a special relationship with the state authority in that the former authored the law that the latter 
coercively enforces on the former, global citizens cannot be said to be the authors of the rules 
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of multilateral institutions.
351
  
In Liberal Internationalism our global justice responsibilities, according to Maffettone, 
originates principally from our universal obligation to protect and ensure the security and 
subsistence of every person irrespective of their citizenship, state or relational linkages.
352
 
Furthermore, he argues, even if we agree with statists that the idea of distributive justice is 
only plausible domestically but implausible globally, “There can nonetheless be other sources 
of moral obligations which are based on justice towards the poor around the globe. These 
sources are connected to natural duties, but are non-relational. This way, they do not depend 
on any existence of a controversial basic structure.”353 Consequently, the global poor have 
rights to security and subsistence irrespective of their associations, relations or linkages.      
For Maffettone, without securing and protecting these basic rights, humans cannot flourish, 
they will not even be able to exercise the majority of other rights, and they might not even be 
alive. So these rights are so indispensable that he considered them, as Henry Shue does, as 
some sort of meta-rights, namely rights “without which no other rights or opportunities may 
be enjoyed. In this case, they would be a requirement to live one’s life.”354 These meta-rights 
are similar to Hannah Arendt’s right to have rights, and arguably these meta-rights play the 
same role here as Arendt’s right to have rights play in The Origins of Totalitarianism.355 
As Maffettone succinctly puts it, “The basic rights and the correspondent universal duty 
depend on the nature of our human vulnerability. They are imposed by the fact that our 
weakness as human beings requires a necessary support that cannot be overlooked.”356 In 
reconciling the cosmopolitan
357
 view and the statist view, Maffettone argues that we can 
imagine that there is a line separating members of Rawls’ cooperating society from those 
under the line. While the former are to be treated according to Rawls’ liberal principles, 
liberals should not adopt a neutral position to the latter. Rather the latter should be treated 
according to the notion of urgency; paying special attention to them due to their urgent 
situation which needs urgent response.
358
  
                                                             
351 Ibid. p. 132. 
352
 Ibid. p. 136. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid. p. 137. 
355
 Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Books, 1994: pp. 292-299.  
356
 Maffettone, Sebastiano, “Normative Approaches to Global justice.” Globalisation, Multilateralism, Europe: 
Towards a Better Global Governance? Ed. Mario Telo. Surrey: Ashgate, 2013: p. 137. 
357
 Although the model of cosmopolitanism he chose was that of Amartya Sen in The Idea of Justice. 
358
 Maffettone, Sebastiano, “Global Justice: Between Leviathan and Cosmopolis”, Global Policy, Vol. 3, Iss. 4. 
(November 2012): pp. 443-454. 
Page 101 of 252 
 
Re-echoing Arendt’s concept of ‘the right to have rights,’359 the notion of urgency demands 
that whether there is a global structure that is similar to the nation-state or not, humans have 
an obligation to protect the ‘dignity and fragility’ of their fellow human beings. In other 
words, there are ‘a few fundamental basic rights’ that must be guaranteed, these include such 
socio-economic rights without which other rights cannot be enjoyed and without which life 
will not be fully lived.
360
  
For the above reasons - that is, due to the characteristics of the basic rights - Maffettone sees 
these meta-rights as sui generis and argues that consequently they neither pose any threat to 
(liberal) pluralism nor are they subject of controversy, and they are not hinged on any 
singular notion of the good. Because they either precede any notion of the good or they 
encompass all notions of the good.
361
  
These universal obligations, according to Maffettone, must respect two provisos. We can 
term the provisos the anti-perfectionism proviso and the less-demandingness proviso. The 
anti-perfectionism proviso states that the universal obligations “should not violate the anti-
perfectionist principles which are treasured by the liberal political conception.”362 While the 
less-demandingness proviso states that the universal obligations “should be less demanding 
than obligations that depend on the soundness of a ‘full’ theory of global distributive 
justice.”363 Given that these universal obligations of justice are neither relational nor 
associative; their justifiability does not need the existence of a basic structure.
364
 
One of the desiderata on which Maffettone bases his Liberal Internationalism is that: we 
usually argue for a greater global distributive justice in two ways; the two ways are usually 
confused to mean one and the same thing; and there is a need to disentangle these two ways.  
This disentanglement, I should add, is called for presumably in order for the argument for 
greater global distributive justice
365
 to have a strong case and a wider acceptability.  
In the first way, he argues that cosmopolitans directly extend distributive justice from the 
domestic society to the global society.  Because they focus on relative deprivation or relative 
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inequality, consequently cosmopolitans argue for greater global distributive justice. The other 
way which he opts for is the sufficientarian one which is concerned with human rights and 
minimal thresholds.
366
 It does not concern itself with relative poverty. Rather it aims at 
solving the problem of absolute poverty and hence makes no comparison between global 
inequality and domestic inequality.
367
 In other words, he asserts that his humanitarian duty of 
justice is rather sufficientarian than egalitarian, by which he means that while egalitarian duty 
of justice focuses on relative deprivations and relative inequalities, his sufficientarian duty of 
justice focuses on absolute deprivations and absolute inequalities.
368
 
Another desideratum for Liberal Internationalism, according to Maffettone, is that: unlike 
non-relational cosmopolitans, it has no tendency to radically moralize international relations 
or global politics; and unlike statists, it has no tendency to eliminate the role of morality in 
international relations or global politics. He believes that, for a liberal, both the cosmopolitan 
and statist positions should prove scarcely convincing. The cosmopolitan and statist 
positions, he argues, should be implausible for a liberal political philosopher, and it is on this 
ground that he calls his intermediary position liberal internationalism.
369
 
In short, Maffettone provides both relational institutional and non-relational moral arguments 
to support liberal internationalism. He calls the former normative regionalism while he calls 
the latter humanitarian duty of justice.
370
 He criticises statism for not accommodating 
humanitarian duty of justice, and criticizes cosmopolitanism on two grounds namely 
institutional and moral grounds. While his institutional criticism is directed at relational 
cosmopolitans, his moral criticism is directed at non-relational cosmopolitans.
371
 
Finally, I share Maffettone’s concern with ‘absolute poverty’ and ‘sufficientarian’ arguments 
for ‘positive duties’ and ‘basic rights’ or ‘meta-rights.’ But I will go further to ask: what, if 
any, are the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and the 
global institutional order in resource curse?; and given the contributory roles of individuals, 
collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse, 
what, if any, is their responsibility in resource curse? 
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*** 
In this chapter I engaged in four kinds of discussion. Firstly, I engaged in the preview of 
cosmopolitanism and statism to prepare for the rest of the discussion which is more detailed. 
Secondly, I presented the views of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. This was aimed at giving 
us a detailed elucidation of the statist perspective by looking at statism through the lenses of 
two prominent statists. Thirdly, I presented the views of Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. As 
I did in the case of statism, this was also aimed at giving us a detailed elucidation of the 
cosmopolitan perspective by looking at cosmopolitanism through the lenses of two prominent 
cosmopolitans. Finally, I discussed the views of Sebastiano Maffettone in order to show us 
the possibility of creating an intermediary position between the cosmopolitan and the statist 
views.  
In this chapter, cosmopolitans and statists argued, in effect, that their respective perspective is 
at once necessary and sufficient for global justice. There might be particular and simple cases 
of global justice in which cosmopolitanism or statism alone might just be at once necessary 
and sufficient. Nevertheless, generally cases of global justice are usually complex, and in 
these cases neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is at once necessary and sufficient. One of 
such complex cases is resource curse. So, the next chapter will focus on resource curse which 
is a typical complex case of global justice or global injustice which reflects the absence of 
global justice within some specific spatio-temporal circumstances and events.   
 
The focus on resource curse will help in narrowing down the scope of the debate on our 
subject-matter. The next chapter will start with a general focus on resource curse. But for the 
purpose of contextualisation, it will proceed and end with a particular focus on Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The focus on Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole shall be an overview while there will be 
special focus on Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Note that the next 
chapter (chapter 3) will only engage in the descriptive analysis of resource curse. The 
application of cosmopolitism and statism to resource curse will only be done in subsequent 
chapters (chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
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3.0.                     A COMPLEX CASE OF GLOBAL (IN)JUSTICE: RESOURCE CURSE      
3.1.1.    Resource Curse 
Resource curse means a situation whereby despite their being endowed with abundant natural 
resources, some states are poor and their poverty is directly or indirectly linked with their 
natural resources endowment. Resource-rich countries “often perform worse in terms of 
economic development and good governance than do countries with fewer resources”372 
(emphasis is original). Other things equal, a resource-rich country is supposed to be 
economically well-developed.  However, in the case of resource-cursed countries, the reverse 
is always the case; hence the term ‘resource curse.’  Furthermore, the situation is also known 
as paradox of plenty because plenty resources, other things equal, should lead to economic 
development rather than poverty. Hence it is a paradox when plenty resources lead to poverty 
or when high level of poverty persists despite plenty resources.  
It is not that every resource-rich country is resource-cursed. Australia, Botswana, Canada, 
Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
373
 South Africa, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, 
United States of America, etc., although have a lot of natural resources, are exceptions to 
resource curse because they avoided the Dutch disease and have a relatively low level of rent-
seeking (these are the two major factors responsible for resource curse).  
It is not the claim of the resource curse thesis that whenever and wherever a country is 
endowed with abundant natural resources such country must be resource-cursed. Rather, the 
claim of the thesis is that many resource-rich countries such as Angola, Cameroun, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
South Sudan, Venezuela, Zambia, etc.
374
 are economically worse-off today due to their 
natural resources. 
 Countries, without the endowment of abundant natural resources, such as Japan and the 
Asian Tigers - Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan - have been able to develop 
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economically basing their economies on manufacturing and export industries.
375
 But in many 
resource-rich countries the situation has been lack of economic development and social 
cohesion.  
About thirty-five years ago, in the mid-1970s, “Indonesia and Nigeria had comparable per 
capita incomes and heavy dependencies on oil sales. Yet today, Indonesia’s per capita income 
is four times that of Nigeria.”376 This situation is not peculiar to oil and gas countries such as 
Nigeria. It is also true of resource–cursed countries that do not have oil as the mainstay of 
their economy but are diamond, gold, uranium, etc. producing countries. If we compare 
countries endowed with abundant diamond such as Botswana and Sierra Leone, we will find 
out that over the past twenty-five years, while the economy of Botswana grew averagely at 
seven percent, averagely Sierra Leone’s per capita GDP from 1971 to 1989 dropped thirty-
seven percent, and from 1991 to 2001 the country was ravaged by a civil war.
377
 
A major oil producing country like Norway is top-ranked at the United Nations Human 
Development Index (UNHDI). Also, oil producing countries such as Argentina, Brunei, 
Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are high-ranked. However, some of the 
lowest-ranked countries are oil-producing countries such as Angola, Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, etc.
378
  “Variation in the effects of 
resource wealth on well-being can be found not only across, but also within them. Even when 
resource-rich countries have done fairly well, they have often been plagued by rising 
inequality – they become rich countries with poor people”379 (emphasis is original). Although 
the living standard and the general economic well-being of the citizenry of some resource-
cursed countries have improved over the years, the facts are: (i) given the natural resources 
they have, they should have been better-off; (ii) their being worse-off relative to non-
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resource-rich countries is directly or indirectly due to their being endowed with abundant 
natural resources.  
Moreover, the taxation of natural resources, at least theoretically, is a guaranteed source of 
revenue. Many natural resources, for instance oil and gas, are immobile. Oil and gas, being 
immobile commodities, are not like mobile assets, for instance capital, which can be moved 
away from a country because of high tax. Furthermore, given that tax proceeds from oil and 
gas (given their ‘immobility’) are guaranteed, and in view of the fact that these proceeds can 
and ought to go into creating better economic conditions for everyone, it is plausible to 
expect oil and gas-rich countries to have, in economic terms, lesser degrees of inequality and 
higher degrees of equality among their citizens.
380
 This is as well true for many solid mineral-
rich countries such as uranium-rich countries, diamond-rich countries, gold-rich countries, 
copper-rich countries, etc. 
 
3.1.2.   The Distinct Nature of Natural Resource Wealth 
Given the statistical caveat that correlation is not causation, resource curse sceptics have 
argued that although studies have shown that the abundance of natural resources - “or at least 
an abundance of particular types of natural resources – and various development outcomes 
are correlated with one another, they do not prove that the former causes the latter. Those 
arguing in favour of the notion of resource curse have merely inferred causality from the 
evidence of correlation. However, the direction of causation may in fact run the other way”381 
(emphasis is original).  
 
In the above vein, Andrew Rosser states that proponents of the resource curse thesis pose the 
wrong question when they ask why natural resource-endowment promotes diverse political 
diseases and consequently leads to poor development. For Rosser, the right question to ask is; 
which dynamics, both political and social, allow some natural resource-endowed countries to 
use their natural resource-endowment to foster development on the one hand and do not allow 
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other natural resource-endowed countries to use their natural resource-endowment to foster 
development on the other hand.
382
   
 
In the following discussion I will show how natural resource-endowment and 
(under)development are linked with each other in terms of both correlation and causation. 
Empirical works have been done to support the resource curse thesis. In 1995, Jeffery Sachs 
and Andrew Warner
383
 empirically showed that from 1970 to 1989, averagely the growth 
rates of many resource-rich countries were about 1% slower than the growth rate of non-
resource-rich countries.  
 
Sachs and Warner’s empirical findings have been corroborated by Leite and Weidmann’s 
empirical findings in 1999, and Bravo-Ortega and de Gregorio’s empirical findings in 
2001.
384
 In 1999, Leite and Weidmann
385
 empirically showed that resource-rich countries are 
prone to corruption. Before then, Mauro
386
 had empirically shown in 1995 that resource-rich 
countries are prone to corruption. In the same year, 1995, Lane and Tornell
387
 empirically 
showed the susceptibility of resource-rich countries to rent-seeking.  
  
In 1999, Ricky Lam and Leonard Wantchekon empirically showed that “a one percent 
increase in the size of the natural resource sector generates a decrease by half a percentage 
point in the probability of survival of democratic regimes”388 Also in 1999, Wantchekon 
empirically showed that “a one percent increase in resource dependence as measured by the 
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ratio of primary exports to GDP” results in an increment of almost eight percent in the 
possibility of dictatorship.
389
   
Furthermore, in 1998 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler
390
 empirically showed that resource-
rich countries, compared to non-resource-rich countries, are more prone to civil conflicts. 
According to them, non-resource-rich countries only have a 0.5% probability of civil 
conflicts. But resource rich countries with 26% of resources to GDP have a 23% probability 
of civil conflicts. 
Macartan Humphreys et al. argue that in order to understand resource curse, we must first 
understand why and how natural resource wealth differs from other types of wealth of 
countries.  They mention that the former differs from the latter in two ways which are as 
follow. The first fact is that, “unlike other sources of wealth, natural resource wealth does not 
need to be produced. It simply needs to be extracted (even if there is often nothing simple 
about the extraction process). Since it is not a result of a productive process, the generation of 
natural resource wealth can occur quite independently of other economic processes that take 
place in a country; it is, in a number of ways, ‘enclaved.’” 391 The second factor is that oil, 
gas, and many other natural resources are non-renewable resources. Thus, economically these 
resources should be properly seen as assets rather than sources of income.
392
  
The above factors generate a host of problems among which, and the most of which, is ‘rent-
seeking behaviour.’  Since the value of the natural resources usually far outweighs the cost of 
their extraction, anyone who is able to secure the license to exploit the resources is 
automatically in a lucrative business. For this reason, there is usually a scramble for 
exploration of natural resources which often leads to negative political and economic 
consequences in resource-cursed countries. In other words, a gap commonly referred to as 
economic rent exists between the value of that resource and the costs of extracting it. In such 
cases, individuals, private sectors or politicians, have incentives to use political mechanisms 
to capture these rents.  
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As Ricky Lam and Leonard Wantchekon assert, given their empirical finding, “a one percent 
increase in the size of the natural resource sector generates a decrease by half a percentage 
point in the probability of survival of democratic regimes,” and this is the case due to “elite 
discretion over the process of rent distribution.”393 Furthermore, as Wantchekon asserts, 
given his empirical finding, “a one percent increase in resource dependence as measured by 
the ratio of primary exports to GDP” results in an almost eight percent increment in the 
possibility of dictatorship.
394
 Unbridled avenues exploited by political elites and 
multinational corporations who connive and combine to engender rent-seeking make complex 
and exacerbate the negative political and economic consequences of natural resource-
endowment.
395
  
 
Several experts have argued that the abundance of natural resources contributes to resource 
curse in two other ways. First, because the government can always extract a natural resource 
and get revenue for it, it does not bother about making any investment. Hence the country 
becomes a spendthrift rather than an investor. Second, since it is very easy for the 
government to get revenue from natural resource, the government will not (sufficiently) tax 
its citizens. And given that the citizens are not (sufficiently) taxed, they will not bother to 
check the government’s income and expenditure because they the citizens will not have the 
feeling that their personal money is being spent. This makes the country a rentier state, i.e., a 
state suffering the rentier effect, a socially undesirable and economically and politically 
harmful situation in which governments use large revenues accruing from the sales of natural 
resources to pacify pressure and opposition, evade accountability and abstain from 
institutional reform.
396
  
The first argument is an economic issue, and the solution is thus economic; the government 
should engage in long term investments that will bring reasonable returns in terms of 
development. The second argument is a political issue, and the crust of the argument is that 
unless citizens are (sufficiently) taxed, they will not care how the government goes about 
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spending. In other words, citizens are only concerned with that portion of the revenue that is 
made up of their taxes.  
 
I contend that while the second argument is sometimes true in some cases, it is not always 
true in all cases. Some citizens may not be very enthusiastic about how government spends 
revenue because it is not their tax money. Nevertheless, a large portion of the population will 
still be concerned. In the case of Nigeria, given that governmental financial mismanagement 
has given rise to numerous protests and industrial actions, I am convinced that majority of 
citizens are just as concerned with how their national wealth is squandered whether it is from 
taxation or from natural resources.  
 
However, what I will agree with totally is that the government’s easiness to get revenue from 
natural resource extraction promotes corruption.  First, other things equal, less amount of 
money is realized from taxation than natural resources. Second, it is more difficult to divert 
money from taxation into personal purse because there seems to be a more accurate 
accounting for the money realised from taxation and as a result cover-ups are more difficult. 
Third, on the one hand although politicians might be actively involved in the levying of taxes 
or setting tax rates, the collection of taxes is basically left to the domain of civil service. On 
the other hand politicians in a country like Nigeria have a knack for interfering with the 
process of collecting oil revenue.  
 
Fourth, on the one hand, in the process of collection of taxes, foreign governments and 
multinational corporations have little or no economic interest to corrupt the government; 
except to get lower taxes, tax credit, or to be tax-free. On the other hand, in the process of the 
extraction of natural resources, foreign governments and multinational corporations have an 
economic interest to corrupt the government. As Jeffery Sachs says, the excessive reliance on 
one or few resources like oil, gas, gold, diamonds, etc., tends to drive countries to chronic or 
colossal corruption and violent struggles. In addition, foreign countries that also depend on 
these resources of such resource-rich countries aggravate the problem of corruption
397
 
through various questionable activities they engage in to get natural resources at a low cost.  
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Rent-seeking (as discussed above) and the Dutch disease are the two major problems 
associated with resource curse. The Dutch disease simply means “the currency appreciation 
due to resource revenue and its negative effect on the competitive position of other 
industries.”398 The term ‘Dutch disease’ was first used by The Economist in 1977 to describe 
the economic situation of the Netherlands then.
399
 The Dutch disease, as the name suggests, 
originated in the Netherlands when the country discovered natural gas in the North Sea in the 
1960s/70s. The Netherlands shifted focus from manufacturing industries to the gas industry 
which resulted in the manufacturing sector performing poorly.  
 
The Dutch disease has the following pattern: 
A sudden rise in the value of natural resource exports produces an appreciation in the 
real exchange rate. This in turn makes exporting non-natural resource commodities 
more difficult and competing with imports across a wide range of commodities almost 
impossible (called the ‘spending effect’). Foreign exchange earned from the natural 
resource meanwhile may be used to purchase internationally traded goods, at the 
expense of domestic manufacturers of the goods. Simultaneously, domestic resources 
such as labour and materials are shifted to the natural resource sector (called the 
‘resource pull effect’).400  
The above scenario leads to a situation whereby the prices of manufactured goods will rise, 
and this will in turn raise the cost of manufacturing. In a nutshell, shifting focus to the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources leads to the abandonment of other sectors. In 
the case of the Netherlands, shifting focus to the exploration and exploitation of natural gas 
led to the abandonment of the manufacturing sector. In the case of developing countries, 
shifting focus to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources usually leads to the 
abandonment of the agricultural sector.
401
 For instance, in the case of Nigeria, shifting focus 
to the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas led to the abandonment of the agricultural 
sector.  
The solution is not that the Netherlands should have focused on manufacturing or developing 
countries should focus on agriculture or Nigeria should focus on agriculture rather than oil 
and gas. Rather the solution is that, taking into consideration absolute and comparative 
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advantages, diversification is the best possible option. Because, a diversified economy, rather 
than a mono-product economy - or an almost mono-product economy - is a safer way to 
stable economic growth in particular and economic development in general.   
Alongside rent-seeking and the Dutch disease, there are other problems associated with 
resource curse such as unequal expertise, volatility, living off your capital, insufficient 
investments (in education, health, etc.), spoliation, weak and unaccountable states, threats to 
democracy, grievances in producing regions, military challenges to governments, political 
and economic interactions,
402
 etc. However, most of these problems are either generated by 
rent-seeking or the Dutch disease or a combination of both. Hence I am focusing on rent-
seeking and the Dutch disease rather than on these problems. Nevertheless I will discuss a 
couple of the problems as a way of giving us an insight into what they are.  
Unequal expertise has to do with the fact that in many cases, international companies have a 
superior know-how in mineral exploration than developing countries that possess the 
resources. Although it is not all resources that are very expensive and challenging to explore 
and exploit, the exploration and exploitation of some resources like oil and gas is at once 
capital and technological intensive. Hence in the extraction of oil and gas, usually 
governments need to cooperate with multinational corporations that have the technical know-
how, the wherewithal and long experience in the industry. In numerous instances, 
unfortunately, this cooperation results in a situation whereby the multinational corporations 
are more knowledgeable about, and have more information (information asymmetry) on, the 
oil and gas than the government. Consequently, the multinational corporations have a 
bargaining leverage on the government.
403
  
There are solutions that can be proffered to the above problem of unequal expertise. The 
government can choose to stop cooperating with international companies and rather 
cooperate with local companies. But this solution does not quite work well. Presumably, the 
local companies might not have the high capital and technology of the international 
companies. Even if the former has the high capital and technology of the latter, being local 
does not necessarily mean that the former will be patriotic. The former might just be as 
opportunistic as the latter. Hence a more plausible solution might be for resource-rich 
countries to find ways to contract with companies, especially the high capital and 
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technologically advanced ones which are mostly international, such that both parties will 
fairly share the disadvantages and advantages of their contract.
404
  
As Macartan Humphreys et al. say, if there are many companies with high capital and know-
how, this will lead to competition which will be favourable to host countries. However, 
competition is not that rampant in the exploration industry
405
 given the huge level of capital 
required for exploration. Also, the companies do not always act alone. Sometimes, in the case 
of foreign companies, they are supported by their foreign governments. Companies can bribe 
their governments in order to get the support of their governments in doing illegal or 
unethical business with agents of resource-rich countries.  
On the problem of volatility, volatility is simply “the fluctuation in commodity prices and its 
disruptive effects.”406 The problem has to do with the fact that exporting countries have little 
or no control over the timing of resource revenues. In other words, resource revenue is 
volatile
407
 and this volatility “comes from three sources: the variation over time in rates of 
extraction, the variability in the timing of payments by corporations to states, and fluctuations 
in the value of the natural resource produced.”408 While the volatility problem might be 
relatively manageable in terms of some natural resources, the level of price volatility when it 
comes to oil and gas is very high.  
High volatility of prices leads to high volatility of revenues. High volatility of revenues leads 
to high volatility of expenditure. And high volatility of expenditure leads to high volatility in 
economic development and the living standard of citizens. Basically, a high level of 
uncertainty characterizes the whole economy of the resource-rich country; and this is 
obviously a recipe for anxiety in the ‘present’ and disaster in the ‘future’ for resource-cursed 
countries.  
Still on volatility, natural resources can be used as collaterals by resource rich-countries. 
When prices of certain natural resources are high, countries rich in those resources will earn 
more revenue. But also such natural resource rich-countries and lenders - being confident that 
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debt will be repaid - tend to do business. Such countries have the leverage to borrow more 
and lenders are induced to lend more. But when prices are low, lenders - usually lacking the 
confidence that those countries will be able to repay their debt the lower the prices of their 
natural resources - demand for repayment.
409
  Hence, the level of volatility in the economy 
becomes even higher and citizens suffer the negative consequences. 
 
3.1.3.   Natural Resource Wealth and Overlapping Curses 
The foregoing discussion has been centred on the problem that many countries, notably less 
developed countries, that get a huge proportion of their revenue from the export of very 
valuable natural resources are liable to the affliction of resource curse. Leif Wenar asserts 
they are liable to be afflicted by three overlapping curses. The first curse is proneness to 
authoritarianism. Here authoritarianism stands for any sort of despotism or dictatorship 
whereby power is illegitimately concentrated in the hands of a single or few persons whose 
main instrument of governance is violence or the threat of violence. The second curse is 
higher risk of civil conflict and the third curse is lower rates of growth.
410
  
In the same vein, Pogge argues that underdevelopment and conflicts characterise many 
resource-rich developing countries because of the lure of the benefits from governing such 
countries. As usually happens in resource-rich developing countries with corrupt leaders, a 
huge part of the funds realized from the selling of the resources goes into the private pockets 
of the corrupt leaders. Furthermore, such leaders can use the natural resources of their 
countries as collaterals to get loans. Like the revenues from the sales of resources, a huge 
percentage of the loans borrowed by such corrupt leaders is embezzled. Since a huge 
percentage of any money borrowed goes into the private pockets of such leaders at the 
expense of the country, this incentivises them, and gives them the funds, to perpetuate 
themselves in power. These situations worsen the condition of resource-rich developing 
countries, and encourage rogues to want to come to power because of the benefits.
411
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Similarly, Wenar argues that there is a correlation between resource curse and 
authoritarianism because authoritarians can enhance their power by selling valuable natural 
resources and use the huge revenue to boost their repressive apparatus in order to repress and 
suppress any domestic resistance to their authoritarian rule. Also since authoritarians do not 
have to levy tax to get any revenue, they have no sense of responsibility for or accountability 
to the people or tax payers. Finally authoritarians can use their slush funds to bribe persons or 
leaders or movements that pose any threat of resistance to their regime.
412
  
In terms of civil conflicts – civil war and coup d’états – the desire to gain control over 
abundant valuable natural resources and the enormous economic benefits from such control 
make civil wars and coup d’états rampant. Without these resources or the revenues accrued 
from them: many rebels and military governments cannot sustain their militaries or prosecute 
expensive civil wars; also the incentives for coup d’états would have been lower.413 Although 
many coup plotters cite injustice, unfairness and bad governance as their reasons for carrying 
out a coup, actually often the two major reasons are power and money. No wonder when they 
take over they become, sooner than later, just as ruthless and corrupt as their predecessors or 
just as guilty of the charges they levelled at the regime they toppled. 
Without the economic incentive, the power incentive would often be the only major incentive 
for coup d’états; hence reducing the instances of coups. Also, since many people, 
corporations and states that support military regimes do so because of the economic 
incentive, they too will have no incentive to support military regimes. When we look at many 
resource-cursed countries we see how conflicts, coup d’états or strong men can drive 
countries to the brink. “Abundant resources are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
authoritarian repression, civil conflict, or low growth.”414 But abundant resources make 
countries prone to the above curses.  
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When we combine the two curses of authoritarianism and civil conflicts with corruption, the 
Dutch disease, price volatility, unequal expertise, insufficient investments, etc. then we have 
a recipe for low growth; hence the third curse namely low rates of growth. “The more a 
country relies on exporting minerals, the worse its standard of living tends to be. Resource 
dependence is correlated, for example, with...higher poverty rates and lower life 
expectancy.”415 Finally, the above sort of over-dependence on natural resources by resource-
rich states is internal over-dependence. There is another sort of over-dependence which is 
external over-dependence.  
In external over-dependence, powerful countries over-depend on the natural resources of 
developing countries. This leads to aggressive resource competition which in turn is likely to 
result in resource conflicts and consequently underdevelopment and insecurity. There is no 
doubt that the scramble for Africa and the subsequent partitioning of Africa by European 
colonialists had, among other things, a lot to do with natural resources. In post-independence 
Africa there is still what Dino Mahtani refers to as “new scramble for Africa’s resources”416 
and what John Ghazvinian refers to as the scramble for Africa’s oil.417  
There is nowhere in the world that the resource curse and the overlapping curses of resource 
curse are more manifested than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, at this juncture, I shall switch 
my general focus to a special focus on the sub-continent and use the remainder of this chapter 
to discuss the nature and consequences of resource curse on the sub-continent. Countries such 
as Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo shall be used to highlight the 
dismal condition of the sub-continent in terms of resource curse 
 
3.2.     Resource-Cursed Sub-Saharan Africa 
Although the GDPs of Sub-Saharan African countries have recently risen, the sub-continent 
has experienced woeful economic performance for five decades. On average, from 1960 to 
2008, the per capita GDP of the sub-continent only grew at the ratio of 0.74% annually 
compared to East Asia’s 5.47%, South Asia’s 2.78%, Latin America’s 1.83% and low income 
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economies’ 1.67%.418 Although the sub-continent’s ratio of natural resource exports to total 
merchandise exports has dropped from 77% to 65%, in 2006 this was still far higher than that 
of low income economies which was about 49% and that of middle income economies which 
was about 41%.
419
  
In Africa, as it is in developing countries, extractive industries have an enclaved nature, i.e., 
“they are oriented to external markets and may have few linkages to the domestic 
economy.”420 Given that many of these natural resources are non-renewable, non-
reproducible and immobile, extractors reap large benefits from scarcity rents.
421
 This partially 
accounts for why many resource-rich Sub-Saharan African countries are not only poverty-
stricken but are also chronically corrupt as they form the bunch of the most corrupt countries 
in the world.  
The ‘unholy alliance’ between the powerful elites of these countries and multinational 
corporations (MNCs) has devastated these countries. In the natural resource sector of 
developing countries, morally and legally corrupt practices by MNCs are the order of the day. 
Elf Aquitaine, with its corrupt deals in Africa from the 1980s to the 1990s, is a poster child of 
such MNCs.
422
 The unholy alliance is so banal to the extent that it is common knowledge that 
the extractive industry is a play ground for corruption practitioners.  
Alongside the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP), the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and 
similar transparency requirements proposed by the European Commission seem to be steps in 
the right direction in terms of curbing corrupt practices in the extractive industry. 
Unfortunately, on Dodd-Frank, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the United 
States of America “has so far stalled in issuing the final disclosure rules for companies. In the 
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meantime, the industry campaigns to dilute or abandon the reforms.”423 While the European 
Union (EU) member states, and the EU parliament, are stalling on approving the European 
Commission’s proposals.424  
Many of the Sub-Saharan African countries are not only chronically corrupt and poverty 
stricken, they are also conflict stricken. These countries are not just plagued by ordinary 
conflicts; many of them have actually been plagued by civil wars. In West Africa, Cote 
D’Ivoire is just re-emerging from the rubbles of a civil war. Mali has just barely survived a 
civil war. Chad has just returned from the brink of a civil war. Nigeria fought a civil war from 
1967 to 1970. Sierra Leone fought a civil war that brought the country to its knees. Sierra 
Leone is now infamous for its ‘blood diamonds.’ Liberia with monstrous Charles Taylor is 
another story altogether. Chad, Mali and Niger are hubs of Al Qaeda. While Nigeria is the 
home of Boko Haram which has spread to parts of Cameroun, Chad and Niger.  
In Central Africa, the DRC has been an arena of two devastating civil wars since the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961. As for East and Central Africa, with Joseph Kone 
and his Lord’s Resistance Army shuttling between East and Central Africa, moving around 
Uganda, DRC and Rwanda, peace is still far from the people of that axis. In East Africa, the 
dictator Yoweri Musoveni and the rebel Joseph Kone have turned Uganda into a theatre of 
conflicts. Sudan was split into two countries by its civil war. In Southern Africa, Angola, 
having already fought a thirteen-year liberation war, fought a twenty-five year civil war from 
1977 to 2002. 
In Equatorial Guinea, the autocratic Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo who has been in 
power since 1979 has epitomized absolute dictatorship to the extent that he describes himself 
as “the country’s God.”425 Having personalised the country and its oil wealth, no wonder he 
feels like the God of the country. Since 1995, a nineteen-year-period, the country’s average 
daily export of oil has been 400,000 barrels, “a bonanza that has made the country wealthier 
in terms of GDP per capita than France, Japan and the United Kingdom. Little of this wealth, 
however, has helped the vast majority of Equatorial Guinea’s 700,000 people; today, three 
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out of every four Equatorial Guineans live on less than $2 a day.”426 Since oil was discovered 
in the 1990s, Equatorial Guinea has become a rich country; but a rich country with very poor 
people.  
Africa’s third largest oil exporter behind Angola and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea as of 2007 
“has the fourth highest average income in the world: 15 percent higher than the per capita 
income of the United States.”427 Equatorial Guinea’s oil reserves are more than one billion 
barrels. Yet Equatorial Guineans are some of the poorest people in the world and the average 
Equatorial Guinean lives in abject poverty. 
Obiang, whose personal wealth was US$ 600 million in 2007, and expectedly far higher now, 
spent US$ 55 million to purchase a sixth private jet in addition to five private jets he already 
has, while “raw sewage runs through the streets of the country’s capital, three quarters of the 
country’s people are malnourished, and the majority of its citizens survive on less than ...$1 a 
day.”428 In 2010, alarmingly, 75% of Equatorial Guineans lived on less than US$700 per 
annum while the country had Africa’s highest per capita income of about US$ 35,000.429 
Like father, like son! Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mangue who is the heir apparent to the 
‘throne’ and the oldest of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo’s sons, has followed the 
corruption footsteps of his father. Apart from his wealth in Equatorial Guinea and Paris, he 
owned assets in Malibu, California which were worth US$71 million in October, 2011.
430
 No 
wonder John Ghazvinian describes Equatorial Guinea, and aptly so, as “a family business 
masquerading as a country.”431 After all, Equatorial Guinea is more of an ‘Equatorial 
Business’ than an Equatorial country! 
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Although Gabon’s daily production of oil is around 300,000 barrels, the majority of the 
people wallow in abject poverty while the extremely rich few lavish the oil money on 
themselves. “At one point, Gabon was the world’s largest per-capita importer of 
champagne.”432  Despite decades of oil production, Chad remains one of the poorest countries 
in the world “with 80% of its citizens living below the poverty line.”433 We can go on and on 
mentioning case after case and country after country; the final analysis is that the situation of 
the sub-continent is a misnomer. So, rather than keep mentioning case after case and country 
after country, I shall concentrate on some of the worst cases and countries namely Nigeria, 
Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
3.3.1.    The Nigerian Context 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria comprises thirty six states and the federal capital territory. 
Nigeria is a West African country with an area of 923,768 km
2
 and 356,667 sq mile; bordered 
by Benin Republic in the west, Chad and Cameroun in the east, Niger Republic in the north, 
and the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean in the south. Nigeria gained political 
independence from the United Kingdom on October 1, 1960 and became a republic on 
October 1, 1963. Its Lingual Franca is English Language, and has over 250 ethnic groups 
with about 520 languages. In the last census which was taken in 2006, it was estimated that 
Nigeria has a population of 150,000,000. In July 2011, the United Nations estimated that 
Nigeria has a population of 162, 471,000 while in July 2012 the CIA World Factbook 
estimated Nigeria’s population to be 170,123,740. 
Since political independence, Nigeria has had twenty-four years of woefully disappointing 
civilian rule and thirty years of brutal military dictatorship. Alongside the civil war, the 
numerous religious and ethnic conflicts, there have been assassinations of heads of state;   
Tafawa Balewa in January, 1966 and Aguiyi Ironsi in July, 1966. There have been several 
coups: Awolowo planned coup, 1963; Five Majors Coup in January, 1966; Northern Military 
Officers Coup in July, 1966; Mohammed Coup in July, 1975; Dimka Coup in February, 
1976; Buhari Coup in December, 1983; Babangida Coup in August, 1985; Vatsa Coup in 
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December, 1985; Orkar Coup in April, 1990; Abacha Coup in November, 1993; Obasanjo 
and Others Coup in 1995; and Diya and Others Coup in 1997.
434
  
A look at Nigeria reveals some very obvious facts. Nigeria has a lot of natural resources that 
if well managed will surely make its citizenry better-off. Also Nigeria has a lot of human 
resources that if well managed will make the country and its citizenry better-off. Nigeria has 
a lot of potentials that if well harnessed will make the country and its citizenry better-off. On 
the other hand, there are facts that are even more evident. Corruption has become part and 
parcel of the Nigerian system. Religious tensions are rife. Ethnicism has become very 
cancerous. Violence has been normalised. And poverty is the fate of the vast majority of 
Nigerians.  
In my opinion the civil war is the greatest catastrophe that has befallen Nigeria since the 
October 1, 1960 independence. But Nigeria was able to navigate its way through the civil war 
and still remains ‘one Nigeria’, although with unnecessary lost of numerous precious lives 
and properties. But nothing, not even the civil war, has plagued Nigeria for so long like the 
resource curse. Without the resource curse, corruption and poverty would have been at the 
barest minimum, and conflicts would have been reduced drastically. Hence, by the Nigerian 
context I shall mean the impact of resource curse on Nigeria or what I refer to as ‘resource-
cursed Nigeria.’  
The years 1956 to 2014, a fifty-eight-year period, is my focus. I am choosing this time period 
because oil was discovered in 1956 in Oloibiri (in Bayelsa State) by Shell-BP and extraction 
started in 1958. Over ninety percent of Nigeria’s income comes from oil and gas.435 With an 
estimated 2,211, 000 barrels extraction per day in 2009, Nigeria is the 7
th
 largest Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil producing country and the 14
th
 largest oil 
producing country in the world.
436
 It used to be the largest African oil producing country; it is 
now the second African oil producing and exporting country. With over 35.5 billion barrels 
of reserve, Nigeria has the world’s tenth largest oil reserves making it the 10th largest oil 
country in the world. It has over 187 trillion cubic feet (2800 km) of gas reserves which 
triples the amount of crude oil it has. This makes Nigeria’s gas reserve the largest natural gas 
reserve on the African continent and the 9
th
 largest in the world. 
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Forty percent of oil revenue goes to the oil companies and sixty percent goes to the 
government, and the federal government gives an oil-producing state thirteen percent of the 
oil revenue that the federal government realises from that state. The oil producing states are 
Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Oil was 
discovered in Anambra in 2012 and the state will start production soon.  
The oil producing states are known as the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is so-called because it 
is the delta of the River Niger. Actually, before the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta, it was 
predominantly a palm oil producing delta. Hence the British named it the British Oil Rivers 
Protectorate in 1885 when it became a British protectorate until 1893 when, with the addition 
of more territory, it became the Niger Coast Protectorate.  
The Niger Delta originally consisted of present day Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers States. But 
every oil-producing state is now officially considered to be part of the Niger Delta since 2000 
AD when the government of Olusegun Obasanjo named Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo, 
Imo and Ondo States as part of the Niger Delta. Altogether these states have around six 
hundred and six oil wells. It is estimated that the Niger Delta hosts three percent of the 
world’s oil. 
Oil, being the most lucrative commodity on the commodities market, generates billions of 
dollars. No wonder some of the largest corporations in the world are oil companies. For about 
a period of thirty years, from the 1940s to early 1970s, the oil industry was dominated by the 
Seven Sisters/Super Majors/Big Oil (before various mergers and acquisitions). From the early 
1970s dominance was wrested from the Seven Sisters by the New Seven Sisters/New Super 
Majors. Four of the Seven Sisters/Super Majors were operating in Nigeria, three are still 
operating today, and two of the New Seven Sisters/Super Majors are operating in Nigeria.  
Together, the Seven Sisters and the New Seven Sisters top the list of the twenty-five biggest 
oil companies in the world.
437
 Eleven of these twenty-five companies had presence in 
Nigeria. Today, ten of them are still present. Alongside these ten, several oil companies are 
present in Nigeria. They include: the biggest oil company in Nigeria namely the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company whose parent company is the Royal Dutch Shell (Anglo-
Dutch); the former British Petroleum (BP) - now African Petroleum (AP); Texaco 
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(American) – now Chevron (American); ExxonMobil (American); ConocoPhillips 
(American); Total (French); Elf Aquitaine which is now a major brand of Total (French); Eni 
(Italian); Agip which is a subsidiary of Eni (Italian); StatoilHydro (Norwegian); former 
Addax Petroleum (Swiss) - now Sinopec (Chinese); Petrobras (Brazilian); Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); etc. 
From 1965 to 2000, “Nigeria’s cumulative revenues from oil (after deducting the payments to 
the foreign oil companies) have amounted to about US$350 billion at 1995 prices. In 1965, 
when oil revenues per capita were about US$33, per capita GDP was US$245. In 2000, when 
oil revenues were US$325 per capita, per capita GDP remained at the 1965 level.”438 In 
Nigeria, annual oil exports yield revenues of between six billion and ten billion US dollars 
which in turn make up around 25 percent of the GDP.
439
  
As Leif Wenar says, different Nigerian governments from 1970 to 2000 earned around three 
hundred billion US dollars as petroleum revenue. But “during this period the percentage of 
Nigerians living in extreme poverty ($1 per day) increased from 36 percent to almost 70 
percent. Meanwhile inequality skyrocketed and corruption was everywhere evident in the 
Nigerian government.”440 After fifty-six years of oil extraction and over seven hundred 
billion dollars of oil revenue, Nigeria is still a developing country with most of its citizens 
wallowing in abject poverty. 
In a country characterised by an abysmal social infrastructure, Nigerian roads are literally 
death-traps, the aviation is known for plane crashes, and with no reliable electricity supply 
Nigeria is the highest consumer of power generators in the world. With an abysmally high 
poverty rate, half of the population lives in abject poverty surviving on less than one US 
dollar or one hundred and seventy naira per day.  
From 1970 to 2000 the number of those subsisting on less than US$1 per day increased from 
35% to almost 70%. While “in 1970 the top 2 percent and the bottom 17 percent of the 
population earned the same total amount of income, in 2000 the top 2 percent had the same 
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total amount of income as the bottom 55 percent.”441 This is a reflection of the well-known 
fact that “Nigeria has been a disastrous development experience. On just about every 
conceivable metric, Nigeria’s performance since independence has been dismal. In PPP 
terms, Nigeria’s per capita GDP was US$1,113 in 1970 and ...US$1,084 in 2000.”442 These 
statistics make Nigeria one of the poorest countries in the world.  
Despite being the 26
th
 largest economy in the world and the largest economy in Africa, 
Nigeria’s wealth does not trickle down to the average citizen. Hence, the average citizen 
remains a poor citizen in a rich country. For this reason, although Nigeria is theoretically one 
of the richest countries in the world, it is practically one of the poorest countries in the world. 
The best and simplest way to define Nigeria paradoxically is to say it is a rich country with 
poor people.  
Given the above-mentioned negative characteristics of Nigeria, unsurprisingly it is one of 
“the 20 countries in the world with the widest gap between rich and poor....Nigeria has one of 
the highest Gini indexes
443
 in the world - for Nigeria, it is 50.6”444 In the year 2000, United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that Nigeria’s real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) between the years 1977 and 1998 suffered a 22 percent decline – on average, 
a more than 1 percent decline for a continuous period of 21 years. 
 
On 22 November, 2012 the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), in its 2013 “Where-To-Be-
Born Index,” ranked Nigeria as the worst of eighty countries. Nigeria had the lowest score of 
4.74 points. Out of the eighty countries assessed, Nigeria was ranked 80
th
. Hence among the 
eighty countries, Nigeria was the worst country to be born in.
445
 In other words, none of the 
respondents would want to be born in Nigeria.
446
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Transparency International rated Nigeria’s literacy level of 60.8 percent around 175th in the 
world. The education system is in shambles, and those who can afford better education go to 
the United States of America, Europe, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Ghana, etc. In the 
UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), Nigeria is ranked 156
th
, with  life expectancy of 
51.9 years, $2,069 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in PPP terms, 0.278 inequality-
adjustment HDI value, 0.471 HDI value, and with 5 years mean years of schooling of adults.  
We have to bear in mind Mahbub Ul Haq’s, Amartya Sen’s and others’ caveat on how to 
calculate well-being; meaning that we have to go beyond income of persons. So employing 
the HDI which Ul Haq and Sen created and is used by the UNDP; in 2011 Nigeria was 
ranked 157th out of 187 countries by the UNDP HDI. This made Nigeria a low HDI country 
and part of the fourth tier of the HDI.
447
 
A 2008 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report on Nigeria shows that sixty-four 
percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line of US$1.25, and only fifty-eight percent of 
the population has access to clean drinking water while only thirty-two percent has access to 
improved sanitation facilities. However, I disagree with the above data. Having lived in and 
regularly visits different parts of the country from the south to the north, and from the east to 
the west, in villages, towns and cities, what I see seems even worse than UNICEF reported.  
Concerning health issues, generally the Nigerian health system is at best malfunctioning. 
There is prevalence of fake drugs, and hospitals are in shambles. As a testament to the above 
claim, usually the rich and powerful go to India, Europe, United States of America, Canada, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, etc. for medical treatment. In World Bank’s estimation, “public 
spending per capita on health is less than $5 - and is as low as $2 in some parts of Nigeria - 
which contrasts with the $34 recommended for low-income countries by the World Health 
Organization.”448 The inefficient health system has particularly affected women. Nigeria is 
the second country, behind India, with the highest amount of maternal mortality rate. In 
Nigeria, according to Friday Okonofua - the Executive Director, Women Health and Action 
Research Centre (WHARC) - at least forty thousand woman die each year due to maternity 
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problems. This figure means fourteen percent of worldwide maternity deaths occur in Nigeria 
yearly.
449
 
 
3.3.2.  The Main Economic Aspect of the Nigerian Resource Curse: The Dutch Disease 
The resource curse is largely responsible for the decay and poverty in Nigeria. Both the 
economic and political aspects of the resource curse are prevalent in Nigeria. On the 
economic side, the two diseases which Nigeria has clearly caught are the Dutch disease and 
the volatility problem. But the former is by far the one that has affected Nigeria more. 
Moreover, the effects of the latter are especially devastating when the former exists. But in 
the absence of the former, the effects of the latter are almost always minimal. This is because 
it is the failure to diversify – consequently the over reliance on one commodity – that makes 
the volatility in the price of, and revenue from, that commodity send shock waves through the 
spines of the economy of a country.  
Before the discovery of oil in 1956, and even after the discovery of oil until the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the mainstay of the Nigerian economy was agriculture. Since the discovery 
of oil, the agricultural sector has become neglected and almost forgotten. The northern part of 
the country was producing groundnut and cotton, the eastern part was producing kola nut and 
palm oil, the western part was producing cocoa, and the mid-west was producing rubber and 
palm produce, so on and so forth.  
Nigeria was the world’s leading palm oil and vegetable oil producer in the 1960s and early 
1970s. Malaysia sent some Malaysians to the Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research 
(NIFOR) in the 1960s to learn from Nigeria how to propagate palm. Malaysia got the first 
palm seedlings they cultivated from NIFOR. Today, Nigeria cannot even produce enough 
palm oil and vegetable oil for its local consumption, talk less of exporting.  
Nigeria currently imports palm oil and vegetable oil produce from Malaysia in order to meet 
its local consumption demand. This has nothing to do with Nigeria having comparative 
advantage in international trade; it is rather a fact and consequence of the Dutch disease. As 
conceded by President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria’s excessive reliance on oil and gas has 
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devastated the Nigerian economy.
450
 While the Nigerian palm sector is almost non-existent 
today, Malaysia has grown to be the second producer of palm oil, behind Indonesia, and its 
palm oil industry employs about six thousand people.  
Alongside the Dutch disease, the volatility problem which often gives rise to borrowing and 
debt has affected Nigeria over the years. In the extraction industry, “Future prices are not 
known with certainty and, historically, have been highly volatile.”451 Due to volatilities in 
production and prices of oil and gas, the Nigerian economy as a whole has suffered. 
Regarding volatility of the growth rate of Nigeria’s GDP, it rises when oil prices rises and 
falls when oil prices fall. Adding other undesirable economic factors to the volatility 
problem, Nigeria’s economy is a non-stable one and it is even more unstable than the 
economies of many other oil producing countries.
452
  
Of particular notice is Nigeria’s debt. For instance, in December, 2000 when Nigeria 
attempted to reschedule its debt, the principal was US$10.3 billion, the interest arrears was 
US$4.45 billion and late interest was US$5.18 billion. Having had a rescheduling agreement, 
the principal was USD$1.48 billion, the principal arrears was USD$10.31 billion, the interest 
arrears was USD$4.45 billion while the late interest arrears was USD$5.18 billion.
453
 
Furthermore, from 2002 to 2003, due to depreciation of the US dollars – the currency of the 
debt - there was a US$4 billion increment in Nigeria’s debt profile.454  
 
In the second half of the 1980s, in the face of severe balance of payments, the Ibrahim 
Babangida government accepted the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank to adopt the structural adjustment programmes. Although this was allegedly 
aimed at ensuring that Nigeria was able to service, at that time, its 28 billion dollars foreign 
debt and sustain a healthy economy, it led to a mass retrenchment of workers thereby taking 
the level of employment to a record high and consequently increasing the level of poverty in 
the country.  
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3.3.3.    The Main Political Economy Aspect of the Nigerian Resource Curse: Rent-Seeking 
The problem of resource curse is at once a problem of economics on the one hand and 
political economy on the other hand. The political economy problem is usually seen as a 
political problem and a political philosophy problem. This is quite apt because practically the 
problem is political, but on the theoretical level it is a political philosophy problem. The 
economic issues of resource curse do not really need any political philosophy in order to be 
resolved. Sound economic theories, principles and policies are enough to deal with them. So I 
will direct my attention to where political philosophy fits, that is, the political economy, 
political philosophy, or political problem.  
Although, if the political issues are resolved without actually dealing with the economic ones, 
the resource-cursed country will in the long run suffer. So the economic issues, just like the 
political issues, should be dealt with in order for the economy to be viable. Just as the heart of 
the economic problem is the Dutch disease, the heart of the political economy, political 
philosophy, or political problem is rent-seeking. Rent-seeking is the hub which every other 
political problem revolves around.  
Rent-seeking has to do with using political means at the political realm to try to get economic 
rent. By economic rent, it is meant the variation between the total cost of production and the 
total price of the product. The product can be goods or services or both. Rent-seeking is an 
economic term. The British economist, David Ricardo, introduced the term ‘rent’ into 
economics. By rent he meant “the payment to a factor of production in excess of what is 
required to keep that factor in its present use.”455 Ricardo applied the notion of rent to land 
which was a main factor of production during his time. Although Ricardo is most famous for 
his theory of comparative advantage, it is his notion of rent that plays a crucial role in the 
analysis of resource curse. 
In the context of extractive industry, economic rent would mean “the difference between the 
value of production and the cost to extract it. The extraction cost consists of normal 
exploration, development, and operating costs as well as a share of profits for the 
industry.”456 Based on the Ricardian notion of rent, Gordon Tullock originated the idea of 
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rent-seeking in 1967 and was popularised by Anne Krueger in 1974.
457
 Rent-seeking is not 
purely economic, perhaps it is more accurately a political-economy issue – political economy 
understood as the way in which the production and use of wealth is organised by states, the 
interaction between politics and economics and how they affect each other.  
In the resource curse discourses, rent-seeking is understood to be a political problem because 
the arena in and the means by which rent is sought is political. Rent-seeking is the central 
political problem of resource curse because, although it may not be the only source, it is the 
chief source of other political problems of resource curse. The seeking of rent leads 
individuals, companies, organisations, and states to get involved in corruption, bad 
governance, abuse of human rights, dictatorship, disregard for the rule of law, so on and so 
forth. Rent-seeking has largely fuelled corruption in Nigeria, and corruption is so endemic in 
the Nigerian system that many Nigerians see it as ‘normal.’ When the abnormal is seen as 
‘normal’, then surely there is perversion in society. In this case, the long history of corruption 
has made the Nigerian society perverted. 
 
3.3.4.       Corruption 
Eleven years ago, on the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, Nigeria 
scored 1.4 out of 10 which made the country the second most corrupt country in the world.
458
 
Corruption has cancerously invaded the Nigerian body, system or context that getting rid of it 
or ‘managing’ it seems more difficult than the Herculean task of cleaning the Augean stables. 
It seems more like Pandora’s Box. Nigeria has opened the box and can no longer control the 
content that has been let out. Hence in any conceivable form of measuring corruption, and 
whatever methodological way corruption is measured, Nigeria fails woefully.  
In 2010, in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Nigeria scored 2.4 
out of 10. “The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt 
their public sector is perceived to be. A country/territory's score indicates the perceived level 
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of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a country is perceived as 
highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean. A country's rank 
indicates its position relative to the other countries/territories included in the index.”459 Hence 
out of 178 countries, Nigeria was ranked joint 134
th
 with Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Honduras, 
The Philippines, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.  
According to Sala-i-Martin, “nowhere are all the pathologies associated with oil are clearly 
manifest as in Nigeria....oil, and the institutional deterioration that it has led to, has perhaps 
been the single most important cause of Nigeria’s economic and political problems.”460 If oil 
were not a curse to Nigeria, the revenues from oil would have turned Nigeria into an African 
version of the United Arab Emirates in terms of economic development. To put this in 
perspective, consider that the Marshal Plan to rebuild Europe after the Second World War in 
current purchasing power parity is one hundred and forty-eight billion US dollars. But the 
cost of the Marshal Plan is not even up to fifty percent of the amount of oil revenue that has 
been embezzled in Nigeria.
461
  
 
Obiageli Ezekwesili - former minister of solid minerals, former minister of education and 
former World Bank Vice-President for Africa - says around four hundred billion US dollars 
of oil revenue has been embezzled by the elite one percent. This near-total embezzlement 
amounts to eighty percent of oil revenue.
462
 Nigeria is virtually a mono-product economy 
which excessively relies on oil. Since oil accounts for ninety percent of Nigeria’s export, if 
eighty percent of oil revenue has been going into the private pockets of only one percent of 
the population since independence in 1960, then most Nigerians have been subjected to 
abysmal levels of poverty.  
 
The Global Financial Integrity estimates that about two hundred and eighteen billion dollars 
left Nigeria between 1970 and 2002 for the United States of America in illicit financial flows. 
Analysts have opined that this amounts to Nigeria’s total revenue between 1970 and 1990. In 
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other words, two decades of any sort of development have been eroded due to illicit financial 
flows.  
 
Nigeria is estimated to have lost about US$380 billion to corruption between 1960 and 
2007.
463
 Some of the corruption cases include those of: the government of Babangida which 
is reported to have looted around US$12.2 billion dollars; Abacha’s government which is 
reported to have looted around US$10billion;  Abubakar’s government which is reported to 
have looted around US$2.7 billion dollars;
464
 former internal affairs minister, Sunday 
Afolabi, who is reported to have looted around  US$214 million; former  Inspector General of 
Police, Tafa Balogun, who looted over 13 billion Naira; and the former governor of Delta 
State, James Ibori, who was convicted of laundering around US$290 million. Ibori is 
currently serving a jail term in London. The former Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, stated in an interview that Ibori offered him 
fifty million dollars cash bribe which he rejected.  
 
The EFCC estimates that around US$ 400 billion of oil revenue has been stolen or 
fraudulently spent or compromised in the past five decades.
465
 It has been estimated that, with 
good record keeping, the total amount stolen from the oil sector could be nearing one trillion 
dollars. Four billion dollars was recovered from the stolen money of General Sanni Abacha 
alone. Recently, the former central bank governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who was 
arbitrarily relieved of duty by President Jonathan for being a whistle-blower, said between 
2012 and 2013 US$20 billion accrued from the sale of crude oil was not remitted to the 
national treasury by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).
466
 In other words, 
the money was embezzled. 
 
During the military dictatorship of General Sanni Abacha, each member of the Provisional 
Ruling Council (PRC) - the highest ruling body of the dictatorship - was allocated oil wells. 
So, although theoretically the oil wells were owned by the citizenry, in practice the oil wells 
were owned by military generals who belonged to the PRC. Much more alarming was that 
although those oil wells were taken over through the barrel of the gun, which makes the take- 
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over theft, robbery and illegal, the military generals were treated as having legal possession 
of the oil wells. Hence multinational oil corporations, the international community and 
individuals (both Nigerians and non-Nigerians) did ‘businesses’ with the military generals. 
This is a clear case of Pogge’s international resource privilege. 
 
General Abdusalaami Abubakar was Abacha’s Chief of Defence Staff. He was the third-in-
command and later the second-in-command in the hierarchy of the PRC. After the death of 
Abacha, Abubakar took over as the new military head of state, the commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces and the head of the PRC. Concerning his military regime, The Economist 
reported that revenues from oil were directly paid to the top-most command of government 
and General Abubakar had absolute power over and absolutely control “all the cash. He 
depend[ed] on nobody and nothing but oil. Patronage and corruption spread” from the top, 
beginning with general Abubakar, down to the bottom.
467
 
 
In November 2012, the Petroleum Revenue Task Force (PRTF), which was set up to look 
into the dismal condition of the petroleum sector in Nigeria, reported that  “estimates of crude 
oil stolen or spilled reviewed by the Task Force ranged from 6 to 30 percent of production, 
with 35 percent claimed for one especially troubled area.”468 Nigeria’s refineries are not 
functioning due to mismanagement. Hence it exports crude oil and imports refined oil which 
is a strategy aimed at maximising the opportunities for higher corruption. The country looses 
billions of naira from importing while corrupt importers gain billions of naira. This scheme 
was clear to the public to see during the January, 2012 removal of subsidies on petroleum 
products by the Jonathan government. The government accepted that there is a ‘cabal’ that 
benefits from oil importation at the expense of the country.  
 
Jeffery Sachs, who advised Nigerian governments, says Nigeria is a prototype of a resource-
cursed country. It is a corruption playground for individuals, MNCs, Nigerian governments 
and foreign governments. For instance, Halliburton – an American oil-service company – was 
convicted of enormous bribery offences in Nigeria which were committed when former 
American vice president, Dick Cheney, was its chief executive officer.
469
 Julius Berger, a 
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German construction company, acted as the intermediary between the giver of the bribe and 
the takers. 
 
On 13 October, 2009 the then US Ambassador to Nigeria - Robin Renee Sanders - met with 
Ann Pickard, the then Shell’s vice president for Sub-Saharan Africa, at the US Embassy, 
Abuja, Nigeria. Details of the meeting were revealed in a cable - ‘Nigeria: High Level 
Corruption’ – which was sent from the United States of American Embassy, Abuja, Nigeria 
to the then US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton.  
 
The cable, which was released by WikiLeaks, says;  
The Ambassador asked what the Embassy could do to help with the Joint House 
Committee on Petroleum Upstream and Downstream and Justice that is working on 
the PIB. Pickard said she hoped the current level of dialogue between the GON and 
the IOCs continues. Unfortunately, ‘We have not been able to meet with President 
Yar'Adua for nine months,’ she said. ‘They have him protected.’ She said it would be 
helpful if the Embassy would continue to deliver low-level messages of concern. In 
particular, she thought it would be helpful for the Embassy to call on Speaker of the 
House Dimeji Bankoke to see where he stood on the bill. Beyond that, she would like 
to keep the Embassy in reserve and use it as a ‘silver bullet’ if the PIB passes the 
House. The Ambassador noted that the U.S., U.K., Dutch and French Embassies had 
already made a joint call on NNPC General Managing Director Dr. Mohammed 
Barkindo.
470
 
Furthermore, the cable says;   
Pickard of Shell also reported an instance of the attorney general soliciting a $20 
million bribe to sign a document...Oil buyers would pay NNPC large bribes, millions 
of dollars per tanker, to lift oil.” ...Pickard said the Nigerian government “had 
forgotten that Shell had seconded people to all the relevant ministries and that Shell 
consequently had access to everything that was being done in Nigeria.” ...“Pickard has 
repeatedly told us she does not like to talk to USG (United States’ Government) 
officials because the USG is ‘leaky.’ She may be concerned that...bad news about 
Shell’s Nigerian operations will leak out.471 
Nigeria’s corruption problem is so serious that to tackle corruption, Olusegun Obasanjo 
established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent 
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Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). Already in existence are 
offices such as the Code of Conduct Bureau, Office of the Auditor-General and office of the 
Attorney-General that have fighting corruption as one of their aims. Nevertheless, the former 
head of EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu, was reported to have said that the Obasanjo government was 
even more corrupt than the Abacha government. Corruption is still as high as ever. Nigeria’s 
lack of transparency was aided by the Official Secrecy Act which militated against 
transparency. The act was only replaced by the Freedom of Information Act in 2011 although 
the Freedom of Information Bill originated since 1998.  
While corruption is present in every country, it is “more prevalent in emerging economies, 
developing countries and least developed countries”472 especially the resource-cursed ones of 
which Nigeria is a typical example. The vastness and seriousness of the negative effects of 
corruption have been well outlined by  development theorists including Dilip Mhookerjee and 
Ivan Png (1995), Paulo Mauro (1996), Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi (1997), Paulo Mauro 
(1998), Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1997), Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann (1999), 
Edgardo Campos and Donald Lien (1999), George Abed and Hamid Davoodi (2000), Shang-
Jin Wei (2000), Fahim Al-Marhubi (2000), Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi and Erwin 
Tiongson (2000), Sanjeev Gupta, Luiz de Mello and Raju Sharan (2001), Pak Hung Mo 
(2001), Mohsin Habib and Leon Zurawicki (2001), Susan Rose-Ackerman (2001), Mohsen 
Bahmani-Oskooee and A.B.M. Nasir (2002), Seligson (2005), Grigorescu (2006), Cooper 
Drury, Jonathan Kreickhaus, and Michael Lusztig (2006), Maureen Lewis (2006), Lorenzo 
Pelligrini and Reyer Gerlagh (2006), Nejat Anbarci, Monica Ascaleras and Charles Register 
(2006), etc.  
 
3.3.5.     Transparency 
In the traditional policy approaches to resource curse, transparency and accountability have 
been strongly suggested as the remedies for resource curse. However, these are more of 
solutions for the political problem than the economic problem whose solution is mainly 
diversification. Furthermore, transparency and accountability are not sufficient conditions, 
although they are necessary conditions, for the resolution of the political problem. 
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It is pertinent to note the difference between my theoretical approach and the traditional 
policy approaches. I am not going to look at policy-remedies for the problems. Rather, I will 
attempt to argue for a plausible way to look at the issue of resource curse so that ascertaining 
causality and assigning responsibility will be plausibly done in the resource curse debate. In 
chapter four, I shall expand and explicate the notion of responsibility and how I will use it. 
For now, let us discuss the traditional policies. 
It is widely accepted that the road that must be travelled on the way out of (the political 
aspect of) resource curse is transparency. Some countries, having accepted the veracity of the 
above claim, came together to form the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
in June, 2003 at the Lancaster House Conference. The EITI principles are;  
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be an 
important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative 
economic and social impacts.  
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth for the benefit of a country’s 
citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised in the interests of 
their national development.  
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction occur as revenue streams over 
many years and can be highly price dependent.  
4. We recognise that a public understanding of government revenues and expenditure 
over time could help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and realistic 
options for sustainable development.  
5. We underline the importance of transparency by governments and companies in the 
extractive industries and the need to enhance public financial management and 
accountability.  
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency must be set in the context of 
respect for contracts and laws.  
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic and foreign direct investment 
that financial transparency may bring.  
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all 
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure.  
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of transparency and accountability 
in public life, government operations and in business.  
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable approach to the disclosure of 
payments and revenues is required, which is simple to undertake and to use.  
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country should involve all extractive 
industry companies operating in that country.  
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders have important and relevant 
contributions to make—including governments and their agencies, extractive industry 
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companies, service companies, multilateral organisations, financial organisations, 
investors, and non-governmental organisations.
473
  
Furthermore, the EITI has certain criteria which the implementation of the above principles 
must be consistent with. The criteria are; 
1.  There will be regular publication of material oil, gas and mining payments by 
companies to governments (‘payments’) and all material revenues received by 
governments from oil, gas and mining companies (‘revenues’) for a wide audience, 
and in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and comprehensible manner. 
2. Where such audits do not already exist, payments and revenues should be the subject 
of credible, independent audit, applying international auditing standards. 
3.  Payments and revenues will be reconciled by a credible, independent administrator, 
applying international auditing standards and with publication of the administrator’s 
own opinions regarding such reconciliation, also referring to discrepancies, should 
any be identified. 
4. This approach is extended to all companies, including state-owned enterprises. 
5.  Civil society is to be actively engaged as a participant in the design, monitoring and 
evaluation of this process and should be able to make contributions to public debate. 
6. A public, financially sustainable work plan related to all of the above should be 
developed by the host government, with assistance from the international financial 
institutions where required, and it should include measurable targets, a timetable for 
implementation, and an assessment of potential capacity constraints.
474
 
That Nigeria is a member of the EITI seems to be good news. The following even seems to 
be better news; Nigeria, in 2007, established its own national equivalent of the EITI. The 
Nigerian version of the EITI is called Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(NEITI). “The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act 2007 mandates 
NEITI to promote due process and transparency in extractive revenues paid to and received 
by government as well ensure transparency and accountability in the application of extractive 
revenues.”475 In order to carry out the above mandate, NEITI adopted the twelve principles 
and six criteria of EITI. 
If the above principles and criteria were observed in Nigeria, the problem of resource curse, 
or specifically political resource curse, would have been dealt with already. However, eleven 
years after  EITI and seven years after NEITI, the Niger Delta is still a dialectic Delta, the 
Nigerian system is still malfunctioning, the story remains the same, history is still repeating 
itself, and as it has always been, it is still business as usual. 
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3.3.6.      Conflicts 
Apart from corruption, rent-seeking has also fuelled the abuse of human rights and conflicts. 
In the Failed States index - an annual special report by the Foreign Policy Magazine and the 
Fund for Peace - in 2010, 2011 and 2012 Nigeria was ranked 14
th
 while in 2013 it was ranked 
16
th
 alongside countries like Somalia, Iraq, etc.
476
 The index has five categories ranging from 
the worst cases to the best cases: Critical; In Danger; Borderline; Stable; and Most Stable. In 
all the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 rankings, Nigeria is placed in the worst cases, that is, 
Nigeria is termed a critical case. With the Boko Haram terrorist group ravaging Nigeria, there 
is no surprise that Nigeria appeared on the failed States index and is ranked as a critical state 
and one of the most insecure places in the world.  
 
The African Insurance Organisation, in October 2012, ranked Nigeria – which accounts for 
twenty-five percent of all the kidnapping cases in the world - as the ‘Kidnap-for-Ransom 
Capital of the World.’ According to the ranking, “Somalia, which had been in the business of 
sea piracy and kidnappings long before Nigeria joined the 'league', has long been overtaken 
by Nigeria.”477  Also, Nigeria was ranked “the sixth most dangerous African country to live 
in”478 by the Global Peace Index in June 2012.  
 
Although Nigerian conflicts are mostly ethnic and religious, there have been some that were 
glaringly due to the crude oil in the Niger Delta. In such oil-related conflicts, an estimated 
one thousand die every year.
479
 In this vein, Annegret Mähler argues that violence has 
increased in the Niger Delta because of “the involvement of security forces, politicians and 
(international) businessmen in illegal oil theft.”480 After over twenty-five years of non-violent 
resistance, the injustice in the Niger Delta gave birth to militant groups such as the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF), Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Niger Delta Strike Force 
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(NDSF), Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV), People’s Liberation Force (PLF), Central MEND, 
Outlaws, etc.  
When meeting with some Niger Delta youths on 16
th
 April, 2004 President Olusegun 
Obasanjo admitted that due to insincerity on the parts of all stakeholders – governments, 
corporations, individuals, etc. – underdevelopment, abject poverty, insecurity and conflicts 
have engulfed the Niger Delta. Then he concluded that it is only when stakeholders become 
sincere in dealing with poor villagers of the Niger Delta that violence will be abated. 
481
  
Also, the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, concedes that the Niger-Delta conflicts 
are as a result of underdevelopment and decades of social and economic neglect which the 
people have been subjected to by various governments, oil companies and other agents.
482
  
In the Niger Delta, over fifty thousand civilians have been killed by government security 
apparatus. 1n 1990, there were killings in Umuechem. In the 1990s, Ogoni women were 
raped and Ogoni people were massacred by soldiers led by Major General Paul Okutinmo. 
Similarly in 1999, Odi women were raped and Odi people were massacred my soldiers led by 
Colonel Agbiaka.  
The government of Obasanjo said the Odi killings in Bayelsa State were aimed at stopping 
militancy in Odi. But President Goodluck Jonathan, who was the deputy governor of Bayelsa 
State during the killings, said, “After that invasion, myself...and the governor entered 
Odi…Most of the people that died in Odi were mostly old men, women and children; none of 
the militants was killed.... If bombarding Odi was to solve the problem... the attack on Odi 
never solved the militancy problem and we had more challenges after that attack on Odi.
483
 
Due to the gruesome nature of the Odi massacre, many human rights activists in Nigeria have 
been campaigning for Obasanjo to be charged to the International Criminal Court for crimes 
against humanity. 
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Also there were massacres in Odioma in 2005, and Agge in 2008. Some of the people who 
have suffered more than others due to the actions and omissions of the oil companies and 
various governments are the Ogoni people. Thus they formed the Movement for the Survival 
of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The former MOSOP leaders, human right activists, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbooko, Paul Levera, Felix Nuate, 
Baribor Bera, Barinem Kiobel and John Kpuine were hanged by the Abacha government in 
November, 1995.  
On 9 June, 2009 the Guardian Newspaper of the United Kingdom reported that “The oil giant 
Shell has agreed to pay $15.5m (£9.6m) in settlement of a legal action in which it was 
accused of having collaborated in the execution of the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other 
leaders of the Ogoni tribe of southern Nigeria.”484 One of the witnesses who testified against 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and others revealed that he was bribed by Shell to testify falsely. Shell is in 
charge of fifty percent of the oil in the Niger Delta and the profit it makes from the Niger 
Delta is reported to be forty percent of its global profit. So, collaborating with Abacha to 
execute the human rights activists protects Shell’s business interests.  
Between 2001 and 2011 the United States of America imported about 11 percent of its crude 
oil from Nigeria. It is estimated that around 50 percent of Nigeria’s oil is exported to the 
United States of America, and America imports around 10 percent of its oil from Nigeria.
485
 
“In parallel with the expansion of oil imports from Nigeria, the United States has increased its 
supplying of weapons to the country and has expanded its military presence in the Gulf of 
Guinea, for example, via naval patrols.”486 This Nigerian-United States oil trade can be said 
to have fuelled conflicts in Nigeria due to what many of the imported weapons are used for. 
 
The volume of the oil trade was planned to be increased before shale gas became a substitute 
to a certain percentage of imported oil in the United States of America. If this Nigerian-
United States oil trade can be said to have fuelled conflicts in Nigeria in the past, in the future 
it will add another problem namely economic volatility. With the recent massive exploration 
and exploitation of shale oil and gas in the United States, Nigeria is set to experience 
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economic volatility because the United States will certainly reduce its demand for Nigerian 
crude oil. 
 
3.3.7.     Pollution 
The Niger Delta which experiences daily pollution is the worst polluted oil place in the 
world. In gas flaring, Nigeria is only second to Russia. Gas flaring is hazardous to human 
health and the environment because it may emit methane, sulphur dioxide, benzene, toluene, 
xylenes, benzapyrene, etc. Activities of the oil companies have resulted in environmental 
degradation: polluted water and land resulting in death of fish, land animals, vegetation, and 
lack of clean water for consumption; and cessation of fishing and farming which are the 
livelihood of most families in the villages in the oil extraction areas.  
 
The Niger Delta is “the site of more than 6,800 recorded oil spills.”487 As usual, the number 
of unrecorded spills will beat the imagination. In an interview, Mnimmo Bassey - the 
president of Friend of the Earth International - says about the Niger Delta; we have more than 
one oil spill everyday in an area that is already heavily polluted. The best way to sum up the 
amount of pollution going on is to compare it to the Exxon Valdez spill that happened in 
1989 in Alaska. It is estimated that what we have here is equivalent to one Exxon Valdez spill 
every year.
488
  
 
When the spills are multiplied by about fifty-six years, then we have about fifty-six ‘Exxon 
Valdez spills’ in the Niger Delta. During the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP was rightly 
pressured by the American government to stop the spill, clean up the area and pay a 
compensation of 4.5 billion US dollars. But in the Niger Delta, as a resident of the Niger 
Delta puts it, ‘the oil companies and the Nigerian government are one’; they work hand in 
hand to let oil spill continue without any consequence to the oil companies and no 
compensation to the victims. 
 
Shell (SPDC) CEO, Mutiu Sunmonu - in a bid to portray Shell as an environmental friendly 
company - says, in an interview, that Shell has cleaned up over two hundred spill sites in the 
first five months of 2012.
489
 While Sunmonu might think this claim helps place Shell as an 
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environmental friendly company, it goes a long way to show how much the inhabitants of the 
Niger Delta suffer. The actual amount of spills is always far greater than the official amount. 
In April, 2012 The Guardian (UK) reported that Shell’s oil spill in the Niger Delta is sixty 
(60) times the official amount Shell claimed.
490
  
If the inhabitants experience the ‘Shell-officially accepted amount’ of spill of over two 
hundred spills within five months from only one oil company, one can only wonder how 
much the inhabitants have suffered, are suffering, and will continue to suffer from the spills 
of all the oil companies. Then consider that the actual amount of spill is sixty times the 
official amount.  
In addition to land and water pollution is air pollution which has contributed a lot to making 
the Niger Delta oil producing areas inhabitable. The Niger Deltans almost live in a Stone 
Age; “They live in stick huts on little islands in the mangrove swamps. Many of the villages 
are accessible only by boat. Nearby, you will have ... multibillion oil facilities, with 
executives being dropped in by helicopter.”491 No wonder the Niger-Deltans live as if they 
were in a Hobbesian state of nature where their lives are extremely nasty, principally brutish 
and ultimately short.  
3.3.8.   The Nigerian Resource Curse Summarised 
Do the activities of actors, namely individuals, collectives, corporations, Nigerian 
governments and foreign states, in the Nigeria context particularly in the extraction industry, 
result in the current poor state of Nigeria through mainly rent-seeking and the Dutch disease? 
Firstly, and most important, there is evidently rent-seeking and the Dutch disease in Nigeria. 
Secondly, the Nigerian history of debt is largely due to volatility in oil prices and bad 
governance.  
Thirdly, although there are other contributing factors to corruption in Nigeria, the corruption 
is almost singularly fuelled by the abundance of oil and gas and lack of transparency. 
Fourthly, although most conflicts are due to other factors such as ethnicism, religion, etc., the 
conflicts in the Niger Delta as described in this chapter are all exclusively due to the 
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abundance of oil and gas there. Of course there are non-oil-related conflicts in the Niger 
Delta, but very few.  Finally, as has been shown, these factors, combined, have kept Nigeria 
poor.  
While it is clear how rent-seeking and the Dutch disease have contributed to the poor 
Nigerian context, the role of conflicts in the Niger Delta might not be clear. But I think it is 
clear enough if we realise that these are conflicts that have led to: the loss of lives of people 
who are mostly the bread-winners of their families; the loss of properties of people who can 
barely replace those properties; the destruction of the means of livelihood of people who 
barely have alternatives; the displacement of people which has made them destitute and 
internal refugees; and the scaring away of potential investors and the abandonment of actual 
investments by investors.   
I readily admit that it is not every problem, or every major problem for that matter, in Nigeria 
that has to do with resource curse. Most conflicts in Nigeria are based on ethnicism, religion 
and politics. For instance, the Boko Haram terrorism is mainly based on religion and politics. 
The civil war was largely based on ethnic and geo-political differences. Nevertheless, oil 
played a strategic role in the prosecution of the war. Although Chukwuemeka Odumegwu 
Ojukwu - the leader of Biafra - was fighting for the Igbos, he annexed the present Akwa-
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River and Rivers
492
 states (although they were not Igbo) to Biafra 
simply because these states have oil; at least this is the most plausible reason for the 
annexation.  
 
Also, when the strongest command of the Nigerian Army during the civil war (the Third 
Marine Commando commanded by Benjamin Adekunle who was later replaced with 
Olusegun Obasanjo) invaded Biafra, the first task of the commandoes was to recapture the oil 
states for Nigeria. With the recapturing of the oil states, Nigeria could fund the war while 
Biafra could no longer fund the war. This, to a large extent, contributed to Nigeria winning 
the war and Biafra losing it.  
 
There are other significant issues that are not at all based, or at least entirely based, on 
resource curse. There are a lot of cases of pollution that have nothing to do with resource 
curse; there can be pollution without the extraction of natural resources. Many corruption 
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cases cannot be linked to resource curse, and in fact, have nothing to do with resource curse. 
A country does not have to have abundant resources in order for its citizens to be corrupt. But 
some cases are purely due to resource curse, for instance the US$12.4 billion oil windfall 
between 1988 and 1994 which the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Attorney-General of the 
Federation have failed to account for how it was spent. On this case, although the Pius 
Okigbo Panel Report indicted former military president, Ibrahim Babangida, he has never 
been charged to court by the federal government.  
As can be seen in the foregoing discussion, resource curse is a huge problem for Nigeria, and 
oil has been the ‘Devil’s excrement’ for Nigeria. Prima facie, one would wonder why the 
Venezuelan politician and co-founder of OPEC, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, would describe 
oil as the Devil’s excrement. But a close observation of the activities related to oil extraction 
and a critical examination of the activities of stakeholders would make one understand 
Alfonzo’s metaphor.  
As Alfonzo says, “Ten years from now, twenty years from now, you will see: oil will bring us 
ruin … Oil is the Devil’s excrement.”493 ‘I call petroleum the devil’s excrement. It brings 
trouble…waste, corruption, consumption, our public services fall apart, and debt - a debt we 
shall have for years.’494 Looking back to 1956 when oil was discovered or 1958 when 
extraction started, if we are to summarize what oil has been to Nigeria over the past six 
decades, we will be apt to confirm in hindsight about Nigeria what Alfonzo predicted in 
foresight about Venezuela.  
In re-echoing Alfonzo’s words, oil has certainly brought Nigeria ruin, trouble, waste, 
corruption, debt, propensity to consume without propensity to produce other goods apart from 
oil, failed and inefficient public services, etc. In short, oil for Nigeria is the Devil’s 
excrement. To borrow the slogan or motto of the World Social Forum (WSF), ‘Another 
World is Possible’, looking at the Niger Delta in particular and the Nigerian context in 
general, looking at what ought to be and what can be, one might ask: Is another Nigeria 
possible?; Is another Niger Delta possible?; Is another Shell possible? So on and so forth. I 
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think I am apt to think that the singular answer is yes, but with a caveat. The answer is yes, if 
and only if the problem of resource curse, particularly rent-seeking, is tackled in Nigeria. 
The Nigerian resource curse is unabated today mainly due to the dilemma the principal 
(citizenry) and the various agents face. The citizenry face a dilemma between despair and 
hope, between action and inaction, and between complicity and denunciation. They 
sometimes lose faith that they can do anything to change the status quo. Sometimes they say 
‘if you can’t beat them, join them.’  
 
Individuals (businessmen, politicians, etc.) face the dilemma between the common good and 
self-interest that is detrimental to the common good. The government of the day faces the 
dilemma between their own interest that is detrimental to the citizenry and the interest of the 
citizenry, between retaining power by all means necessary and allowing fair play. Foreign 
governments face the dilemma between maximising the gains for their countries and the 
interest of Nigeria. As for the corporations, they face the dilemma between profit 
maximization without moral constraints and operating a business with moral constraints. 
 
Usually, businesses face a dilemma between business ethics and cost/benefit analysis, 
between moral procedures and efficient procedures, and between the moral consequences of 
their actions and return on investment. The ability to balance these moral and business 
challenges is the hallmark of a moral business; for these moral and business challenges are 
not mutually exclusive as many corporations deemed them to be.  
 
However, the oil companies in the Niger Delta in their operations do not have regard for 
business ethics, moral procedures and the moral consequences of their actions. Rather, they 
are only concerned with cost/benefit analysis, efficient procedures and return on investment. 
As has been made evident in this chapter, alongside the oil companies, some individuals and 
governments of Nigeria in particular and foreign countries are in various ways, like the oil 
companies, responsible for the resource curse in the Nigerian context.  
 
In the end, the picture of Nigeria we have is the following. In recent years the Nigerian 
economy has been growing at an average rate of between 5 and 7 percent. But as the National 
Bureau of Statistics reported; “Despite the fact that Nigerian economy is paradoxically 
growing, the proportion of Nigerians living in poverty is increasing every year....The 
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proportion of the population living below the poverty line increased from 1980 to 2004.”495 
In 1982 the proportion of those living below the poverty line was 27.2 percent, in 1985 it 
soared to 46.3 percent, in 1992 it was 42.7 percent, in 1995 it rose to 65.6 percent, in 2004 it 
was 54.4 percent, and in 2010 it rose to 69.0 percent.
496
 
 
As the apex bank in Africa, Africa Development Bank (AfDB), says in its Africa Economic 
Outlook 2011 report, in spite of the GDP growth mentioned above, “the Nigerian Economy 
remains confronted with many serious challenges. Structural imbalance and lack of 
diversification – with the economy excessively dependent on oil – is preventing the domestic 
economy from flourishing. High youth unemployment, poor infrastructure facilities, and 
widespread insecurity are the key challenges....containing political, civil and ethnic unrest, 
especially in the Niger Delta region, remains a challenge.”497 To the above challenges, I will 
add the factor which the general Nigerian populace correctly knows to be the greatest 
challenge faced by Nigeria due to resource curse in general and rent-seeking in particular; 
corruption. 
 
3.4.      Angola: A Rich Country with Poor People 
Angola has overtaken Nigeria as the leading oil producer and exporter in Africa. The 
Portuguese colonialists discovered oil in Angola in 1955. Just as agriculture was the mainstay 
of Nigeria’s economy, so also it was the mainstay of Angola’s economy. Before the 
Portuguese colonialists shifted focus to oil, agricultural products made up fifty-six percent of 
Angola’s export, and coffee was chief among the products.498  
The Dutch disease and rent-seeking, as usual in resource curse cases, have become part and 
parcel of Angola. The evidence of the Dutch disease in Angola is undisputed given that 
Angola has effectively become almost an oil-only economy – supplementary to oil is 
diamond. “Since the 1970s, with the exception of the oil sector, almost all other economic 
sectors have stagnated or declined. This situation has left Angola overwhelmingly dependent 
on oil revenue....agriculture is ever declining .... It is no wonder that oil has been accounting 
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for more than 90 percent of merchandise exports since 1980.”499 Expectedly, the United 
States of America and China are the two highest consumers of Angola’s oil. 
Angola is not just the largest oil producer and exporter in Africa. It is also the fourth largest 
source of diamonds in the world.
500
 Angola’s oil and diamond revenues were used by both 
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to finance the twenty-five-year civil war. “The 
hallmarks of resource curse have followed; a corrupt, rent-seeking government which made 
secret deals with foreign oil companies and completely disregarded the well-being of the 
population.”501 Describing how the Angolan civil war was fought and won, Tony Hodges 
says revenues from oil and diamond were essential means to winning the war, and are the 
spoils the victor gets for winning the war.
502
  
On one side, Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA which controlled the extraction of oil was 
supported by Cuba and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). On the other side, 
Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA which controlled the extraction of diamonds was supported by 
South Africa and the United States of America (USA). It was the use of blood diamonds by 
UNITA to finance its rebellion that led to the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme. With Jonas Savimbi on one side and Jose Eduardo dos Santos on the other side, 
Angola fought a civil war from 1977 to 2002 that finally ended with the death of Savimbi. 
Add this civil war to the thirteen years liberation war Angola fought against the Portuguese 
who would not let Angola be free because chiefly, among other factors, Angola was already 
booming with oil and diamond. Then we have thirty-eight years of wars.  
Like the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Cabinda is the oil hub of Angola. Just as the Niger Deltans 
are plagued by poverty so also the Cabindans are plagued by poverty. And just as the Niger 
Delta is rife with conflicts, so also Cabinda is rife with conflicts. In short, injustice is the 
common denominator of the Niger Delta and Cabinda.  So, just like Nigeria, Angola is 
another poster child of resource-cursed countries where corruption, conflicts, bad 
governance, underdevelopment and abject poverty are the order of the day.  
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Poverty, conflicts, authoritarianism, lack of respect for the rule of law, corruption, so on and 
so forth, are rife in Angola. But the lack of transparency and accountability, the secrecy - 
which is now an ‘open secret’ and ‘transparent corruption’ - which characterizes the Angolan 
extractive industry is seriously dangerous for the country. In these dubious dealings, “Angola 
is clearly in a class of its own.”503 When, due to pressure for transparency and accountability, 
in February, 2001 British Petroleum (BP) attempted to disclose to the world its payments to 
the Angolan government, the government warned that BP’s contract would be terminated 
“for violation of contractually guaranteed confidentiality”; hence, BP reneged.504  
The IMF, the Human Rights Watch, Transparency International, and even the Attorney-
General of Angola reported several and separate cases of corruption, some including billions 
of US dollars.
505
 Since it gained political independence in 1975, Angola, a typical resource- 
cursed country, has been in the shackles of corruption and authoritarianism.
506
 The 
strongman, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who came to power since 1979, is in his fourth decade 
in power. He uses oil funds to sustain his dictatorship.
507
  
Historically, dos Santos’ autocracy has misappropriated Angola’s natural resource wealth 
“and used its control over oil wealth to insulate itself from public scrutiny.”508 With a corrupt 
dictator who returns Multinational Corporations favour of cash in kind, corruption is stock-
in-trade in Angola.
509
 dos Santos’ daughter, Isabel dos Santos, is one of Africa’s billionaires. 
She is one of the few female billionaires on the continent and she is the youngest of them. 
Given that she has a huge stake in the extractive industry, in both the oil and diamond sectors, 
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and in other important sectors like the communications sector, it is no surprise that she is 
worth US$3 billion.
510
  
The Revenue Watch Institute reports that Angola earns US$16 billion annually from oil 
revenues.
511
 This is not surprising because Angola has become the leading producer and 
exporter of oil in Africa.
512
 Oil boom has certainly made Angola’s economy better-off; 
thereby making it a middle income economy. But the poor are still poor which means that the 
gains from oil only go to ‘well-placed’ people. Angola, though theoretically a rich country, is 
practically poor. If richness is measured by the amount of oil reserves and diamond a country 
has, and by the amount of revenues a country gets from minerals, then Angola is certainly a 
rich country. But this richness has not translated to well-being. So the people are still actually 
poor. Angola has a sixty-eight percent poverty rate and its rankings in other social indicators 
are some of the world’s lowest.513  
Angola has over 80 billion barrels of oil on its coasts, over 30 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas, and its oil revenues are expected to rise astronomically from US$16 billion to US$30 
billion annually.
514
 The estimated 18 million Angolans who own these resources should be 
economically well-off. But their plight is not different from that of other Sub-Saharan 
Africans who have been plagued by resource curse. Given the interplay between foreign 
interests and the interests of Angolan elites, or oil nomenklaturas as they are called, most of 
the revenues from oil, gas and diamond are illegally siphoned and remain off-shores without 
even reaching Angola.
515
  
In Luanda, the capital of Angola, the gap between the rich and the poor “is like nowhere else 
in the world.”516 Angola, in a nutshell, is a “successful failed state.”517 It is “successful at the 
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purpose for which it is intended, enriching the elites, even as it fails to provide for the country 
as a whole.”518 Comparing the Human Development Index (HDI) rankings of Southern 
African countries, Angola only fares better than Malawi and Mozambique. Even countries 
like Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe fare better 
than Angola. Beyond Southern Africa, as poor as Tanzania is it still fares better than Angola 
in the HDI. Worldwide, Angola was ranked 162
nd
 out of 177 countries in the HDI.
519
 In the 
end, it is apt to say that oil and diamonds are not gifts to Angolans. They are Trojan Horses! 
 
3.5.  The Democratic Republic of Congo: What Is that Ought Not To Be 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), like Angola and Nigeria, is abundantly endowed 
with natural resources. But like Angola and Nigeria, it is also resource-cursed. Its abysmal 
economic and political performances in spite of plentiful natural resources is, like those of 
Angola and Nigeria, another typical paradox of plenty. Like the Cabinda province of Angola 
and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, the DRC’s Katanga region is so rich in natural 
resources that colonial geologists described it as a “veritable geological scandal.”520 For they 
had never seen one region so endowed with abundant natural resources of different kinds. 
Ironically, the region is now rife with different kinds of social, economic and political 
problems because of its natural resources. 
Resource curse in the DRC can be traced back to one hundred and forty-three years ago, 
1871. In that year, Sir Henry Stanley, an explorer of the British Empire, travelled on the 
River Congo route, explored the Congo and discovered that the Congo was abundantly 
endowed with natural resources.
521
 On hearing Sir Stanley’s discovery, the King of Belgium - 
King Leopold II - set up the Association Internationale Africaine in order to colonize the 
Congo,
522
 and of course, ultimately exploit its resources. 
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King Leopold II owned the Congo as a private property rather than as a colony of Belgium. 
Even during the scramble for Africa and the resultant partitioning of Africa, the European 
imperialists and colonialists at the Berlin Conference of 1885 respected King Leopold II’s 
‘property right.’ It was only in 1908 that he made Congo a Belgian colony.523 Among other 
serious harms and damages, King Leopold II’s brutal oppression and exploitation resulted in 
the death of around ten million people which was half or fifty percent of the population 
then.
524
  
After independence in 1960 when Patrice Lumumba was democratically elected to head the 
new government, he strongly believed, and asserted in his inaugural speech, that political 
independence without economic independence would still leave the country in imperial 
chains. Not pleased with Lumumba’s resolve to make the country economically independent 
of imperial powers “which were hoping to keep their hold over the country’s resources,” the 
United States of America and Belgium, as confirmed by the then CIA chief in Congo, plotted 
the assassination of Lumumba.  
The United States of America and Belgium “sent aid to anti-Lumumba factions, and in 1961, 
Lumumba was assassinated.”525 Lumumba was eventually succeeded by Joseph Mobuto Sese 
Seko whose coup d’état was “endorsed by the USA in 1965.”526 Despite his very long run 
oppression of his people and plunder of his country, not least the stashing away of US$4 
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billion in Swiss banks, Mobuto Sese Seko was referred to as “one of our most valued friends” 
by President George Bush (Sr.).
527
  
Mobuto Sese Seko, who ruled for over three decades, effectively ruled the DRC as if he were 
running his own private business. He plundered and squandered the resources of the country 
even as Congolese were dying in conflicts and dying of poverty. After the overthrow of 
Mobuto Sese Seko, his successor, Laurent Kabila, merely followed his footsteps. The latter 
governed the DRC as if he came to power to accomplish, ironically, the mission which was 
begun by the man he overthrew.  
Alongside other conflicts, the DRC has experienced two protracted and wasteful civil wars. 
Nearly six million people have lost their lives due to these conflicts. Out of the 5.4 million 
people who lost their lives between 1996 and 2010 because of violent conflicts, 45% are 
children. Although the war has officially ended, 45,000 people still die monthly in the 
seemingly never-ending war that is “the deadliest war since World War II.”528 Regrettably, in 
the DRC “more than a thousand people die every day in the chaos caused by militias fighting 
over the minerals used to make chips for cell phones and laptops.”529 With this destructive 
war still raging, it is not any surprise that the DRC remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world. On every - and any imaginable - economic and political indicator or metric, the DRC 
performs dismally. The lives of its 60 million people, like the lives of those who have been 
sent to early graves, are wastefully, in Hobbessian terms, nasty, brutish and short. 
The conflicts in the DRC make the resources of the country a free-for-all affair which in turn 
fuels the already existing conflicts. Columbite-Tantalite, popularly known as coltan, 
particularly attracts plunderers to DRC which has 64% to 80% of the world’s deposit of 
coltan. It is “the most profitable natural resource the Congo possesses, more so than gold or 
diamonds, and one of the most cherished minerals in the world....It is fundamental in 
sustaining and developing our civilization as it is used in almost all modern technological 
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devices.”530 At the ‘formal’ end of the second civil war, which started in 1998 and ended in 
2002/2003, no less than “seven foreign governments, sometimes in collusion with mining 
companies,” were involved in plundering the country’s resources.531 No wonder the second 
civil war was referred to as ‘world war.’ 
The DRC is home to around one-third of the world’s cobalt and about two-thirds of the 
world’s coltan. It “is also extravagantly endowed with copper, cassiterite (tin ore), diamonds, 
and gold. Yet this abundance of riches has led to war and poverty instead of peace and 
prosperity.”532 The DRC, which is as huge as the whole of Western Europe, is home to 
minerals including uranium, diamonds, gold, tin, cobalt, coltan, etc. worth US$ 24 trillion 
which “equals the combined GDP of Europe and the United States.”533 In plundering and in 
trade, both legal and illegal, natural resources worth around US$6 million are shipped, flown, 
driven or taken out of the DRC every day.
534
  
In summary, in the DRC, if there is anything that has any practical meaning, surely it is not 
the United Nations Declaration which says that “The right of peoples and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the 
interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the state 
concerned.”535 Surely, if natural resources have not been blessings to Sub-Saharan Africa, 
then they have not been blessings to the DRC. If natural resources have been curses to Sub-
Saharan Africa, then they have been curses to the DRC. If oil is the Devil’s excrement in 
Nigeria, coltan is the Devil’s excrement in the DRC. If oil and diamonds have not been gifts 
to Angolans, then coltan and other resources have not been gifts to Congolese. And if oil and 
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diamonds are Trojan Horses to Angolans, then coltan and other resources too are Trojan 
Horses to Congolese. 
 
*** 
In this chapter I engaged in the descriptive analysis of resource curse. Generally, I 
descriptively analysed the distinct nature of natural resource wealth, and the connection 
between natural resource wealth and overlapping curses.    Particularly, I described the nature 
of resource curse in Sub-Saharan Africa. Then I especially analysed the nature of resource 
curse in Nigeria, Angola and DRC. Firstly, I dwelt on the Nigerian context in which I 
analysed the main economic (the Dutch disease) and the main political economy (rent-
seeking) aspects of the Nigerian resource curse, conflicts, corruption and transparency, and 
negative externalities – namely pollution. Secondly, I dwelt on the case of Angola in which I 
analysed why Angola is a rich country with poor people. Finally, I dwelt on the case of DRC 
in which I analysed why the situation in DRC is What is that Ought Not to Be.   
To reiterate, this dissertation is not a work on case studies. Furthermore, the work in this 
chapter is not case studies in the narrow or strict sense of the term. The quasi-case studies are 
for illustrative purposes. Comparatively, the Nigerian case is extensive or very long while the 
Angolan and DRC cases are short. The Nigerian case is extensive because it is my main 
illustration. The Angolan and DRC cases are short because they are aimed at corroborating 
the Nigerian case. In other words, the Nigerian case is only important because it is 
illustrative, and the Angolan and DRC cases are only important because they corroborate the 
Nigerian case. Together, the three cases aid the contextualisation of my descriptive analysis. 
Relying on the descriptive analysis in this chapter, the next chapter will provide a preliminary 
prescriptive analysis of resource curse. Resource curse is a man-made phenomenon; it is 
caused by the activities of humans. The next chapter is aimed at identifying the different 
human agents and their different activities which cause resource curse. In other words, the 
chapter will discuss the causal roles played by different agents in resource curse.  The chapter 
will tackle the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that 
cause resource curse.  The end-result shall be that despite the complexity of resource curse 
and the multifaceted nature of the activities that cause resource curse, we can still identify the 
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different causal roles played by different agents, and thus attribute causal responsibility to the 
agents.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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4.0. THE COMPLEXITY OF RESOURCE CURSE: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND LEVELS OF CAUSALITY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY (PART 1) 
4.1.    George Soros’ Analysis 
Resource curse, to use George Soros’ expression, is a complex phenomenal. For Soros, there 
are three factors to this complexity. The first factor is the Dutch disease.
536
 The second factor 
is volatility.
537
 While the third factor has to do with the effect resource curse has on political 
conditions.
538
 Soros argues that the third factor is the most important factor of the three 
factors because the impact it has on a resource-endowed country is far greater than the impact 
of the first and second factors combined. He says while the first and second factors are purely 
economic conditions, the third factor - to be properly understood - needs a combination of 
economic theories and political philosophy.
539
  
More importantly, Soros argues that there are four key players involved in resource curse 
namely international companies, national companies, and the governments and the people of 
the countries concerned.
540
 Although Soros used oil in his analysis, he admits that any other 
commodity involved in resource curse can be used. Hence, I am speaking generally about 
natural resources rather than specifically about oil. Nevertheless, oil and gas get more 
emphasis because of the discussions on Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc. 
Soros expressed his “analysis in terms of three kinds of asymmetry: asymmetric information, 
asymmetric agency, and asymmetric bargaining power.”541 For him, the problem of 
asymmetric agency is far more important than those of asymmetric information and 
asymmetric bargaining power.
542
 Deductively from his analysis, this is because agency - in 
the context of resource curse - has to do with the agent (politicians and business men and 
women) and the principal (the people who are represented).  
When there is asymmetry between the agent and the principal, and the asymmetry advantages 
the agent while it disadvantages the principal, there is a problem. The agent is merely a 
representative of the principal; hence everything the agent does is supposed to be for the 
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interest of the principal. But in resource curse, the principal becomes the means while the 
agent becomes the end. To use Kantian term, in resource curse the agent uses the principal as 
mere means rather than as an end in themselves. 
For Soros, since “agency problem arises when the agent does not faithfully serve the interest 
of the principal,” the first task of the analyst of resource curse is to identify who the principal 
is, that is, to identify who owns the natural resources.
543
 He concludes that this sort of 
analysis is exclusively the role of political philosophers and the domain of political 
philosophy.   
Soros alluded to the political philosophy assertion that sovereignty lies with the people rather 
than the king or government. Hence, the government is a mere agent while the people are the 
principal. But being agents, it is the government that represents the people when companies, 
both national and international, want to exploit resources in a resource-endowed country. 
Members of the government can thus have the chance, which they take in resource curse 
cases, to be corrupted by resource exploiting companies. So also resource exploiting 
companies have the chance, which they also take in resource curse cases, to corrupt the 
agents of resource-rich countries.  
Having bribed the agents and gotten their way, the companies have no incentives to care 
about the interests of the principals. And having been corrupted by the companies, agents 
now have enough resources to keep themselves in power and even to suppress or oppress the 
principal whom they supposedly represent. Hence the problem of resource curse goes on and 
on and the country becomes more impoverished and more destabilized and volatile. For 
Soros, this agency-companies corroboration of, and collaboration with, each other at the 
expense of the people is the primary source of resource curse.
544
  
It is worth nothing the similarity and contrast between the agents of the people and the agents 
of the companies. The agents of the people, like the agents of the companies, are mere 
representatives of the interests of their various principals. But unlike the agents of the 
companies who do almost everything, including illegal and immoral acts, within their power 
to satisfy the interests of their principal, the agents of the people do almost everything, even 
illegal and immoral acts, within their power to satisfy their own interest.  
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So, while the agents of the companies are faithful representatives of their companies, albeit 
their actions are illegal and immoral, the agents of the people are unfaithful representatives 
and their actions are also illegal and immoral. Although both the actions of the agents of the 
people and the agents of the companies might be legal in many cases, the problem is that they 
are also unethical or immoral. In such cases, the actions are usually at best procedurally legal 
but failing the test of substantive law. 
Soros’ analysis of resource curse may shed light on my ‘levels of analysis’ or ‘levels of 
causality and responsibility’ approach which I will use in the next sub-chapter and the next 
chapter. Although Soros’ analysis does not totally reflect my approach, it helps to elucidate 
my approach to a large extent. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to mention that while his analysis 
is similar to mine in notable ways, it is also remarkably different from mine. The differences 
will be glaring when I present my approach in the remainder of this chapter and in the next 
chapter. 
In my analysis, the factors responsible for resource curse, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, are the handiwork of the following agents: 
(i)  Individual agents. 
(ii)  Collective agents. By collective I do not mean an institution or a group of individuals 
forming an institution, a corporation, etc. I simply mean two or more individuals - a 
group of individuals, a bunch of individuals or a plurality of individuals – that act 
jointly in a case of resource curse.  
(iii)  Corporations. In this context, in the narrow sense of corporation although oil 
companies are the obvious ones, banks and law firms which aid money laundry, etc. 
are part and parcel of ‘corporations’ in the wider sense. So, by corporation I mean 
multinational corporations, mainly those in the extractive industry, but also financial 
institutions, law firms, and lobby groups and to a lesser extent the media and public 
relations firms.  
(iv)  State. By state I mean the resource-rich and resource-cursed state (visibly represented 
by its government).  
(v) The global institutional order.   
 
4.2. The ‘Individual’ Level of Analysis or Level of Causality and Responsibility 
I shall start by looking at the ‘individual’ level of analysis or the ‘individual’ level of 
causality and responsibility where cosmopolitanism, or particularly interactional moral 
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cosmopolitanism, is primarily applicable. In view of its tenets, cosmopolitanism will help us 
to understand the causal role of the individual in resource curse. On the individual level, 
individual agents can be said to contribute to the causes of resource curse in various ways. 
Generally these ways can be summed up in twelve ways. I shall outline the twelve ways, 
neither by precedent nor antecedent, and neither in chronological, lexical nor in hierarchical 
order. They are outlined below without any special order.  
(i) 
Individuals contribute to the causes of resource curse, when sui generis, they seek rent for 
themselves, corrupting or being corrupted for their own sake – giving or taking bribes for 
themselves. When the individual agents, sui generis, seek rent or give or take bribe for 
themselves, they place priority on their selfish needs at the expense of the rightful owners of 
the resources, i.e., the citizens of the resource-rich states.  
(ii) 
Individuals can contribute to resource curse by acting as corrupt agents of the government or 
other sectors of the resource-rich state. When the individual and collective agents as officials 
of the government or other sectors of the resource-rich state allow themselves to be corrupted 
in order to facilitate rent-seeking, they place priority on their selfish interests at the expense 
of the citizenry they are supposed to be representing. 
(iii) 
Individuals can contribute to resource curse by acting as agents of a rent-seeking foreign 
government. The individual as an agent of a rent-seeking foreign government is not seeking 
rent for him/herself. Rather, the individual agent is seeking rent for the government which 
s/he represents. Since the government in turn represents its citizenry, by extension or 
ultimately the individual is seeking rent for the foreign citizenry. By so doing, s/he is not only 
placing priority on the interest of the foreign government at the expense of the citizens of the 
resource-rich state, but also s/he places priority on the foreign citizenry at the expense of the 
citizenry of the resource rich-state. 
(iv) 
Individual agents contribute to the causes of resource curse by acting as agents of rent-
seeking multinational corporations. When the individual agent seeks rent on behalf of 
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multinational corporations (often oil, gas and mining companies) s/he does not seek rent for 
him/herself. But by seeking rent for the corporations s/he represents, in the process or as a 
means of getting rent, s/he corrupts officials of the government or other sectors of the 
resource-rich state which is detrimental to the citizenry.  By so doing, s/he is placing priority 
on the interest of the corporations, in reality on the interest or profit of the share-holders of 
the corporations, at the expense of the citizenry of the resource-rich state.  
(v) 
The individual can contribute to resource curse as an agent of financial institutions, e.g. 
banks, which aid money laundry and other financial transactions concerning resource course. 
Here, note that my focus for now is not on the financial institutions themselves, but the 
individual who acts on behalf of the financial institutions. As for the role of agents of 
financial institutions which aid money laundry and financial transactions related to resource 
curse, it is abundantly clear as a matter of historical fact that without their aid many 
corruption cases related to resource curse would not have been able to be executed. Infamous 
Swiss accounts, secret accounts in Seychelles, Cayman Islands, etc. aided by financial agents 
are some of the major routes for capital flight, money laundry and other illicit financial 
transactions concerning resource curse.   
(vi) 
Individuals also contribute to the causes of resource curse as lawyers helping to facilitate 
corruption. This can be done legally by looking for loopholes in legal systems or illegally by 
helping companies escape prosecution from their activities that resulted in negative 
externalities, providing cover-ups to corrupt clients, etc. These lawyers may often represent 
their legal firms or act on their own. In any way they act, they are basically putting priority on 
the interest of their clients, firms and their own selfish interests to the detriment of the 
rightful owners of the resources from which the money is gotten by their clients.  
(vii) 
Individual agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse by representing public 
relations companies, the media or a medium that misinforms or ‘disinforms’ the public 
concerning the roles of certain actors in resource curse. For instance, when people are 
misinformed about the activities of a company that is causing resource curse, rather than 
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taking action, say, protesting or suing the company, they might just decide not to act against 
the company believing the company is doing no harm.  
(viii) 
Individual agents can contribute to resource curse as law makers responsible for laws that aid 
resource curse. This happens when the individual agents as legislators are part of the 
machinery that made a law that aids resource curse. For instance: sponsoring a bill that is 
passed into law, or voting for a bill, that allows oil companies to abnegate their corporate 
social responsibilities or community development in extraction areas or communities; or 
voting against bills that were meant to check the negative externalities of oil companies.  
The individual agents might be acting for different reasons. Some might act because they 
have been corrupted or they stand to benefit economically from the law. In this case, we can 
say the individual agents are putting priority on their selfish interests at the expense of the 
populace. But others might act due to certain economic ideologies, political ideologies,
545
 
political philosophies, etc. In this case, if for instance the individual agents believe that too 
much regulation leads to under-productivity and consequently non-competitiveness of the 
economy, intuitively we are likely to say they have the interest of the citizenry at heart albeit 
their ideology non-intentionally leads to resource curse. So they are not morally 
blameworthy. But if they defend such ideologies as a means of satisfying their selfish 
interests at the expense of the citizenry, then they are morally blameworthy.  
(ix) 
Individuals can contribute to resource curse as law enforcement agents failing to enforce laws 
that mitigate resource curse, for instance failing to prosecute ‘suspects.’ When individuals as 
law enforcement agents failed to enforce the law, for instance, failed to prosecute people 
responsible for illegalities which result in resource curse, we would say they are 
blameworthy. But if the law is such that even egregious activities that result in resource curse 
are not illegalities, then the law enforcement agents will have no blame at all for standing by 
and watching such activities happen. In this latter case the problem is not with the inaction of 
the law enforcement officers, but the law itself, and hence the law would need to be changed. 
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(x) 
As members of the judiciary, for instance judges miscarrying justice, individual agents can 
contribute to resource curse. This can be illustrated in the following simple way. The 
individual as a judge miscarries justice in order to let off the hook defendants who, beyond 
any reasonable doubt, have been proven to have engaged in gross illegalities which are 
connected to resource curse, and the judge must have acted due to ulterior motif. Then 
certainly s/he is blameworthy.   
(xi) 
Individuals can contribute to resource curse as policy makers responsible for bad or poor 
policies that aid resource curse. Individuals are morally blameworthy if they intentionally 
make poor or bad polices to satisfy their own interests at the expense of the citizenry. 
Nevertheless, they can make poor or bad policies that lead to resource curse and yet not be 
morally blameworthy. This latter case does not seem very comprehensible; hence it needs a 
bit of explanation which I will do by citing an example. Every Dutch disease is an effect of a 
cause which is always bad or poor economic policies of lack of diversification of production. 
But this does not necessarily suggest that the policy makers that contributed to or caused a 
particular Dutch disease placed priority on their own interests at the expense of their 
citizenry. Rather, it might just be that the policy makers were not good enough in making 
good economic policies or were not good enough to run the economy.   
(xii) 
Individual agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse by lobbying on behalf of 
lobby groups or multinational corporations in order to get law makers and policy makers to 
make laws and policies that will benefit the corporations even when those laws and policies 
will contribute to resource curse and will be detrimental to the citizenry. 
 
In spite of the above ways in which individual agents contribute to resource curse, it is 
difficult to expressly say these individuals are anti-cosmopolitan. If we look at the individuals 
and their activities, often we do not see anything to suggest that they are anti-cosmopolitan in 
the sense that they are not racists, supremacists, xenophobes, etc. As ordinary individuals or 
as singular individuals, they relate with anyone and everyone without any prejudice or 
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discrimination. Yet one wonders how it is possible to say, on cosmopolitan grounds, these 
individuals share in the causality and responsibility of resource curse.  
Given that ‘interactional cosmopolitanism assigns direct responsibility for the fulfilment of 
human rights to other individuals or collective agents’, to understand how, although these 
individuals are not anti-cosmopolitan, but can be said to be part of the causality and 
responsibility of resource curse, their actions and omissions should be looked at from two 
angles. Firstly, their actions and omissions should be looked at as individual actions. 
Secondly, their actions and omissions should be looked at as collective actions (this argument 
will be extensively dealt with in sub-chapters 5.1 and 5.2 in which we will not only look at 
the individual actions but also the collective actions). As collective actions and omissions, 
they cause resource curse. And as individual actions, they are part of the collective actions 
that cause resource curse. 
Furthermore, although it is difficult to see how the individual actors in their own right share 
in the causality and responsibility of resource curse without being anti-cosmopolitan, a look 
at their actions and omissions in relation to the tenets of cosmopolitanism namely 
individualism, universality and generality, will help us in our analysis. Firstly, individualism 
holds that our ultimate units of concern ought to be human beings or persons.
546
 Where the 
individual agents fail is that their ultimate units of concern are not human beings or persons; 
for they are not really concerned about the victims of resource curse or anyone affected 
negatively due to their actions and omissions.  
Secondly, universality holds that we ought to attach equal status of ultimate unit of concern to 
every human being or person. 
547
 And thirdly, generality holds that everyone ought to be an 
ultimate unit of concern for everyone.
548
 However, the individual agents are interested in 
their personal welfare, gains, profits, etc. to the detriment of the victims of their negative self-
interest. As long as their actions and omissions ensure them their desired goals, they do not 
care what harm the actions and omissions cause the victims. In other words, there is negative 
self-interest at play. Also, to the detriment of the victims of resource curse, the individual 
agents are interested in the welfare of their entities they represent be it companies, 
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governments, etc. As long as they achieve the goals of their entities they do not care about the 
negative consequences these cause their victims.  
When the goals of the entities the individual agent represents have a lot in common with the 
common good or desires of the general population or victims, there is no harm or there is 
minimal harm. But when the goals and desires are invariably divergent, there is usually a 
high probability of grievous harm. But it is hardly the case that the goals of the entities the 
individual represents will have a lot in common with the goals of the populace. Because the 
aim of the individual agent is usually to help his/her entities subvert the goals of the 
populace. So, if both set of goals had a lot in common, then there would be no need for 
subversion. 
In all the listed twelve scenarios above, at the expense of the citizenry of the resource-rich 
states some individual agents prioritize the interests of the shareholders of their companies, 
some prioritize the interests of their foreign governments and compatriots, some prioritize the 
interests of their friends-in-crime or friends-in-immorality (fellow corrupt politicians, judges, 
CEOs, etc.), and some prioritize just their own interests. Yet others were merely bad or poor 
policy makers, unfortunate ideologists or were just procedurally constrained by the law, and 
so on.  
Apart from the individuals who were constrained procedurally by law, or merely poor policy 
makers or unfortunate ideologists, and so on, the rest - given our proof of culpability or moral 
responsibility in the next chapter - are morally culpable for their roles in resource curse. The 
culpable individual agents, in view of moral cosmopolitanism, have failed to hold the tenets 
that everybody weighs equally in moral consideration, no one should be discriminated 
against, and everyone should be an ultimate unit of moral concern. Because of their 
culpability, they will have the pro tanto obligations which apply to culpable agents as will be 
argued in the next chapter. They have the negative duty to refrain from their harm-causing 
actions and the positive duty to remedy the harm they have already caused. 
Finally, in view of moral cosmopolitanism we would paraphrase the three standard 
conceptions of responsibility in the next chapter as follows. The first standard conception will 
be taken as saying individual agents have a duty to respect everyone as an ultimate unit of 
moral concern, and they will be blamed if they fail to do so. This blame even becomes 
apparent especially when the individual’s failure to respect everyone as an ultimate unit of 
moral concern contributes to the causation of resource curse. The second standard conception 
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will be taken as saying that the individual agents have a duty to help remedy resource curse 
because of their role in the causation of resource curse. While the third standard conception 
will be taken as saying that the individual agents are blameworthy for resource curse because 
their deeds are part of the causation of resource curse.  
The point I am making through the standard conceptions of responsibility and their 
paraphrases become clearer if we look at the conceptions and paraphrases not as mere 
independent or separate conceptions and paraphrases, but look at them jointly as an argument 
or specifically as a syllogism: the first conception (paraphrase) being the first premise; the 
second conception (paraphrase) being the second premise; and the third conception 
(paraphrase) being the conclusion.   
 
4.3. The ‘Collective’ Level of Analysis or Level of Causality and Responsibility 
Since by collective we simply mean two or more individuals - a group of individuals, a bunch 
of individuals or a plurality of individuals, or a group of individuals bound together by a 
common goal or purpose – that act jointly in a case of resource curse, whatever was said 
about the singular individual in the previous sub-chapter is also true of the plurality of 
individuals in this sub-chapter. So I shall simply discuss the collective level by 
“collectivising” the individual, or by “pluralising” the “singular individual” on the individual 
level. Nevertheless, I note that the actions or omissions of the individual acting alone or 
failing to act are not as powerful as those of a collective acting together or failing to act.  
Here too, cosmopolitanism, particularly interactional moral cosmopolitanism, is primarily 
applicable. It will help us to understand the role of the collective. Like individual agents, 
collective agents can be said to contribute to the causes of resource curse in various ways 
which, generally, can be summed up in twelve ways. Just as I did in the previous sub-chapter, 
I shall outline the twelve ways, neither by precedent nor antecedent, and neither in 
chronological, lexical nor in hierarchical order. They are outlined below without any special 
order.  
(i) Collective agents contribute to the causes of resource curse, when sui generis, 
they seek rent for themselves, corrupting or being corrupted for their own sake 
– giving or taking bribes for themselves.   
(ii) Collective agents can contribute to resource curse by acting as corrupt agents 
of the government or other sectors of the resource-rich state or its government.  
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(iii) Collective agents can contribute to resource curse by acting as agents of a 
rent-seeking foreign government.  
(iv) Collective agents contribute to the causes of resource curse by acting as agents 
of rent-seeking multinational corporations.   
(v) Collective agents can contribute to resource curse as agents of financial 
institutions, e.g. banks, which aid money laundry and other illicit financial 
transactions concerning resource course.    
(vi) Collective agents also contribute to the causes of resource curse as lawyers 
helping to facilitate corruption.   
(vii) Collective agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse by 
representing public relations companies, the media or a medium that 
misinforms or ‘disinforms’ the public concerning the roles of certain actors in 
resource curse.   
(viii) Collective agents can contribute to resource curse as law makers responsible 
for laws that aid resource curse.   
(ix) Collective agents can contribute to resource curse as law enforcement agents 
failing to enforce laws that mitigate resource curse, for instance failing to 
prosecute ‘suspects.’  
(x) As members of the judiciary, for instance judges miscarrying justice, 
collective agents can contribute to resource curse.   
(xi) Collective agents can contribute to resource curse as policy makers 
responsible for bad or poor policies that aid resource curse.   
(xii) Collective agents can also contribute to the causes of resource curse by 
lobbying on behalf of lobby groups or multinational corporations in order to 
get law makers and policy makers to make laws and policies that will benefit 
the corporations even when those laws and policies will contribute to resource 
curse and will be detrimental to the citizenry. 
 
Since, as already stated, what is true of the singular individual in the previous sub-chapter is 
also true of the plurality of individuals in this sub-chapter, and since we are simply discussing 
the collective level by “collectivising” the individual, or by “pluralising” the “singular 
individual” on the individual level, I will not rehash the various explanations and arguments 
in the previous subchapter here. Therefore, I shall simply reiterate that the explanations in the 
previous sub-chapter apply here and the arguments are equally valid here.  Albeit all the 
while noting that the actions or omissions of the individual acting alone or failing to act are 
not as powerful as those of a collective acting together or failing to act.  
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4.4. The “Corporate” Level of Analysis or Level of Causality and Responsibility   
Many big corporations have become so powerful that even powerful, ‘developed’, high 
income and well-governed states rarely dare upset them or are very cautious when dealing 
with them. If these big corporations can almost always do whatever they will in powerful and 
well-governed states, then doing whatever they will in less developed and non-well governed 
states like Nigeria, Angola, DRC, etc. is almost a walkover.  
As Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, in paraphrasing Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s 
argument, succinctly put it: 
it can no longer be assumed that interstate relations are always the most important; in 
the modern world, the decisions and actions of non-state actors can affect our lives as 
much as, if not more than the decisions and actions of states....it can no longer be 
assumed that states have the power to regulate effectively these actors; in principle, 
some states may have this capacity but, in practice, they are loath to exercise it given 
the potential costs of so doing in economic, social and political terms.
549
  
Multinational corporations might be involved in different lines of business (oil and gas, gold, 
uranium, banking, etc.), all these different lines of business are all means to one end; profit. 
Whatever the line of business multinational corporations are involved in; their common 
ideology is the maximization of profit and the minimization of costs and risks. In this vein, 
their modus operandi is cost/benefit analysis.  
Multinational corporations might do a bit of corporate social responsibility, community 
development, community service, charity project, or they might follow the rules and 
regulations of the state, but these things are secondary. If the cost of, say, even following 
rules and regulations outweighs the benefit, they are likely not to follow the rules and 
regulations. On the other hand if the benefit outweighs the cost, they will certainly follow the 
rules and regulations. Consequently, if the benefit derived from exploiting individuals and 
societies outweighs the cost, minimizes cost and maximizes profit, multinational corporations 
will be prone to exploit individuals and societies.   
Some of these corporations, especially those in the extractive industry, have a huge incentive 
to play illegal games and, more often than not, immoral games. Given the immobility of 
many natural resources especially in the extractive industry, many corporations in the 
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extractive industry cannot easily relocate their businesses from one country to another. For 
this reason, they are more likely to collude with politicians in order to maintain their business 
interests in a country. This collusion usually manifests in illegal and immoral practices which 
take the form of political interference.
550
   
Corporations contribute to the cause of resource curse in different ways. In the extractive 
industry, oil and gas companies, mining companies, some other energy companies, etc., 
contribute to the cause of resource curse mainly through seeking rent and creating negative 
externalities. Negative externalities are costs “accruing to an individual or group – a third 
party – that is external to a market transaction”551 (emphasis is original). In the context of the 
extractive industry, there are two sides of the coin called negative externalities. The first side 
of the coin is that corporations benefit from it. The flip side is that individuals, local 
communities in particular and the country in general suffer from it.  
Such companies exploit or use resources, e.g. the natural resources of the oil-rich 
communities, freely without any form of compensation. An oil or gas company in the process 
of drilling, or a copper, or gold, or uranium company in the process of mining, causes 
environmental pollution. When the activities of the companies are unchecked and the 
companies, as they often do, act irresponsibly with impunity, the environmental pollutions 
are devastating. Land, water and air are polluted, and the economic, health and social hazards 
are borne by the local communities. While the companies, as the saying goes, privatize the 
profits from production, they socialize the risks of, and losses from, production.   
In essence, in order to produce their goods the companies freely pollute the environment of 
the local communities without compensation. On the one hand, the companies minimize their 
cost of production and maximize their profit. On the other hand, the economic, health and 
social well-being of the inhabitants of the local communities are minimized, even reduced to 
the barest minimum, and their poverty, diseases, sicknesses, pains and sufferings are 
maximized. So, the lives of the locals become, in Hobbesian terms, nasty, brutish and short. 
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By seeking rent, companies get involved in corruption especially bribery. “Extractive 
industries are notoriously subject to bribe requests.”552 A common bribery phenomenon is 
grease payment, also known as facilitating payment. Philip M. Nichols defines grease or 
facilitating payments as “bribes paid to secure routine, non-discretionary acts from 
government officials.”553 In some of the countries where many multinational corporations 
have their headquarters it is legal for multinational corporations to give certain bribes, and 
these bribes are classified as tax deductibles or expenses of running business. 
 
As Pogge says, “most affluent countries, until quite recently, allowed their firms to bribe 
foreign officials and even made such bribes tax-deductible.”554 Australia is one example 
among many where such bribes are considered as tax deductibles. These sorts of bribes are 
called grease or facilitating payments. Although grease or facilitating payments are not 
considered as bribes by the United States of America, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), international anti-bribery conventions, etc.,
555
 they are 
only not bribes in legal terminology. But in effect they are actually bribes, albeit legalized 
bribes - “the international regime does not require countries to criminalize the payment of 
these bribes abroad.”556 Due to moral pressure on the OECD, recently it started giving 
considerations to the criminalisation of the legal bribe it has always considered to be grease 
or facilitating payment.  
 
Massive corruption that involves billions or multimillion dollars is impossible or at least 
almost impossible without the help of financial institutions (notably banks) and financial 
practitioners, and often without the help of financial and business lawyers too.  So, in terms 
of corporations, alongside the multinational corporations in the extractive industry (which are 
the main corporate contributors to resource curse), the next in line are financial institutions 
notably banks, and then law firms.  
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While the banks do the financial transactions, the law firms provide legal support or illegal 
cover-up. Looking for loopholes in legal systems to exploit, the latter assist both the 
multinational corporations in the extractive industries, the banks in the financial sector, and 
corrupt individuals and collective agents to facilitate (il)legally the movement of money 
related to resource curse, or to escape prosecution from their activities that resulted in 
negative externalities, etc.     
As Alpha Conde, the president of Guinea, says, “Too many of the world’s financial centres 
enable the predators, who rely on offshore corporate vehicles to mask their identities, to loop 
their finances through exotic jurisdictions, while using prestigious law firms, accountants, 
financial advisers and public-relations firms to give their destructive behaviour a veneer of 
respectability.”557 Alongside all the above forms of rent-seeking in general and corruption in 
particular, tax evasion, transfer pricing and other forms of corporate opacity are means by 
which different sorts of corporations and individuals collude to contribute to the causation of 
resource curse.  
Another form of corporation is lobbying groups. These groups have only one interest; to help 
their client-corporations. They contribute to the cause of resource curse by lobbying on behalf 
of multinational corporations in the extractive industry in order to get law makers and policy 
makers to make laws and policies that will benefit the corporations even when those laws and 
policies will contribute to resource curse and will be detrimental to the citizenry.  
In 1938 during the Second World War, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the then president of the 
United States of America, said about lobbying; “Today’s threat to our national security is not 
a matter of military weapons alone. We know of new methods; the Trojan horse, the fifth 
column.”558  That Roosevelt would consider lobbying just as a dangerous threat as military 
weapons to America’s national security during the Second World War shows how harmful 
lobbying can be.  
Furthermore, lobbying can degenerate into corruption. It is not every form of lobbying that is 
positive; in fact most forms of lobbying are negative. Often, rent-seeking is done through 
negative lobbying. This is not to say that governments receive bribes when lobbying 
degenerates into bribery. Governments qua governments do not receive bribes as such. When 
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we say a government or the public sector is corrupt, we mean the office holders are corrupt. 
As Joseph Nye succinctly puts it, “Public sector corruption is the use or abuse of a public 
office or trust for personal rather than public benefit.”559 Moreover, bribe can be defined as a 
transaction in which an official, especially a public official, abuses his/her office to render 
services in order to receive private benefit in return.
560
  
Also, public relations companies and the media, whether international or local, can contribute 
to resource curse. They can ‘disinform’ or misinform the public concerning activities related 
to resource curse. This usually happens when the media are favourable to the multinational 
corporations, governments, individuals and collective agents responsible for resource curse. 
As we know; some of the public relations companies and media are either owned, controlled, 
or are connected to these agents of resource curse.  
 
In view of the standard conceptions of responsibility, just as the individual and collectives are 
to blame for their roles in resource curse, so also corporations are to blame for their role in 
resource curse. Just as the individual and collectives have negative and positive duties in 
preventing and remedying resource curse, so also corporations have negative and positive 
duties in preventing and remedying resource curse.  
 
As Robert Nozick says, “Individuals have rights and there are things you cannot do to them 
without violating their rights.”561 To the above assertion, we may add that individuals and 
peoples, communities and societies have rights and there are things multinational 
corporations cannot do to them without violating their rights. Multinational corporations have 
the negative duties to refrain from rent-seeking and the creation of negative externalities.  
 
Financial institutions have the negative duty to refrain from facilitating financial transactions 
that are connected to resource curse. Law firms have the negative duty to refrain from helping 
agents of resource curse get away with negative externalities and corruption. Lobby groups 
have a negative duty to refrain from lobbying law makers and policy makers into making bad 
laws and policies that aid resource curse. And the media and public relations companies have 
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a negative duty to refrain from disinformation and misinformation. In addition, multinational 
corporations in the extractive industry, financial institutions, law firms, lobby groups and the 
media and public relations companies have the positive duty to remedy the damages they 
have already caused.  
 
Given the exploitative tendencies of multinational corporations, the role of the government 
and state is not only to make sure there are multinational corporations that provide goods and 
services or a viable economy and market, but also more importantly to set a good basic 
structure to determine the relationship between corporations and individuals, corporations 
and fellow corporations, and corporations and the government and state. This is to ensure the 
advantages and disadvantages from the relationships are fairly distributed and the 
relationships are mutually beneficial. The government ought to prevent multinational 
corporations from acting extra-basic structure or contrary to the basic structure. It is also the 
role of the state or government to sanction multinational corporations when they act contrary 
to the basic structure. 
 
So, when corporations are causing resource curse we know that they are acting contrary to the 
basic structure and they ought to be sanctioned. If when they act contrary to the basic 
structure they are not sanctioned, then we know that the basic structure is ineffective and 
needs to be made effective. And if even when corporations cause resource curse, yet they are 
not judged to be acting contrary to the basic structure, i.e., their actions that cause resource 
curse are actually in accordance with the basic structure, then we will know that the basic 
structure is bad and unjust and needs to be fixed.  
 
It is the role of the state, through its basic structure and otherwise: to ensure that corporations 
do not produce undesirable consequences ab initio; to ensure that corporations are sanctioned 
or punished when they produce undesirable consequences; to ensure that the damages caused 
by the undesirable consequences are remedied; and to ensure that no further undesirable 
consequences are produced in the future.  
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Because of his commitment to liberalism
562
 Rawls’ stance is that we do not have any feasible 
rules which we can practically “impose on economic agents that can prevent these 
undesirable consequences. These consequences are often so far into the future, or so indirect, 
that the attempt to forestall them by restrictive rules that apply to individuals would be an 
excessive if not impossible burden. Thus we start with the basic structure and try to see how 
this system itself should make the corrections necessary to preserve background justice.”563 
For the above reasons, we need statism to help us fit multinational corporations into the basic 
structure of our societies.  
 
There is a particular limitation of statism when it is applied to corporations. This limitation is 
explained in the following two paragraphs. It is not every individual agent who is a citizen of 
the resource-cursed state and it is not every individual agent who resides in the resource-
cursed state. So also it is not every corporate agent that is a registered corporation in the 
resource-cursed state. But the case of multinational corporations is even more complex. Many 
of them are at once registered corporations in the resource-cursed states and also registered 
corporations in their home countries. While the resource-cursed state is seen as a host state, 
the country where the corporation is headquartered is seen as the home state. Some 
corporations are not even hosted in the resource-cursed state; they are registered elsewhere, 
headquartered elsewhere and hosted elsewhere.  This creates a dilemma for statism in the 
following way. 
 
In the foregoing discussion, we have been talking about the corporate level as if it were 
merely domestic. But as just explained, it is also international or global. Here is one 
limitation of statism; it cannot deal with international or global aspect of corporations. While 
this aspect is rightly left to the global institutional order, it reminds us that statism alone is not 
sufficient for our multi-level and complex analysis. Although this aspect of corporation is not 
“the” reason or “the only” reason why we need a fusion of horizons, it is “part” of the reason 
or it is “one of the” reasons why we need a fusion of horizons. The grounds for fusion of 
horizons have already been explained in the introduction and chapter 1, and will be revisited 
and expatiated in the next chapter. 
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4.5. The ‘State’ Level of Analysis or Level of Causality and Responsibility 
In resource curse, the government and state factor is the most critical of all the factors 
because the collapse of the basic structure leaves the state itself and other factors unchecked. 
On the government and state factor, on the one hand when we look at government we look at 
it in terms of its arms and functions. On the other hand when we look at the state we look at it 
as the unit which embodies or is supposed to embody the basic structure. Analogically the 
government is the hub through which the state, the wheel, revolves around. The wheel is not 
rotational without the hub, but the hub is just a means to help the wheel be functional. The 
government is to the state what the hub is to the wheel. The government is the representative 
or face of the state. 
We can look at how the state or government contributes to the causation of resource curse by 
looking at crucial functions of the state or government. Within the remit of the legislature, we 
can look at law making. By commission or action, the state or government makes bad laws 
that aid resource curse. And by omission or inaction, it fails to make good laws that prevent 
or fight resource curse. Within the remit of the executive and civil service, we can look at 
policy making. By commission or action, the state or government makes bad policies 
(especially economic policies) that aid resource curse. And by omission or inaction, it fails to 
make good policies (especially economic policies) that can prevent or fight resource curse.  
Also within the remit of the executive and the civil service, we can look at policy 
implementation. By commission or action, the state or government implements bad policies 
(especially economic policies) that aid resource curse. And by omission or inaction, it fails to 
implement good policies (especially economic policies) that can prevent or fight resource 
curse. Furthermore, the state or government contributes to the causes of resource curse in 
terms of law enforcement when, by commission or action, it enforces bad laws that aid 
resource curse. And when by omission or inaction it fails to enforce good laws that can 
prevent or fight resource curse.  
Regarding the judiciary, the state or government contributes to the causes of resource curse in 
terms of inefficient or corrupt judicial system. This usually happens when the judiciary is so 
inefficient or corrupt to such an extent that rather than being the last hope of the common 
man, it becomes a safe haven for corrupt individuals, collective agents, and companies 
involved in resource curse activities because the courts are always letting them off the hook.  
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In the case of the failure of private markets, the state or government should have the role of 
correcting the failure. Failure to control certain market failures contribute to resource curse.  
The state or government’s failure to control these market failures will be tantamount to it 
contributing to the causes of resource curse. One form of market failure is negative 
externalities and one form of negative externalities is pollution.
564
 In performing one of its 
duties namely allocation, government should not restrict itself to the production of public 
goods, but it should also correct negative externalities.
565
  
Like corporations, some individuals and collectives have exploitative tendencies which can 
cause or engender resource curse. So, it is also the role of the government or state to check 
them. But the state or government is not immune from causing resource cause; it is a chief 
party to resource curse. Given the state’s role in resource curse, the conclusion that will be 
reached, in view of the standard conceptions of responsibility, will be related to the 
conclusions reached on the individual, collective and corporate levels. 
Just as individuals, collectives and corporations are to blame for their roles in resource curse, 
so also the state is to blame for its role in resource curse. Just as the individuals, collectives 
and corporations have negative and positive duties in preventing and remedying resource 
curse, so also the state has negative and positive duties in preventing and remedying resource 
curse. The state has the negative duties to refrain from making bad laws, enforcing bad laws, 
making bad polices, implementing bad policies, and unfairly trying resource curse agents in 
law courts. Also, the state has the positive duties to make good laws, enforce good laws, 
make good policies, implement good policies and fairly try resource curse agents in law 
courts. Finally, the state has the positive duty to remedy the damage it has already caused.  
 
4.6. The “Global Institutional Order” Level Of Analysis or Level of Causality and Responsibility 
To analyse how the global institutional order contributes to resource curse, we do not have to 
go into an unknown terrain or follow a road that has not been travelled. We only have to go 
into a terrain that is well known and follow a road that is well travelled by Thomas Pogge and 
Leif Wenar. A combination of Pogge’s analysis of international borrowing privilege and 
international resource privilege with Wenar’s analysis of property right and resource curse 
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will suffice. Before then, let us briefly look at Hedley Bull’s analysis of “Order and Justice in 
World Politics”; this will provide a helpful background for the appreciation of Pogge’s and 
Wenar’s analyses.  
Ali Mazrui argues that the international system prioritises peace, order and stability at the 
expense of justice and human rights.
566
 Hedley Bull agrees with Mazrui. However while 
Mazrui thinks the situation should be the other way around, Bull defends the status quo. 
According to Bull, “not only is order in world politics valuable, there is also a sense in which 
it is prior to other goals, such as that of justice. It does not follow from this, however, that 
order is to be preferred to justice in any given case.”567 Just as in social life order is the 
precondition which if it exists, allows us to pursue other goals, so also international order is 
the precondition, which if it exists, allows us to pursue ideas of justice, human rights, 
sovereignty, etc.  
 
Nevertheless, Bull warns that although order is a priceless precondition for the realisation of 
justice and other values, order should not be seen as an overriding value. Moreover, “to show 
that a particular institution or course of action is conducive of order is not to have established 
a presumption that that institution is desirable or that that course of action should be carried 
out.”568 But the fact that order is not an overriding value does not negate the fact that it is a 
precondition for justice. Since order is a precondition for justice, without global order human 
or cosmopolitan justice will be unrealisable.
569
 
 
Bull asserts that because of the primacy of order over justice, the structure of global order is 
hostile to human justice. “The international order does not provide any general protection of 
human rights, only a selective protection that is determined not by the merits of the case but 
by the vagaries of international politics.”570 Although the global society recognizes human 
rights that citizens have and obligations that can legitimately be demanded against the state, 
generally the global society is restrained from making these claims effective, except 
discriminately and in a warped manner.  
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For Bull, given that there might be situations whereby the prioritization of different human 
rights will be problematic, therefore treating human rights or justice as primary and order as 
secondary is surely a recipe for disaster. If order were to be seen as secondary to human 
justice, this might become counterproductive to the extent of threatening or even eroding 
world order. It is for this reason that the international society opts for the primacy of 
international order at the expense of human justice.
571
  
 
As Bull says, “the institutions and mechanisms which sustain international order, even when 
they are working properly, indeed especially when they are working properly, or fulfilling 
their functions ... necessarily violate ordinary notions of justice.”572 For Bull, it is not that 
justice and order are incompatible as such. It is possible to have a society that provides the 
precondition of order and also sustains other secondary goals such as justice. There is no 
theoretical reason, or in principle there is no reason, to argue that we cannot have a global 
society that accommodates both global order and global justice at the same time.  However, 
the problem is that the institutions and rules that sustain the current global order are 
incompatible with justice.  
 
This incompatibility is due to the fact that: advocating global justice entails the demolition of 
the current international society and it’s system; the current international society or system 
can only discriminately and in a warped manner be receptive of demands for human justice; 
and although the current international society or system is not essentially unreceptive of 
demands for interstate and international justice, it can only satisfy these demands 
insufficiently.
573
  
 
Therefore, Bull, not sanguine about the feasibility of cosmopolitan justice, argues that even if 
cosmopolitan justice is feasible, it can only be realised within a world society. Thus 
clamouring for cosmopolitan justice is tantamount to clamouring for a revolutionary change 
of the current world system. Global order, as Bull puts it, “is preserved by means which 
systematically affront the most basic and widely agreed principles of international justice.”574 
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Although cosmopolitan justice and world order are not mutually exclusive, agitating for 
cosmopolitan justice necessarily conflicts with the current world order because the 
instruments by which the current world order is maintained are at variance with cosmopolitan 
justice.
575
  
 
In view of the foregoing discussion, Bull explains that international law does not only 
sanctify the status quo, but also when there is a violation of international law and this 
violation results in a new situation – a feat made possible by force rather than justice - 
international law legitimises this new situation, and agrees with the forceful instruments 
through which it came to be. As Bull says, “The conflict between international law and 
international justice is endemic because the situations from which the law takes its point of 
departure are a series of faits accompli brought about by force and the threat of force, 
legitimised by the principle that treaties concluded under duress are valid.”576 Re-echoing 
Mazrui, Bull says international law initially denounces aggression, but once aggression is 
triumphant, international law stops denouncing it but rather recognises it as legitimate. 
577
  
 
Finally, Bull argues, it is not that the high propensity of international law to be very receptive 
of power politics was some accidental unfortunate fault that can easily be corrected if one 
wills. Rather, this characteristic of international law, which necessarily puts it in conflict with 
elementary justice, is essential to the functioning and effectiveness of international law. 
Absent this essential characteristic, international law cannot deal with the reality of the 
international system; hence international law will become utterly redundant.
578
 
 
In his analysis, Wenar argues that resource curse does not occur in poor countries because 
they are endowed with abundant natural resources. In itself the abundance of natural 
resources is a blessing rather than a curse. “The ‘curse’ results from a defect in the rules that 
allocate control over these resources. The fault is not in nature, but in human 
institutions....Only human practices can turn what should be a national asset into a collective 
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liability.”579 Hence Wenar opines that the story of resource curse is only partially about the 
abundance of natural resources in a country. The other part of the story is the revenue or 
foreign exchange dictators and corrupt regimes earn from exploiting these resources.
580
 
 
In the same vein, as earlier discussed, Pogge argues that regardless of how any group comes 
to power - how it exercises power and whether the citizenry supports or opposes it - as long 
as such group has the preponderance of the means of coercion or near monopoly of force 
within the state, it is internationally recognized as the legitimate government of the state.
581
 
This is in spite of the fact that the nature of its coming to power, the nature of its exercise of 
power and the opposition of it by the citizenry make it illegitimate. By recognizing such 
group as the legitimate government the international community consequently bestows upon 
it two crucial privileges namely international resource privilege and international borrowing 
privilege. These privileges respectively allow the government to sell the natural resources of 
the country and to borrow money in the name of the country.
582
  
 
Such despotic governments, given their corrupt and unaccountable natures, borrow at will 
without considering the impact it will have on the population. Worse still they use the money 
to perpetuate themselves in power and for other self-aggrandisements and for their cronies, 
without any commitment to developing the country or making the plight of the population 
better. Nevertheless: 
Any successor government that refuses to honour the debt incurred by a corrupt, 
brutal, undemocratic, unconstitutional, repressive, unpopular predecessor will be 
severely punished by the banks and governments of other countries; at minimum it 
will lose its own borrowing privilege by being excluded from the international 
financial markets. Such refusals are therefore quite rare, as governments, even when 
newly elected after a dramatic break with the past, are compelled to pay the debts of 
their ever so awful predecessors.
583
  
Although in the above paragraph Pogge only mentioned the banks and governments of other 
countries, sometimes the Bretton Woods institutions - the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank Group - can even do more damage. From the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) to the Washington Consensus, there are unfavourable conditionalities for 
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receiving ‘help’ from IMF and World Bank. Just like IMF and World Bank, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) has the capacity to cause its own fair share of damage. Moreover, under 
the guise of free trade there are ‘strings attached’ to doing ‘business’ with WTO.  
The international resource privilege, Pogge argues, goes beyond the global institutional 
order’s acceptance of the group in power as having the power of control over the natural 
resources of a country. This privilege involves the global institutional order recognizing both 
de facto and de jure the group in power as having the power and authority to legally, validly 
transfer the ownership rights of these natural resources to whoever they wish.
584
 When this 
happens, while the benefits are usually very lucrative for the benefactors, the consequences 
are usually very dire for the helpless victims.  
Consider the following true case scenario. For instance, “a corporation that has purchased 
resources from...Sanni Abacha, has thereby become entitled to be – and actually is - 
recognized anywhere in the world as the legitimate owner of these resources”585 (emphasis is 
original). Indeed Abacha allocated oil wells to himself and military generals who were 
members of his Provisional Ruling Council. The oil companies Abacha and his generals sold 
their oil wells to still have legal title to those oil wells today. So also the generals who 
decided to keep their oil wells rather than sell them still have legal titles to those oil wells 
today. When we add these immoral legalities to the billions of dollars Abacha,  his family, 
military generals and other cronies stole from oil revenues, then the consequences of Pogge’s 
international privileges become horrific.  
Compare the above international case with a commercial law case; then you can deduce what 
is wrong with the former.  “A group that overpowers and takes control of a warehouse may 
be able to give some of the merchandise to others, accepting money in exchange.”586 Neither 
the group nor the buyers are legally recognized as the rightful owners of the merchandise. But 
in the case of a group that illegitimately takes over power by force and sells off the natural 
resources of the country, “the purchaser acquires not mere possession, but all the rights and 
liberties of ownership, which are supposed to be – and actually are protected and enforced by 
all other states’ courts and police forces.587 (emphasis is original). Juxtaposing the 
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international case with the commercial case, we can see that while commercial law is close to 
principles of domestic justice, international law is far away from principles of global justice. 
Corroborating the above commercial law case, Wenar argues that in legal parlance when a 
thief steals your watch the thief has no title to your watch, he or she only has possession of 
your watch. Even if the thief sells your watch to someone else, the transfer will be invalid, 
hence illegal. So you still have title to your watch - although you have lost possession of it – 
while the thief merely sells a stolen good and the buyer only has possession of a stolen 
good.
588
 Employing the legal maxim, nemo dat quod non habet (no one can give what he or 
she does not have), Wenar argues that the thief cannot give, sell or transfer your watch to 
another person legally because the thief does not own your watch and you have not 
authorized him or her to dispose of it. In legal terms, the thief’s title is void and whoever buys 
or gets the watch will consequently have a void title.
589
  
However, Wenar admits that there are exceptions to the above legal rule or norm. When one 
is dispossessed of his or her possession through deception, brainwashing, fraud, etc. and the 
dispossessor sells the possession to someone else, the buyer – in legal parlance – has no void 
but voidable title to the watch. If the purchaser purchases the watch in good faith, believing 
that s/he was buying the watch from the rightful owner, not knowing that the seller got 
possession of it through fraudulent means – has cogent reasons to believe that the seller is the 
rightful owner – then his/her title might not be voided. But if s/he buys the watch in bad faith, 
knowing that s/he might not be buying the watch from the rightful owner, knowing or 
suspecting that the seller got possession of it through fraudulent means – has cogent reasons 
to believe that the seller is not the rightful owner of the watch - then he or she has no valid 
title and his or her title can be voided in law court.
590
  
While military regimes gain possession of natural resources through force (having come to 
power through the barrel of the gun) corrupt civilian regimes usually gain possession of 
natural resources through fraudulent means either by stolen ballots, administrative opacity or 
both. But the international system treats them as if they were the rightful owners of the 
resources. The foreign states and corporations that buy these resources know too well how 
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they are ill-gotten. These foreign states and corporations act as if there were nothing wrong 
with their trade. Even if there is nothing legally wrong with such international trade as the 
international system currently deems it, but surely there is something morally wrong with it. 
In other words, even if it is legally procedural, it is not legally substantive. 
Wenar argues that there is a daily violation of national ownership principle. This daily 
violation is made possible by an outdated “provision in the international system that invites 
the seizure of natural resources by violence and threat.”591  This argument is based on the 
grounds that “The property rights of a people are violated, as any owner’s right would be, 
whenever someone gains control of this property through theft, deception, force, or extreme 
manipulation.”592 Wenar supports his arguments with some international covenants.  
Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that all peoples 
have the right to “freely pursue their economic ...development”, and “for their own ends, 
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.” In corroboration, Article 21 of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that “All peoples shall freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the 
people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.” Based on the above articles Wenar aptly 
argues that the natural resources of a country belong to the people of that country. This 
property right or principle of ownership is recognized by international law and enshrined in 
many state constitutions (of course except some monarchies) and legitimated by several UN 
declarations.
593
 But recognition of this property right is not enough. It also needs to be 
respected. 
In view of the foregoing discussion, Wenar argues that international trade, as it is today, 
permits the selling and buying of stolen goods. “The raw materials used to make many of 
these goods have been taken – sometimes by stealth, sometimes by force – from some of the 
poorest people in the world. These goods flow through the system of global commerce under 
cover of a rule that is little more than a cloak of larceny.”594 Therefore, for him, many of the 
products sold and bought can be considered to be stolen goods. 
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Pogge’s and Wenar’s notions of property rights re-echo that of William of Ockham who was 
a fourteenth century Franciscan friar and philosopher. He developed his notion of property 
right when he sided with the then Minister-General of the Order of Friars Minor (a.k.a. 
Franciscans) Michael Cesena against Pope John XXII in Avignon on their dispute on the 
correct biblical meaning of the vow of poverty. Here, rather than rehash the historical context 
in which Ockham developed his notion of property right, I will simply state the content or 
substance of the notion. Ockham’s notion of property right holds that the owner of a 
thing/property has authority over, and retains the right to, the thing/property. Although others 
can use the property, they can only use the property with the consent of the owner and 
according to the intention of the owner, and the owner can recall the property if s/he so 
wish.
595
  
Applying Ockham’s notion of property right to resource curse, in political philosophy - as 
already mentioned in sub-chapter 4.1 - it is generally accepted that sovereignty lies with the 
people rather than the government. The government is a mere agent while the people are the 
principal. The agent cannot be a representative of the principal without the consent of the 
principal, and the agent should not act contrary to the intention of the principal. The agency 
of the agent is derived from the principal and the principal has authority over, and retains a 
right to withdraw, the agency. So the resources of the state belong to the people. It is the 
people who give the government agency to manage the resources on behalf of the people and 
for the interest of the people. When this agency does not come from the people or when the 
people cannot withdraw this agency or when the government utilizes the resources contrary 
to the intention of or against the interest of the people, then the agency is illegitimate or null 
and void.  
In the context of resource curse the corrupt politicians/military dictators are the illegitimate 
agents while the people are the rightful principal. But the global institutional order is on the 
side of the ‘illegitimate’ agents rather than respecting the property rights of the rightful 
principal. My position is that if the global institutional order respects Ockham’s, Pogge’s and 
Wenar’s notions of property right, the causes of resource curse will be minimized and the 
problem alleviated. 
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If the global institutional order respects Ockham’s, Pogge’s and  Wenar’s notions of property 
right, the causes of resource curse will be minimised in the following related ways.  First, 
obviously because rather than having five levels on which resource curse is caused, we will 
be left with only four levels since the problem on the global institutional order level will be 
resolved. Second, while the major economic problem of the Dutch disease will still remain, at 
least the major political economy problem of rent-seeking will be reduced to some extent.  
Third, the resource curse triangle or tripod (“proneness to authoritarianism, higher risk of 
civil conflict and lower rates of growth”596) will lose at least one of its angles or legs thereby 
reducing its negative effectiveness. For instance, authoritarians will have less money to 
finance their repressive apparatus, coup plotters will have less incentive to take over power 
and rebels will have no funds or will have fewer funds to finance their rebellion. 
Consequently there will be fewer conflicts which may in turn lead to higher growth. 
Moreover, given the standard conceptions of responsibility, there is no doubt that the global 
institutional order contributes to resource curse. If we had doubt about the role of the global 
institutional order in resource curse, given Pogge’s analysis of the international borrowing 
privilege and the international resource privilege, and Wenar’s analysis of resource curse and 
property right, at least we have enough grounds, and good grounds, to hold the global 
institutional order morally responsible.  
Consequently, commensurate to its causal role in resource curse, the global institutional order 
is saddled with both negative and positive duties that are pro tanto. Like individuals and 
collective agents, corporations and the state, the global institutional order has a negative role 
to refrain from contributing to the causation of resource curse and a positive role to remedy 
the harm it has already done. 
Finally, when it is determined that the global institutional order, through its actions or 
omissions, has done something wrong – for instance as it is in the cases of Pogge’s 
international borrowing privilege and international resource privilege, and Wenar’s resource 
curse and property right – the global institutional order’s negative duty of refrain and positive 
duty of reparation are not mere politico-legal duties but more importantly moral duties. The 
more the global institutional order observes these duties, the more just our world will be. 
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But according to Nagel “the idea of a just world for Rawls would have to be the idea of a 
world of internally just states.”597 However, as we know from the fallacy of composition, that 
something is true of, or good for, a part, some parts, or every single part does not necessarily 
mean that it is also true of, or good for, the whole as a unit. Therefore, a Rawlsian or 
Nagellian world populated by internally just states is not necessarily a just world. I readily 
concede that the requirement that individuals and institutions adhere to moral principles, 
without any politico-legal structure, is not an effective and practical way to manage the 
global institutional order. Nevertheless, this does not obliterate the moral responsibility of the 
global institutional order.    
 
*** 
In this chapter I engaged in the preliminary prescriptive analysis of resource curse. I 
discussed the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of the activities that 
cause resource curse. Despite the complexity of resource curse and the multifaceted nature of 
the activities that cause resource curse, I identified the different causal roles played by 
different agents, and thus attributed causal responsibility to the agents.   
Analysing the agents on different levels, the chapter started with the ‘individual level’ in 
which the causal roles of individuals were analysed. This was followed by the ‘collective 
level’ in which the causal roles of collectives were analysed. The next levels were the 
‘corporate level’ and the ‘state level’ in which the causal roles of corporations and the state 
were respectively analysed. Finally, the causal roles of the global institutional order was 
analysed at the ‘global institutional order level.’    
The next chapter will extend the prescriptive analysis in this chapter by examining the moral 
relationship between causality and responsibility on different levels in the context of resource 
curse.  The next chapter has three aims. First, it is aimed at resolving some moral quandaries 
concerning causal roles that are contributory rather than necessary or sufficient, or necessary 
and sufficient. Second, it is aimed at resolving some moral quandaries concerning degrees of 
responsibilities in relation to contributory causal roles. The final aim is to determine the 
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applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to resource curse in view of contributory causal 
roles and degrees of responsibility.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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5.0.        THE COMPLEXITY OF RESOURCE CURSE: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS AND LEVELS OF CAUSALITY 
AND RESPONSIBILITY (PART 2)  
5.1.    Some Moral Quandaries Concerning Contributory Roles 
When isolated as singular factors or agents, the factors or agents responsible for resource 
curse may neither be necessary nor sufficient conditions for resource curse. Nevertheless, 
when all these factors or agents are not seen in isolation, but are seen holistically, then we can 
see how together they cause resource curse. In other words, resource curse is ‘up to the 
actors’ collectively, therefore they “have a collective causal responsibility for”598 resource 
curse.  
But how can an agent or actor be said to have caused resource curse when his/her/its actions 
are not causality if causality is understood as a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
effect? In my argument, the actor’s actions are not a necessary and sufficient condition for 
resource curse. The actor’s actions are not the cause of resource curse; but they are part of the 
cause of resource curse.  
Let us assume that the actor in question is an individual called Babangida Abacha or an oil 
company called Shell-Mobil. Traditionally, the idea of causation is often looked at from the 
angles of necessity and sufficiency (necessary and sufficient conditions).
599
 But to see 
Babangida Abacha’s or Shell-Mobil’s role in resource curse, it is not enough to ask whether 
his/its actions are at once necessary and sufficient condition for resource curse. Initially we 
have to ask four questions rather than one. If unsatisfied, then we can even ask further 
questions.  
So, Babangida Abacha and Shell-Mobil will not be exonerated from resource curse just 
because their actions have passed the first test, i.e., the first question. They also have to pass 
the second, third and fourth tests, i.e., the second, third and fourth questions, and even the 
further tests or questions. Even if their actions might not be necessary and sufficient 
condition for resource curse, they can still have a causal role in resource curse depending on 
the results of the other tests or questions and any further tests or questions.  
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The first question is: Are Babangida Abacha’s or Shell-Mobil’s actions (hereafter A) 
necessary and sufficient condition for an effect (hereafter E), namely resource curse? The 
second question is; is A necessary but insufficient for E? The third question is; is A 
unnecessary but sufficient for E? And the final question which is an inverse of the first 
question is; is A at once unnecessary and insufficient for E?   
First, assuming A is at once necessary and sufficient for E, therefore;  
(i) If A then E.  
(ii) If not A then not E.  
(iii) That there is the consequent E necessarily implies that the antecedent A is 
present. 
(iv) That there is not the consequent E necessarily implies that the antecedent A is 
not present.  
Second, assuming that A is necessary but insufficient for E, therefore; 
(i)      That there is the consequent E necessarily implies that the antecedent A is    
present. 
(ii)      That there is the antecedent A does not necessarily imply that the consequent E is 
present; apart from A’s presence, other condition(s) is/are needed to cause E. 
Third, assuming that A is unnecessary but sufficient for E, therefore; 
(i)       If A then E. 
(ii)      That there is the consequent E does not necessarily imply the presence of the 
antecedent A; for the consequent E can be caused by other antecedents apart from 
the antecedent A. 
Fourth, assuming that A is at once unnecessary and insufficient for E, therefore; 
(i)      That there is the antecedent A does not necessarily imply that the consequent E is 
also present. 
(ii)      That there is the consequent E does not necessarily imply that the antecedent A   is 
also present. 
(iii)     That there is not A does not necessarily imply that E is also absent. 
(iv)      That there is not E does not necessarily imply that A is also absent. 
So, A is: first, not at once a necessary and sufficient condition for E; second, not a necessary 
condition for E; third, not a sufficient condition for E and; fourth, at once not a necessary and 
not a sufficient condition for E. Then it might be argued that A ought to be exonerated from 
E. Nevertheless, A can still be seen as having a role in E in other ways I will show below.  
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Analogously, Babangida Abacha’s or Shell-Mobil’s actions are: first, not at once a necessary 
and sufficient condition for resource curse; second, not a necessary condition for resource 
curse; third, not a sufficient condition for resource curse and; fourth, at once not a necessary 
and not a sufficient condition for resource curse. Then it might be argued that they ought to 
be exonerated from resource curse. Nevertheless, their actions can still be seen as having a 
role in resource curse in various ways I shall show below.  
First, the actions - on their own - are at once not necessary and not sufficient (passing the first 
and fourth tests or eliminating the first and fourth questions), neither necessary (passing the 
second test or eliminating the second question), nor sufficient (passing the third test or 
eliminating the third question) to cause resource curse. But combining the actions with all the 
factors that cause resource curse, the conditions of necessity and sufficiency might be present 
or the condition of either necessity or sufficiency alone might be met.  
Second, we can see their actions as contributory factors to the causation of resource curse. 
The actions can be seen as contributory factors if, seen as antecedents, herald a consequent – 
resource curse - and alteration to the antecedent leads to alteration in the consequent.
600
 So, 
although the actions are not at once necessary and sufficient, and are neither necessary nor 
sufficient, yet they can be contributory factors to the causation of resource curse. If their 
actions are actually contributory factors to the causation of resource curse, then Babangida 
Abacha or Shell-Mobil ought not to be exonerated from resource curse.  
Borrowing the idea of John Leslie Mackie, we can see their actions as INUS conditions. By 
INUS, Mackie means “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient for the result,”601 in other words, “an insufficient but non-
redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition.”602 Mackie asserts that our idea of 
causation implies insufficient but non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect.
603
  
To illustrate the INUS condition, Mackie uses his famous short-circuit or fire example. For 
instance, a house caught fire but the fire was put out so the house did not get totally burnt. 
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Fire fighters, having investigated the cause of the fire, concluded that the fire was caused by a 
certain short circuit in the house. But the fire fighters, by their conclusion, do not mean that 
the short circuit was a necessary condition for the fire; they know that another short circuit or 
other factors, if they had happened, could have caused the house to burn. Also they do not 
mean that the short circuit was a sufficient condition for the fire. They know that if there were 
no inflammable materials nearby to fuel the fire caused by the short circuit the house would 
not have caught fire. And even if there were inflammable materials near the short circuit but 
there were some automatic fire extinguisher or water sprinkler at the right place and it 
worked efficiently, the fire would not have occurred.  
Although the short circuit was not at once a necessary and sufficient condition, and was 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the fire, the fire fighters have concluded that 
it caused the fire. What they mean is that:  
there is a set of conditions (of which some are positive and some are negative), 
including the presence of inflammable material, the absence of a suitably placed 
sprinkler, and no doubt quite a number of others, which combined with the short 
circuit constituted a complex condition that was sufficient for the house’s catching 
fire – sufficient, but not necessary, for the fire could have started in other ways. Also, 
of this complex condition, the short circuit was an indispensible part of a complex 
sufficient (but not necessary) condition of the fire. In this case, then, the so-called 
cause is, and is known to be, an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is 
itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result. The experts are saying, in effect, that 
the short circuit is a condition of this sort, that it occurred, that the other conditions 
which conjoined with it, form a sufficient condition, were also present, and that no 
other sufficient condition of the house’s catching fire was present on this 
occasion....when we speak of the cause of some particular event, it is often a condition 
of this sort we have in mind.
604
 
If we see Babangida Abacha’s or Shell-Mobil’s actions like Mackie’s short circuit, and 
resource curse like the burning of the house, then we will have no problem comprehending 
the role their actions in particular and other factors/agents/actors in general play in resource 
curse. Moreover, as Pogge says, “injustice can be systemic, can exist without being traceable 
to any manifestly unjust actions by individuals or groups [or institutions]. Our causal 
contribution to suffering is extremely indirect and intermixed with the causal contributions of 
others.”605 In this case, although we cannot trace resource curse to any manifestly unjust 
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actions of Babangida Abacha or Shell-Mobil, yet their causal contributions are indirect and 
intermixed, hence systemic.  
To see Babangida Abacha’s or Shell-Mobil’s role as part of a systemic one which causes 
resource curse, we can also borrow the idea of George Lakoff.  According to Lakoff: 
Systemic causation, because it is less obvious, is more important to understand. A 
systemic cause may be one of a number of multiple causes. It may require some 
special conditions. It may be indirect, working through a network of more direct 
causes. It may be probabilistic, occurring with a significantly high probability. It may 
require a feedback mechanism. In general, causation in ecosystems, biological 
systems, economic systems, and social systems tends not to be direct, but is no less 
causal. And because it is not direct causation, it requires all the greater attention if it is 
to be understood and its negative effects controlled. Above all, it requires a name: 
systemic causation.
606
 
 
Some arguments might be raised against my conclusion as reached above. First, it can be 
argued that in most of the scenarios above, if it were not the particular actor A, or B, or C, or 
if it were not the particular group of actors ABC or XYZ, some other actors would have taken 
their places and done the same immoral deeds because the structures, system or institutions 
are such that there will always be some actors to do the exact deeds.  
However, this does not negate the fact that the actors that actually did the deeds are 
blameworthy. What it shows is that the structures, systems or institutions are also 
blameworthy. When someone has committed a crime or moral wrong, we do not say that the 
person is not to blame because others would have done that crime or moral wrong. For 
instance, when there is a vicious and violent xenophobia in a community, the targets will be 
prone to crimes being committed against them and moral wrongs being done to them. But we 
do not exonerate a xenophobe from his/her morally wrong act or crime of killing someone 
because if he/she did not do it someone else would have done it.  
Perhaps a stronger argument against my conclusion regarding Babangida Abacha and Shell-
Mobil will say that individual or collective agents - unlike the global institutional order, the 
state and corporations - merely act as agents of corporations, governments, etc. Hence it is 
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these corporations, governments, etc. that should be held morally responsible rather than the 
individuals or collective agents.  
Nevertheless, holding the individual and collective agents morally responsible does not 
negate holding the corporations, governments, etc. they represent morally responsible. 
Ultimately the corporations, governments, etc. are responsible for the deeds done on their 
behalf with their approval. But as moral agent(s), the individual and collective agents are 
morally responsible for their part in the deeds – for helping to do the deeds. They could have 
opted not to do the deeds, but they did not.  
In summary, the individual and collective agents face a two-count moral charge namely 
action and inaction or commission and omission. When they act, for instance, seek rent, they 
are guilty of contributing to the causes of resource curse. When they are in a position, say, 
have the legislative power to make laws that can prevent resource curse but fail to do so, or 
have the power to prosecute perpetrators of illegalities but fail to do so, they are also guilty of 
contributing to the causes of resource curse.    
There are exceptions in which although the individual or collective agents contribute to the 
causes of resource curse, they will not be held morally responsible. For instance, in the case 
of non-intentionality of a non-astute economic policy maker whose poor economic policies 
contributed to resource curse but he/she actually intended those policies to yield positive 
results for the citizenry. On consequentialist grounds such a policy maker would be deemed 
morally at fault. But moral cosmopolitanism is not hinged on consequentialism and my 
construal of cosmopolitanism is not ‘Singerian.’607  
Another instance is the case of a judge who finds an oil company that has done a lot of 
negative economic externalities that contribute to resource curse not guilty, then discharges 
and acquits it because the activities of the company are legal although immoral. If intuitively 
we think there is something wrong with the judge’s verdict, then there should be a call to 
amend that section of the constitution which aids negative economic externalities. 
But there is another type of non-intentionality, unlike the non-astute economic policy maker, 
that is morally blameworthy as shown below. First of all, remember that if isolated as 
singular factors or agents, no singular factor or agent may be necessary or sufficient condition 
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for resource curse. Also note that often the actions of these factors or agents are not intended 
to cause resource curse although they inadvertently cause it.  
Consider the popular bank run example; individual account holders, out of fear of losing their 
money, simply withdraw their money and close their accounts. Yet the bank collapses, not 
just as a result of one individual’s action as an individual but as a result of the collective 
actions of the individuals as a collective. A similar but less popular example is that of traffic 
jam. Individuals simply drive onto a road to drive on it, but so many individuals doing that at 
the same time result in traffic jam on a road that does not have the capacity to accommodate 
so many cars at the same time and still be free-flowing.  
Note that in the above two examples the underlying factor is not intentionality but self-
interest. In the first example the bank-runners have no intention to cause a bank to go 
bankrupt or collapse, but they only have the self-interest of safeguarding their money and the 
subsequent bankruptcy or closure of the bank is an unintended consequence or a collateral 
damage. In the second example, the individuals have no intention of causing a traffic jam, 
they only have the self-interest of getting to their various destinations and the resultant traffic 
jam is just an unintended consequence. So also in resource curse, although the actors do not 
have the intention to cause resource curse, their actions, which are propelled by self-interest, 
result in it and a host of negative consequences. Actors are not to be narrowly construed to 
only mean individual and collective agents, but by actors we also mean corporations, state 
and the global institutional order.  
 
Just as the underlying factor in our examples is not intentionality so also the underlying factor 
of the actors in resource curse is not intentionality. Also, just as self-interest is the underlying 
factor in our examples, self-interest is the underlying factor in the actions and omissions of 
the actors in resource curse. However, the difference between our examples and the resource 
curse case – the problem with the resource curse case - is that while the self-interest in the 
examples cannot be said to be a negative one in the moral sense of the word, the self-interest 
in the resource curse case is a negative one morally.  
 
On the one hand, other things equal, a depositor withdrawing his/her deposit or a driver 
driving on the road is a morally neutral incident. On the other hand, other things equal, 
incidents – such as corruption or rent-seeking – which cause resource curse are immoral 
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incidents. Thus, the resource curse case is said to be a moral negative. As a moral negative, it 
is not immune from moral criticisms unlike the interest of our bank-runners and road-users.  
 
According to Paul Collier, “the resource curse happened because of strong forces of self-
interest.”608 Collier is at least partially right. The economic aspect of the resource curse is not 
a result of self-interest. But the political economy aspect or rent-seeking is due to self-
interest. Here, we understand self-interest to be negative self-interest, i.e., self-interest that is 
detrimental to the good of others. This kind of self-interest is very prevalent in resource curse 
cases because it is almost a glorified vice.  
 
For instance, if we ask why rent-seeking is the order of the day in resource-cursed countries; 
the main answer, among other answers, is self-interest - self-interest that is rational but 
unreasonable. But why is self-interest prevalent? Because the system rewards it! When self-
interest or rent-seeking are rewarded, they are basically being reinforced, and when they are 
reinforced they become strong and stronger. But if they were to be punished, they would be 
discouraged, and then become weak and weaker. This implicit, and sometimes explicit, 
approval of negative self-interest suggests that there is collaboration among some agents of 
resource curse.  
 
While on the one hand there is competition among the extractive industry companies, on the 
other hand there is collaboration among the oil companies, state officials, and other financial 
institutions, law firms etc. So the competition is a competition within a system of 
collaboration. Usually individuals do not collaborate except they have some common goal(s) 
or interest(s). So also they do not compete except thy have a goal which both are interested in 
and their interests clash.  
In resource curse, the players – say, Shell against BP - compete for more extraction allocation 
of oil wells (that is the common goal). For example, the United States of America compete 
against China to buy more barrels of oil, say, from Nigeria - so on and so forth. But what 
allows the collaboration is the realization by all involved that they all have (negative) self-
interests (although there are other factors such as force, intimidation, threat etc. that can be 
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involved in one player agreeing to collaborate with another player, negative-self interest is 
the  ultimate factor).  
The extractive industry companies that bribe know that they have an end, namely self-
interest, to achieve and bribery is the means to that end. Also, they know that there are those 
who also have self-interest and their means of achieving that self-interest is collecting bribes 
or facilitating money laundry. The financial institutions or law firms that facilitate the laundry 
of the corrupt money know that they have self-interest to achieve and the means is the 
facilitation of money laundry or bribery. They also know that there are others that have self-
interest and their means of achieving their self-interest is either by giving or taking bribe.  
Furthermore, the state officials who collect the bribes know that they have self-interest to 
achieve and the means is through collecting bribes. They also know that there are others with 
self-interest and their means is either by giving bribe or facilitating bribe and money laundry. 
In short, the givers, receivers and facilitators of bribes know that bribery is a means to an end 
which is ultimately conditioned by negative self-interest. 
In conclusion, there is a lot of herd behaviour in resource curse. When corporations or 
individuals get to areas of resource curse they often do what other corporations or individuals 
are doing there. They are socialized into the culture of bad behaviour. In areas of resource 
curse, the unfortunate necessary ingredients for bad behaviour are rife and plentiful. So, 
corporations and individuals easily join the bandwagon of bad behaviour.  
One reason why, for instance, certain oil companies will behave well in the United States of 
America and behave badly in Nigeria is that they simply join the culture of good behaviour in 
the former where there are few unfortunate conditions for bad behaviour and simply join the 
culture of bad behaviour in the latter where every imaginable condition for bad behaviour is 
available. 
As Kenneth Waltz argues, structures work their effects in two ways. “The first way in which 
structures work their effects is through a process of socialization that limits and moulds 
behaviour. The second way is through competition....Socialization encourages similarities of 
attributes and of behaviour. So does competition. Competition generates an order, the units of 
which adjust their relations through their autonomous decisions and acts.”609 Waltz uses the 
shoe-store example to illustrate his point. Imagine I want to open a shoe-store but wondering 
                                                             
609 Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics.  Readind, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979: p. 76. 
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which part of town to locate it. Then I notice that shoe-stores are usually clustered in one area 
of the town. Applying standard economic rationality, I will assume that market forces make 
the businesses of those who place their stores at the right place profitable, while those who 
place their stores at the wrong place suffer losses.  
Following this economic rationality, I will open my shoe-store in the cluster.
610
 In other 
words, I have been socialised into opening my shoe-store in the cluster. But by opening a new 
shoe-store in the cluster, I will increase the competition in the shoe market. In the resource 
curse ‘business’, agents are just as ‘economically rational’ as shoe-store owners. The higher 
the reward, the bigger the cluster! The bigger the cluster, the more the extensity and intensity 
of resource curse activities!! The more the extensity and intensity of resource curse activities, 
the greater the causal roles of agents!!! The greater the causal roles, the greater the 
corresponding moral responsibility!!!! 
 
5.2. Some Moral Quandaries Concerning Degrees of Responsibility 
A moral agent can be causally responsible in action or in omission and yet can be said not to 
have any corresponding moral responsibility for the consequences of the action or omission. 
So also a moral agent can be said to have a moral responsibility for an event, condition or 
situation even if the agent has no causal responsibility for the event, condition or situation. 
Nevertheless, in the following discussion, we are only concerned with the relationship 
between actions and omissions (causal responsibility) and the consequences generated by the 
action or omission (corresponding moral responsibility). Therefore, in the following 
discussion, the concept of ‘responsibility’ should be understood in the context of the 
relationship between causal responsibility and the corresponding moral responsibility.  
 
The concept of responsibility is always difficult to define. This difficulty is usually resolved 
by proving that: first, a particular agent caused an undesirable incident or failed to prevent an 
undesirable incident; second, then the action or omission is shown to be against certain laws, 
rules, norms, codes or principles. When these two conditions of proof are met, then the 
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agent is said to be responsible for the undesirable incident.  This is usually the standard way 
of resolving the difficulty of defining responsibility in the context of the relationship between 
causal responsibility and the corresponding moral responsibility. 
 
In the court of law, lawyers and judges have a constitution or legal code to serve as their 
frame of reference when proving the guilt of an accused. So their remaining task is only to 
interpret the law in relation to the accused and his/her actions or omissions. But in the court 
of moral philosophy there is neither a written nor an unwritten constitution, and there is no 
particular guidebook or material code that moral philosophers should interpret when proving 
the responsibility of a moral agent.  
 
In moral philosophy, there is no canonical conception of moral responsibility. As Paul 
Ricoeur says, the concept of responsibility is “not really well-established within the 
philosophical tradition.”611 Nevertheless, there are standard conceptions of moral 
responsibility which serve as the Owl of Minerva to moral philosophers when proving the 
responsibility of a moral agent.  
 
In the following lexical order, the standard conceptions of responsibility are:  
(i)       moral responsibility may refer to prospective responsibility whereby a moral agent 
has a certain moral role,
612
 for instance a moral duty to care for or attend to a 
person or a thing, and failure to perform this duty leads to blame or punishment;       
(ii)       moral responsibility may refer to retrospective responsibility which is a situation 
when the actions of a moral agent are judged to be morally wrong, and the moral 
agent thus deserves to be blamed or punished for the actions;
613
  
(iii)     “while theories of moral agency tend to regard an agent as either responsible or 
not, with no half-measures, our everyday language usually deploys the term 
‘responsible’ in a more nuanced way....one way we do this is by weighing degrees 
of responsibility, both with regard to the sort of prospective responsibilities a 
person should bear and a person’s liability to blame or penalties.”614 
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In summary, the three standard conceptions conceive responsibility to be moral culpability 
for one’s actions or omissions which cause moral harm.  
Having established the contributory roles of agents in causing resource curse in chapter 4 and 
sub-chapter 5.1., and in view of the standard conceptions of responsibility, the conclusion we 
would draw is that such agents are morally responsible for resource curse. First and foremost, 
given that resource curse is ‘up to the agents’ collectively, and therefore they “have a 
collective causal responsibility for” resource curse, “this causal responsibility gives rise to a 
moral responsibility, which is a collective responsibility for [their] collective role in”615 
resource curse.  
Second, but of equal importance as the first, contributory causal role or INUS condition (as 
discussed in sub-chapter 5.1.) implies partial blameworthiness, which in turn implies partial 
responsibility. Linking contributory causal role with partial responsibility suggests that the 
principle of commensurability is in application. It is with the help of the principle of 
commensurability that we are able to gauge the exact or approximate relationship between 
contributory causal role and the corresponding partial responsibility.  
Given the contributory causal role or the INUS condition roles the agents play in causing 
resource curse, and given the principle of commensurability, it is only fair that they are prima 
facie morally responsible to the extent or degree that they are causally responsible. In spite of 
the principle of commensurability, the agents’ moral responsibility, commensurate with their 
causal role, should only be a pro tanto obligation.  Because,  for instance, the individual 
being a citizen may have a duty concerning resource curse that goes beyond the extent of his 
or her causal role in resource curse. Therefore, by seeing the individual’s responsibility as a 
pro tanto obligation, there will be enough room left for more demanding obligations. But, 
here, we shall not concern ourselves with such obligations because they are not part of our 
subject matter.  
The foregoing discussion has not considered cases of exception. By this I mean it has not 
considered cases whereby although agents have contributory causal roles in resource curse, 
they may still be deem not blameworthy because of certain circumstances. This raises issues 
such as the following situations: 
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(i) A situation of taking up the slack; although one has done his/her fair share, does s/he 
have the duty to take up the slack when others cannot or refuse to do their own part?  
(ii)  Are persons - children who have not attained the age of reason, mentally retarded 
persons, etc. - (always) morally responsible for what they caused? 
(iii) Are there situations in which we can be morally responsible even if we have no part in 
the cause?  
(iv) What do we have to say about determinism, compatibilism, freewill and freedom of 
choice?  
The list of issues can go on and on. Nevertheless, these are issues that are not within the 
purview of this dissertation. So their resolutions were assumed. Here are some of the key 
assumptions made by my argument in the foregoing discussion. It assumes that agents are not 
taking up any slack. It assumes that agents are neither mentally retarded persons nor children 
who have not attained the age of reason. Some of the other critical assumptions are as follow. 
To say that agents have moral responsibility is already a presupposition that fatalism
616
  and 
determinism
617
 - especially hard determinism
618
 - have been negated. Furthermore, 
responsibility, in the standard conceptions, is not based on compatibilism.
619
 Neither is it 
based on teleology.
620
 Nor is our understanding of moral responsibility in the foregoing 
discussion based on consequentialism.
621
 Even on consequentialist grounds actions and 
omissions which contribute to the causes of resource curse will be deemed morally wrong by 
consequentialists; because, the negative consequences of such actions and omissions 
outweigh the ‘positive’ consequences. Here I am only referring to the benefits that accrue to 
agents of resource curse as positive consequences for the sake of consequentialism.  
Just as our understanding of moral responsibility is not consequentialist; so also, it is not 
based on that paramount form of consequentialism, namely, utilitarianism.
622
 Even on 
utilitarian grounds actions and omissions which contribute to the causes of resource curse 
                                                             
616 A view that we could not have acted otherwise or we cannot act otherwise because having been fated by 
some supernatural or super external forces to act, we have no power to act otherwise. In other words, we 
were or are doomed to act the way we did or in certain way in the future. 
617
 A view that certain external conditionalities have determined us to act in certain ways and we cannot act 
otherwise. 
618 A view which, holding determinism to be correct, says freewill is incompatible with it. 
619
 A view that freewill is possible in spite of determinism. 
620
 A view that humans have a telos, an end or a final cause and they are supposed to act in view of the 
realization of that telos. 
621
 A view that the moral rightness or wrongness of an act depends on the consequences it produces. 
622
 A view which holds that the morally right action is the one that leads to the maximisation of utility – 
maximising pleasure and reducing pain. 
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will be deemed morally wrong by utilitarians; because, such actions and omissions benefit 
few people and harm more people, and cause more pain than pleasure. Furthermore, neither 
act utilitarianism nor rule utilitarianism has a place here in our understanding of morality 
responsibility.  
Finally, it will be apt to assume that our understanding of moral responsibility in the 
foregoing discussion is based on deontology which is a view that as moral agents we have 
certain duties or obligations, and these obligations are formalized in terms of rules. Whether 
the consequences of our actions are positive or negative do not determine their moral 
rightness or wrongness. What determines the moral rightness or wrongness of our actions is 
whether we act or fail to act in accordance with our duty or duties.  
Bracketing different assumptions, my argument is simply following the standard conceptions 
of responsibility. When different assumptions such as the aforementioned ones are bracketed, 
other things equal, moral agents are morally responsible for their actions and the 
consequences of their actions. Consequently, agents are morally responsible for resource 
curse in commensuration to the extent of their causal role. But so many objections are bound, 
plausibly or legitimately, to arise due to this conclusion which seems to be a hasty conclusion 
or a hasty generalisation. For instance, a utilitarian might argue that although an agent causes 
resource curse, as long as there are more people who benefit from the curse than there are 
people who suffer from it, the agent is morally praiseworthy rather than blameworthy.  
I shall make three statements relating to the utilitarian objection in particular and other 
objections in general. First, even if we accept the utilitarian premise, it is common knowledge 
that more people suffer from resource curse while less people benefit from it. So even on 
utilitarian grounds the agent is still blameworthy. Second, I shall neither rehash the literature 
on utilitarianism nor delve into the consequentialist, deontological and teleological debates. 
Third, although there are other possible objections alongside the utilitarian one, I shall only 
focus on what I consider the most potent objection. The counter-arguments I shall proffer in 
defence of the conclusion I reached in the foregoing discussion shall clarify that the 
conclusion is neither a hasty conclusion nor a hasty generalisation.  
The most potent objection might be in the following way. Given that there are agents whose 
actions only resulted in unintended consequences, on what grounds are the agents morally 
responsible?  As discussed earlier, the actions of the agents are not like those actions in our 
examples of the bank-runners and road-users; they are actions based on negative self-interest. 
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We can look at the actions from various perspectives and the agents will still be morally 
responsible from all perspectives. For instance, let us look at the objection from the following 
perspective which seems to be one of the strongest ways to frame the objection.  
The objection can be strongly framed in this form. Certain agents, although had negative self-
interest, did not know that their actions would cause harm; it was only after seeing the harm 
that they realised that their actions were capable of causing such harm. In effect, the agents 
did not know the right thing to do; they were morally ignorant. Here, holding the agents 
morally responsible is tantamount to adopting the legal principle of ignorantia juris non 
excusat or ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of the law does not excuse or 
ignorance of the law excuses no one). This principle or its equivalent, if adopted, will be 
arbitrary since morality does not equal legality or ethics does not equal law. Therefore, 
according to the objection, the ‘ignorant’ agents cannot be held morally responsible for 
resource curse. 
I shall rebut the above objection in two ways. The first rebuttal – which consists of six 
arguments – is as follows: 
(i) The harm of resource curse is so enormous that the sort of singular action or few 
actions that will bring it about will be very enormous.  
(ii)  It takes a long time and repeated several actions to bring about the harm of resource 
curse.  
(iii) In the case of the economic aspect of resource curse, one might ignorantly make a big 
error - in policy area or other areas – which will be responsible for resource curse.  
(iv) In the case of the economic aspect of resource curse, one might ignorantly repeat an 
error severally or commit several different errors which will be responsible for 
resource curse.  
(v) However, in the case of the political economy aspect of resource curse such ignorant 
big errors or repeated several errors are non-existent. Because rent-seeking, 
corruption, etc. are always intended to benefit agents at the expense of the 
principal – citizenry. 
(vi) Even if such ignorant big errors were existent in the case of the political economy 
aspect of resource curse, for the agents that are in a position to cause resource 
curse to be so ignorant is to be grossly negligent. Imagine an agent who is 
ignorant that rent-seeking benefits him/her at the expense of society! The failure 
of the agent to give enough moral consideration to his/her actions, and the society 
the action will affect, is the only plausible explanation for this sort of gross 
negligence. This sort of gross negligence is itself a moral culpability; because, it is 
a failure to give somebody or something the maximum care which is rightly 
deserved. 
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The second rebuttal will assume that the agents were actually ignorant of the fact that their 
actions were capable of causing or engendering resource curse. If the agents were actually 
ignorant but only realised that their actions were capable of causing harm, then after seeing 
the harm and having realized they have caused harm, they should be remorseful. When one 
realizes that due to ignorance s/he has caused harm, especially a serious harm like resource 
curse, remorse is the natural emotional reaction that one feels. To be remorseful is to 
acknowledge that one has done something wrong or bad, and then be extremely sorry for it. 
One who is remorseful holds him/herself morally responsible for his/her actions. Naturally, 
he or she will intend not to repeat the actions.  
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is either agents were ignorant of the consequences of 
their actions or they were not ignorant. If they were not ignorant, then they are morally 
responsible. But if they were ignorant, having realised they have caused resource curse, then 
it is either they are remorseful or not. If they are remorseful, then they already hold 
themselves morally responsible for their actions. If they are not remorseful, then this suggests 
they have no moral consideration for their actions and the consequences of their actions. So 
society should even be more eager to hold them responsible for their actions. 
Counter-arguing against my use of the notion of remorse, one might ask us to imagine the 
following scenario.  An assassin who is a friend of a notoriously corrupt politician was paid 
by the politician to assassinate two innocent persons - a political opponent who lives in Lagos 
and an investigative journalist who lives in London. The assassin assassinated the political 
opponent but did not assassinate the journalist. So the journalist was able to investigate the 
corrupt activities of the politician and publish a report on them. Consequently, the politician 
was arrested, charged, tried, convicted and sentenced to thirty-one years in prison.  
Finally, the assassin is “remorseful” that:  
(i)   he did not assassinate the journalist;  
(ii)   the politician is jailed;  
(iii)  his not assassinating the journalist led to the jailing of the politician - if he knew that 
his decision not to assassinate the journalist was going to lead to the jailing of the 
politician he would have assassinated the journalist.  
The question is: is the assassin morally responsible for failing to assassinate the journalist and 
for the jailing of the politician? Let us answer ‘No.’ The argument is, if he cannot be held 
morally responsible, then remorse does not suggest moral responsibility. However, I contend 
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that the word ‘remorse’ is incorrectly used in the above scenario. Although the assassin feels 
sorry, he is not remorseful, he is merely regretting.  Remorse has to do with morality, and 
unlike remorse, regret is a neutral term. If we juxtapose regret with remorse, we will see that 
the key moral words ‘wrong’ and ‘bad’ are absent in regret while present in remorse. Due to 
this special character of remorse, my use of remorse in describing the moral responsible of 
agents in relation to resource curse is apt.   
To summarise the foregoing discussion in this sub-chapter, agents are morally responsible, 
albeit commensurately, for resource curse. By implication, as already mentioned, they have 
pro tanto obligations which leave enough room for the possibility of more demanding 
obligations. The pro tanto obligations can be summed up into a negative and a positive duty. 
On the one hand, the agents will have a negative duty to desist from their activities that cause 
resource curse. On the other hand, they will have a positive duty to make amends for the 
harm they have already caused.  
 
5.3. The Primary and Secondary Applications of Cosmopolitanism and Statism 
To analyze the different roles of the different agents, I deemed it helpful to look at them on 
different levels of analysis or what I prefer to call levels of causality and responsibility. Here 
is where the two perspectives, namely cosmopolitanism and statism, come into play. Firstly, 
the perspectives tell us whether certain agents have certain moral responsibilities on certain 
levels. Secondly, the perspectives tell us how the failure of moral responsibility on each level 
can cause resource curse. Thirdly, the perspectives tell us what consequent responsibilities 
agents should have given the agents’ failure in their initial responsibilities.  
Cosmopolitanism, rather than statism, is primarily applicable to interactional moral analysis. 
This is because; unlike statism which is primarily morally concerned with institutions 
(especially the institution of the state), cosmopolitanism is primarily morally concerned with 
individuals. But what makes cosmopolitan more suitable – compared to statism - for 
interactional moral analysis is also what makes it less suitable – compared to statism - for 
institutional moral analysis. On the one hand, it is because cosmopolitanism is primarily 
morally concerned with individuals that it is more suitable for interactional moral analysis; 
that is, used primarily for interactional moral analysis. On the other hand, it is also because 
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cosmopolitanism is primarily morally concerned with individuals that it is used only 
secondarily to analyse institutions.  
Cosmopolitanism is appropriately primarily applicable to individuals because all the three 
tenets of cosmopolitanism are individual-centric. According to Pogge, all cosmopolitan 
positions have three elements in common namely individualism, universality and 
generality.
623
 These three elements are all about the individual. The first element is self-
evidently about the individual, and the second and third elements are qualifiers of the first 
element. First and foremost, individualism posits that “the ultimate units of concern are 
human beings, or persons”624 (emphasis is original). This is self-evidently concerned with the 
individual; for it is individuals that are the ultimate units of concern and not corporations, the 
state, the global institutional order or institutions.  
Secondly, universality posits that “the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every 
living human being equally”625  (emphasis is original). It is to individuals that the status of 
ultimate unit of concern is attached and not to corporations, the state, the global institutional 
order or institutions. Thirdly, generality posits that everyone is an ultimate unit of concern for 
everyone.
626
 It is every individual that is an ultimate unit of concern for every individual. The 
principle of generality neither says everyone is an ultimate unit of concern for corporations, 
the state the global institutional order or institutions. Nor does it say that corporations, the 
state, the global institutional order or institutions are ultimate units of concern for everyone. 
The centrality of the cosmopolitan idea is the individual. The three tenets of cosmopolitanism 
are centred on the individual. Whether interactional moral cosmopolitanism or institutional 
moral cosmopolitanism; the idea is the well-being of the individual. Interactional moral 
cosmopolitanism deals with how individuals treat individuals or how some individuals treat 
other individuals. While institutional moral cosmopolitanism deals with how institutions treat 
individuals. These institutions, in our context, are corporations, the state and the global 
institutional order. But cosmopolitanism is only concerned with them to the extent that they 
impact individuals. So the appropriate domains of cosmopolitanism are the individual and 
collective levels of analysis or the individual and collective levels of causality and 
responsibility.  
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But cosmopolitanism can also be applied to the corporate, the state, and the global 
institutional order levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility. In other words, 
cosmopolitanism is primarily applied to the individual and collective levels while it is 
secondarily applied to the corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels. When 
we apply cosmopolitanism primarily to the individual and collective levels, we employ 
interactional moral cosmopolitanism. But when we apply cosmopolitanism secondarily to the 
corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels, we employ institutional moral 
cosmopolitanism.  
Despite the adjective “institutional”; institutional moral cosmopolitanism is not primarily 
concerned with institutions but individuals. It is only concerned with institutions to the extent 
that institutions affect the well-being of individuals. To the extent that institutions treat 
individuals well or not, institutional moral cosmopolitanism will appraise those institutions as 
good or bad.  
To make the above assertion clearer, let us look at the following illustration. In a free market 
system or mixed economy system, although a few corporations might be owned by the state, 
most corporations are usually owned, managed and staffed by individuals or collectives. So, 
even if we cannot primarily apply cosmopolitanism to corporations because they are not 
individuals, we can secondarily apply cosmopolitanism to corporations because they are 
owned, managed and staffed by individuals or collectives. Even in legal parlance, 
corporations – being juridical persons – are considered as if they were persons or individuals 
and thus have legal rights and obligations.  
The primary aim of the owners or shareholders of companies is to make profit for themselves. 
While the primary aim of the managers and entire staff is to make profit for the owners or 
shareholders. Hence corporations are quintessentially profit-seeking and profit-making 
entities. In the course of seeking profit, these corporations (or owners, shareholders, 
managers and staff) by their actions or omissions positively or negatively affect the well-
being of individuals, communities, societies or even our entire world. It is this relationship 
between (owners and staff of) corporations and the persons that are affected by the actions of 
the latter that cosmopolitanism is concerned with.  
In view of cosmopolitanism, on the state and global institutional levels, firstly, the actors 
involved in the resource curse problem are looked at as individuals although they are 
representatives, heads, etc. of supranational institutions, regional organizations, sub-regional 
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organizations, foreign governments, and state governments (ministries, parastatals, from the 
executive, legislature, judiciary, security agencies, civil service, so on and so forth). 
Secondly, the state and the global institutional order as institutions are judged based on how 
their actions and omissions harm their victims namely the victims of resource curse in a 
particular resource-cursed state.  
Given its tenets, cosmopolitanism will help us to understand the role of the individual and 
collectives on the individual and collective levels of analysis or on the individual and 
collective levels of causality and responsibility. Cosmopolitanism tells us, primarily, how 
individuals should treat or relate to other individuals. And, secondarily, how institutions 
should treat or relate to individuals; in our context, how corporations, the state and the global 
institutional order should relate to or treat individuals.  
But cosmopolitanism does not tell us how institutions should relate to one another, that is: (i) 
how a corporation should relate to other corporations, the state and the global institutional 
order; (ii) how the state should relate to other states, corporations and the global institutional 
order; (iii) how the global institutional order should relate to the state and corporations. So, in 
our analysis of the various levels, cosmopolitanism is primarily used to analyze the individual 
and collective levels - the moral responsibilities of individuals and collectives vis-à-vis global 
justice. And it is only secondarily used to analyze institutions namely corporations, the state 
and the global institutional order vis-à-vis their duties toward individuals in global justice. 
In view of the above explanation, I hope it is clear that we can see why cosmopolitanism can 
be secondarily used for institutional analysis and applied to the corporate, the state and the 
global institutional levels. Moreover, as Pogge says:  
Institutions are not only “staffed” and enforced by humans (are complex patterns of 
human conduct); they are also created, shaped, perpetrated, or changed by us. 
Property and promises, money and markets, governments and borders, treaties and 
diplomacy – all these do not occur naturally but are invented by human beings and 
continuously evolve through human conduct. Such institutions are “up to us,” 
collectively, and we therefore have a collective causal  responsibility for existing 
institutions....this causal responsibility gives rise to a moral responsibility, which is a 
collective responsibility for our collective role in imposing existing institutions upon, 
in particular, their most disadvantaged (and involuntary) participants.
627
 
As earlier mentioned, statism, rather than cosmopolitanism, is primarily applicable to 
institutional moral analysis. This is because, as earlier mentioned; unlike cosmopolitanism 
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which is primarily morally concerned with individuals, statism is primarily morally 
concerned with institutions - especially the institution of the state. But what makes statism 
more suitable – compared to cosmopolitanism - for institutional moral analysis is also what 
makes it less suitable – compared to cosmopolitanism - for interactional moral analysis. On 
the one hand, it is because statism is primarily morally concerned with institutions (especially 
the institution of the state) that it is more suitable for institutional moral analysis; that is, used 
primarily for institutional moral analysis. It is also because statism is primarily morally 
concerned with institutions – especially the institution of the state - that it is used only 
secondarily to analyse individuals.  
Statism is primarily morally concerned with institutions, especially the institution of the state, 
because it seeks to determine: the grounds for cooperation institutionally, rather than 
interactionally, within the state; the division of the advantages and disadvantages resulting 
from the institutional cooperation; the relationship between the state and other states; and the 
behaviour of the state towards other states. Hence it is internally concerned with the state and 
its institutions and externally concerned with what, if any, the relationship of the state and its 
institutions should be with other states and their institutions. Consequently, it is not 
concerned, or at least it is not directly concerned, with individuals.  
Statism is not concerned with interactional moral analysis, so it is not directly applied to 
interactional moral analysis or the individual and collective agents’ levels of causality and 
responsibility. Nevertheless, what it tells us about interactional moral analysis or the 
individual and collective levels of causality and responsibility is that when and where there is 
a good basic structure: individuals and collectives are likely to act better rather than worse; 
and individuals and collectives are likely to be better-off rather than worse-off (after all, the 
essence of the basic structure is to make society – and individuals and collectives - better-off 
on all levels). Conversely, when and where there is no basic structure or there is bad basic 
structure: individuals and collectives are likely to act worse rather than better; and individuals 
and collectives are likely to be worse-off rather than better-off.  
Having shown how and why the primary constituencies of cosmopolitan analysis are the 
individual and collective levels, and how and why statism can still be secondarily applied to 
the individual and collective levels, it is quite straightforward to see how and why the 
primary constituency of statist analysis is the state level. But the analysis of the corporate 
level is not as straight forward as those of the individual, collective and state levels. Since 
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cosmopolitanism is primarily concerned with individuals rather than institutions, it follows 
that we can only secondarily apply it to the corporate level because corporations are 
institutions.  
Since cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applied to the corporate level, given that statism is 
primarily morally concerned with institutions, and given that corporations are institutions, 
then it follows that statism can be primarily applied to the corporate level. Again, let us 
reiterate that there is no need to delve into economic theories, legal theories or corporate law 
which might be the naturally applicable theories. As already said, I am concerned with 
prescriptiveness rather than descriptiveness, and with political philosophy rather than any 
other theories no matter how relevant such theories might be.  
The corporate level is said to be primarily analysed by statism because corporations are 
institutions. This is clear when we understand corporation as a big significant organization 
that has a specific aim, and we understand institution as an organization or a set of 
organizations that is/are accepted by law as a distinct entity or distinct entities. For instance, 
in Nigeria, every corporation is registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission and such 
registration qualifies any registered corporation to be an institution or in legal parlance a 
juridical person. It is the duty of the Corporate Affairs Commission to regulate the affairs or 
activities of corporations. Given that the commission is a body of the government or state, 
ultimately it is the state that sanctions the existence of corporations and regulates their affairs. 
For the above reasons, we need statism to help us fit multinational corporations into the basic 
structure of our society. 
In the analysis of the corporate level, we need the two perspectives. This is because on the 
one hand, corporations are seen as part of economic institutions that should be fitted into a 
well organized basic structure by statism. And on the other hand, corporations are seen as 
properties owned by individual shareholders, managed and staffed by individual persons, 
whose individuality must not be assigned more, or less, moral value or weight than assigned 
to other individuals – or whose collective agencies must not be treated as morally superior to 
other collective agencies.  
On why statism is primarily applicable to the state level, statism - as explained in chapters 1 
and 2 - tells us that given the sort of relationship between the citizenry and the state,  justice 
is at once intellectually plausible and practically possible within the state. And in fact, justice 
is a moral requirement within the state. The state ensures justice through mainly the 
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government and its arms, but also through other agencies of the state. When all these means 
of ensuring justice are put together, we have what I will refer to as the state’s justice 
apparatus. In other words, the state has a ‘basic structure’ that ensures or is supposed to 
ensure justice. So, while the sort of relationship that entails between the citizenry and the 
state is the ground for justice within the state, the basic structure is the mechanism that 
ensures justice within the state, 
In view of the above remark, evidently the state level is statism’s primary constituency or 
remit of analysis. By default statism is readily applicable to the state level. So, statism, on the 
‘state’ level of analysis or on the ‘state’ level of causality and responsibility helps us to 
understand the role of the state. Statism has been used by statists to show that states have no 
duty, or they have limited duty, or they have only humanitarian or charitable duty vis-à-vis 
global justice. For now, we are not interested in this ‘use’ of statism, although we shall return 
to it later. We are, at the moment, interested in the other way statists have also used statism, 
that is, to show that the onus is on the domestic state to ensure distributive justice 
domestically. In our cases, as already shown, when the state fails in this duty then resource 
curse is the consequence.  
Nevertheless, cosmopolitanism and statism, within the domestic context, are headed toward 
the same destination but through different directions. Their common destination is justice. 
The statist route is the basic structure while the cosmopolitan route is the three cosmopolitan 
tenets. Here, statism - in essence - says if the social institutions are arranged well in a good 
basic structure, there will be justice in society. As Rawls says, “The role of the institutions 
that belong to the basic structure is to secure just background conditions against which the 
actions of individuals and associations take place.”628 While (institutional) cosmopolitanism 
says if the social institutions uphold the equality of the moral worth of every individual, there 
will be justice in both the domestic society and the global society. 
The question is, according to Sen, “whether the analysis of justice must be so confined to 
getting the basic institutions and general rules right? Should we not also have to examine 
what emerges in the society, including the kind of lives that people can actually lead, given 
the institutions and rules, but also other influences, including actual behaviour, that would 
inescapably affect human lives?”629  For the cosmopolitan, no matter how just the basic 
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structure is and no matter how well the social institutions are arranged or organized: if the 
equal moral value of everyone is not upheld; if certain individuals still suffer avoidably or 
unnecessarily especially because of who they are, where they come from, how powerless they 
are economically, politically and socially; then injustice is still the order of the day.  
On its application to the global institutional order level, statism readily totally exonerates the 
global institutional order from any causal role and responsibility despite the undesirable 
institutional consequences in the global institutional order. This is because of statism’s major 
tenet that justice is not applicable or is almost not applicable or is at best only partially 
applicable to the global realm.  
But the total exoneration of the global institutional order by statism is a crucial part of the 
limitedness of statism. Statism, as we have seen, has been used by statists to show that states 
have no duty, or they only have limited duty, or they have only humanitarian or charitable 
duty vis-à-vis global justice. But here, we are not concerned with charitable or humanitarian 
work. We are concerned with the obligations the global institutional order, because of its 
causal role in resource curse, owes the victims of resource curse. Surely, this obligation is not 
charitable or humanitarian work. 
Even if statists were to accept the causal role of the global institutional order, they would still 
argue that: the realisation of any kind of justice is only possible within the framework of an 
order;
630
 the obligations of the global institutional order are justice obligations; therefore they 
can only be realised if there is order on the global level. Furthermore, since there is no order 
on the global level, the obligations of the global institutional order cannot be realised.  
 
However, even if we were to concede to statists that given the absence or at least partial 
absence of the necessary conditions for state-like justice on the global level, then state-like 
justice is impossible on the global level, we can still argue the case for moral responsibility.  
State-like justice is fundamentally politico-legal justice. But the elusiveness of politico-legal 
justice on the global level does not necessarily mean that moral justice, moral right and moral 
wrong are also elusive.  
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Institutions do not have to be present in order for us to do our negative duties. “We do not 
need institutions to enable us to refrain from violating other people’s rights”631 (emphasis is 
mine). The presence of structures or institutions, whether state-like or not, and whether 
domestic or global, does not bring into existence moral justice, moral right and moral wrong. 
It only brings into existence politico-legal justice. And the absence of structures or 
institutions, whether state-like or not, or domestic or global, do not cease the existence of 
moral justice, moral right and moral wrong, but only ceases the existence of politico-legal 
justice.  
 
Even in the state of nature what we do not have is politico-legal justice not moral justice, 
moral right and moral wrong. The institution of the sovereign or Leviathan gives birth to 
politico-legal justice but not to moral justice, moral right and moral wrong. Any action or 
omission that is morally just or morally unjust, morally right or morally wrong, is said to be 
so due to its nature, but not because of the law, decree or edict of any sovereign. So, moral 
justness, moral rightness or moral wrongness is not conferred on actions and omissions by a 
sovereign; rather the sovereign only has the power to confer politico-legal lawfulness on 
actions and omissions. Morality is independent of the sovereign or Leviathan. What the laws, 
decrees and edicts of the sovereign bring into existence is politico-legal justice.  
 
As Hedley Bull succinctly puts it, “Clearly, ideas about justice belong to the class of moral 
ideas, ideas which treat human actions as right in themselves and not merely as a means to an 
end, as categorically and not merely hypothetically imperative. Considerations of justice, 
accordingly, are to be distinguished from considerations of law, and from considerations of 
the dictates of prudence, interest or necessity.”632 Neither the sovereign nor the laws, the 
decrees and the edicts of the sovereign, can bring into existence moral justice, moral right and 
moral wrong. Because moral justice, moral right and moral wrong pre-exist, and are 
independent of, the sovereign and the sovereign’s laws, decrees and edicts.  
 
More than politico-legal justice, moral justice is what is at stake in resource curse. Because 
what are at stake in resource curse are the basic rights and negative rights of the victims of 
resource curse which “set universal and pre-political limit to the legitimate use of power, 
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independent of special forms of association. It is wrong for any individual or group [or 
institution] to deny such rights to any other individual or group.”633 Looking especially at the 
nasty, brutish and short lives of the worst affected victims of resource curse in the Niger 
Delta, Cabinda, Katanga, etc. as described in chapter 3, without doubt their basic rights and 
negative rights have been violated by the actors in chapters 3-5 who have failed in their most 
basic duties.  
 
In view of the above argument, the global institutional order can be held morally responsible 
for the causal role it plays in resource curse. Since this role directly affects the lives of the 
people in the Niger Delta, Cabinda, Katanga, etc., therefore, we can correctly conclude that 
despite the word “institution” in the global institutional order, cosmopolitanism is applicable 
to the global institutional order. However, since the global institutional order is an institution 
rather than an individual, or it is institutional rather than interactional, it is not the natural 
constituency of cosmopolitanism.  
So, cosmopolitanism is only applied to the global institutional order based on how the actions 
and omissions of the global institutional order affect individuals, in our case, victims of 
resource curse. Using institutional moral cosmopolitanism, and doing institutional moral 
analysis, we can trace the sufferings of victims of resource curse to the causal role played by 
the global institutional order. In other words, we can trace the sufferings of individuals to 
certain harms done to them, and trace the causes of these harms to the global institutional 
order. Then we ask; could the global institutional order have acted differently without causing 
any comparable harm? If yes, then a reform is needed.  
In view of the foregoing discussion, I have shown how and why:  
(i) In the analysis of the individual level: cosmopolitanism is primarily 
applicable; while statism is only secondarily applicable. 
(ii) In the analysis of the collective level: cosmopolitanism is primarily applicable; 
while statism is only secondarily applicable. 
(iii) In the analysis of the corporate level: statism is primarily applicable; while 
cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applicable. 
(iv) In the analysis of the state level: statism is primarily applicable;   while 
cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applicable.  
(v) When applied to the global institutional order, statism tells us why we should 
not expect “too much” from the global institutional order. While      
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      cosmopolitanism tells us at least there is a cogent reason to hold the global    
      institutional order morally responsible for certain facts and situations of   
      our world. 
 
However, given Pogge’s application of institutional cosmopolitanism to sovereignty, one 
might argue that my assertion that cosmopolitanism is only secondarily applied to institutions 
is wrong. I hold that my assertion is right because I think Pogge, in his application of 
cosmopolitanism to sovereignty, overstretches institutional cosmopolitanism beyond its 
limits. 
 In the application in question, the core of Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism is the ‘wide 
vertical dispersal of sovereignty.’ To arrive at this core, Pogge: firstly, present’s his 
conception of sovereignty; secondly, defines absolute sovereignty; thirdly, criticises the 
current Westphalian system; and then, fourthly, proposes his ‘wide vertical dispersal of 
sovereignty.’  
In Pogge’s conception of sovereignty: 
A is sovereign over B if and only if 
1. A is a governmental body or officer (‘agency’), and  
2. B are persons, and 
3. A has unsupervised and irrevocable authority over B 
a) To lay down rules constraining their conduct, or  
b) To judge their compliance with rules, or 
c) To enforce rules against them through pre-emption, prevention, or punishments, 
or 
d) to act in their behalf vis-á-vis other agencies (ones that do or do not have authority 
over them) or persons (ones whom A is sovereign over, or not). 
A has absolute sovereignty over B if and only if  
1. A is sovereign over B, and  
2. No other agency has any authority over A or over B which is not supervised and 
revocable by A.
634
 
Relating the above conceptions of sovereignty and absolute sovereignty to the Westphalian 
system, Pogge describes the system as follows:  
Central to contemporary political thought and reality is the idea of the autonomous 
territorial state as the preeminent mode of political organization at a single level; it is 
states and only states that merit separate colours on a political map of our world. For 
nearly every human being, and for almost every piece of territory, there is exactly one 
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government with preeminent authority over, and primary responsibility for, this person or 
territory. And each person is thought to owe primary political allegiance and loyalty to 
this government with preeminent authority over him or her. National governments 
dominate and control the decision making of smaller political units as well as 
supranational decisions, which tend to be made through intergovernmental bargaining.
635
 
In what seems to be a syllogism, taking the definition of cosmopolitanism and the various 
distinctions therein as a major premise, and taking the conceptions of sovereignty and 
absolute sovereignty and the description of the Westphalian system as a minor premise, 
Pogge draws the follow conclusion: 
From the standpoint of a cosmopolitan morality – which centres around the fundamental 
needs and interests of individual human beings – this concentration of sovereignty at one 
level is no longer defensible. What I am proposing instead is not the idea of a world state, 
which is really a variant of the preeminent state idea. Rather, the proposal is that 
governmental authority – or sovereignty – be widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. 
What we need is both centralization and decentralization, a kind of second-order 
decentralization away from the now dominant level of the state. Thus, persons should be 
citizens of, and govern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes, 
without any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of 
state. And their political allegiance and loyalties should be widely dispersed over these 
units; neighbourhood, town, county, province, state, region, and world at large. People 
should be politically at home in all of them, without converging upon any one of them as 
the lodestar of their political identity.
636
  
Pogge provided some salient arguments for his wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty and 
institutional cosmopolitanism. I shall not rehash the arguments here; rather, I shall present 
some arguments why Pogge’s application is not viable. Let me reiterate what is by now a 
banal criticism among critics of institutional cosmopolitanism. Critics of institutional 
cosmopolitanism argue that cosmopolitanism is not a political or an international relations 
theory, say, political realism, liberalism, etc. that is meant to guide the conduct of states or 
international relations.  Rather, it is a moral doctrine that guides the interactions or 
relationships among individuals. Given that Pogge adopts a wide vertical dispersal of 
sovereignty in place of the current Westphalian system, the above criticism might not be very 
potent in his framework. However, the criticism still carries some weight because the 
institutions Pogge is proposing are state-like to some extent although they are not states as we 
understand states in the current Westphalian system.  
As framed by Pogge, his application is a ‘Catch 22.’ I call it ‘Catch 22’ because it at once 
seeks to replace the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty with a wide vertical dispersal of 
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sovereignty and to avoid world government. But it cannot totally replace the Westphalian 
dispersal of sovereignty with a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty without having a world 
government. It either has to be Westphalian-like at its apex or be world government.  
For Pogge, the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty that exists in our current world does not 
help the cause of global justice, it rather militates against it. Hence he proposes a wide 
vertical dispersal of sovereignty. However, except a wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty 
ends up at its apex with a world government it is always going to be Westphalian-like at its 
apex.  
Pogge argues that in his vertical dispersal of sovereignty, “when some political units turn 
tyrannical and oppressive, there will always be other, already fully organized political units – 
above, below, or on the same level – which can render aid and  protection to the oppressed, 
publicise the abuses, and, if necessary, fight the oppressors”637 (emphasis is original). To 
systematise the above argument, when one sovereignty errs on one level in the wide vertical 
dispersal of sovereignty:  
(i) There will be a higher sovereignty on a higher level to chastise the erring sovereignty.                              
(ii) When there is no higher sovereignty on a higher level there will be other sovereignties 
on the same level with the erring one which will help publicise the undesirable 
activities of the erring sovereignty, an act which may help in making the erring 
sovereignty amenable.    
(iii)When there is no higher sovereignty on a higher level, and when there are no other  
sovereignties on the same level, there will be other sovereignties below the level 
of the erring one which will help publicise the undesirable activities of the erring 
sovereignty, an act which may help in making the erring sovereignty amenable.  
Regards to (i) above, I have already argued that except a wide vertical dispersal of 
sovereignty ends up with a world government, it will always be Westphalian-like at its apex. 
As regards (ii) above, in the current Westphalian system, states can also help publicise the 
undesirable activities of erring states which may also help make the erring states amenable. 
As regards (iii) above, it is simply practically unfeasible that lower sovereignties will be in a 
position of power to discipline higher sovereignties. Even if this sometimes happens, it will 
be an exception rather than the norm. Hence the argument in (iii) might be plausible in theory 
but rarely possible in practice.   
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Therefore, there is neither necessary nor sufficient reason to swap the Westphalian dispersal 
of sovereignty for the wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty. This is by no means a 
justification of the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty in itself; rather it is an explanation of 
why, contra Pogge, it is not necessary to replace the Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty 
with the wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty.  
Whether we look at Pogge’s application of institutional cosmopolitanism to sovereignty 
through the lenses of Pogge’s wide vertical dispersal of sovereignty, the lenses of the 
Westphalian dispersal of sovereignty, or the lenses of institutionalism, the picture remains the 
same. The question is not whether we are short-sighted or long-sighted, for we have already 
seen the problem as it is. On the one hand, we already have multiplicity of institutions around 
the world. We can re-orient them to make them work better; we do not really have to set up 
new ones.  
On the other hand, if cosmopolitanism is committed to individualism, and in fact in Pogge’s 
conception it is, then institutions cannot be the hinge on which cosmopolitanism revolves 
around. If institutions become the centrality of cosmopolitanism, then this will be tantamount 
to an erosion of individualism. Pogge’s application is more of institutionalism than 
individualism. For it is individualism, not institutionalism, that is a tenet of cosmopolitanism. 
The proper way to employ cosmopolitanism in our analysis is as follows. In a nutshell, using 
institutional cosmopolitanism or institutional moral analysis, we can look at individuals or 
collectives who are suffering the effects of resource curse and trace the cause to corporations. 
We can find out that the corporations have prioritized the interests of their shareholders – 
profit maximisation – to the detriment of individuals and collectives. In other words, if the 
corporations were to assign equal moral value to the suffering individuals and collectives as 
they assign to the shareholders, the harm that causes the suffering would have been avoided.  
Therefore, we ask counterfactually; could the corporations have acted differently without 
causing any comparable harm? If yes, so there is a need to reform the activities of the 
corporations. So also we can trace the sufferings of individuals to certain harms done to them, 
and trace the causes of these harms to the state and global institutional order. Then we ask; 
could the state and global institutional order have acted differently without causing any 
comparable harm? If yes, then a reform is needed. 
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*** 
This chapter was engaged in the extended prescriptive analysis of resource curse. In the 
extended prescriptive analysis, the moral relationship between causality and responsibility on 
different levels in the context of resource curse was examined.  First and foremost, the 
chapter provided a resolution to some moral quandaries concerning causal roles that are 
contributory rather than necessary or sufficient, or necessary and sufficient. Secondly, it 
provided a resolution to some moral quandaries concerning degrees of responsibilities in 
relation to contributory causal roles. Finally, it discussed the primary and secondary 
applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to resource curse.     
In view of the primary and secondary applicability of cosmopolitanism and statism to 
resource curse discussed in this chapter, the next chapter will be aimed at discussing the 
plausibilities and implausibilities of fusion of horizons. The next chapter will examine the 
arguments for implausibility namely mutual exclusivity, incompatibility, relativism, 
neutrality and aerial view. Then the chapter will be concluded with the argument for 
plausibility which says that fusion of horizons accommodates the complexity of resource 
curse. 
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6.0.          FUSION OF HORIZONS: PLAUSIBILITIES AND IMPLAUSIBILITIES 
6.1.  Is the Fusion of the Cosmopolitan and Statist Horizons Plausible?  
In finding resolution to complex cases of global justice, or global injustice in the case of 
resource curse, we opted for fusion of horizons on the grounds that: neither cosmopolitanism 
nor statism is at once necessary and sufficient; neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is at once 
unnecessary and insufficient; neither cosmopolitanism nor statism is unnecessary but 
sufficient; but cosmopolitanism and statism are each necessary but each insufficient.  As 
shown in the global injustice case of resource case (chapters 3 – 5), the final result is that 
although each perspective is insufficient, a combination – in the form of fusion of horizons - 
of the two perspectives is sufficient to analyse complex cases of global justice. 
In resolving complex cases of global justice, if cosmopolitanism alone were at once 
necessary and sufficient, there would be no need for statism. This is because if 
cosmopolitanism (C) were at once necessary and sufficient, whenever we apply 
cosmopolitanism to such complex cases we will have a necessary and sufficient resolution 
(NSR) for the problems. Other things equal, we should have an NSR. We will only fail to 
have an NSR if, and only if, we do not apply cosmopolitanism well enough. 
 
Assuming C is at once necessary and sufficient for NSR, therefore; 
(i) If C then NSR. 
(ii) If not C then not NSR. 
(iii) That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied C.  
(iv) That there is not NSR necessarily implies that we have not applied C. 
 
So also in resolving complex cases of global justice, if statism alone were at once necessary 
and sufficient, there would be no need for cosmopolitanism. This is because if statism (S) 
were at once necessary and sufficient, whenever we apply statism to such complex cases we 
will have a necessary and sufficient resolution (NSR) for the problems. Other things equal, 
we should have an NSR. We will only fail to have an NSR if, and only if, we do not apply 
statism well enough. 
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Assuming S is at once necessary and sufficient for NSR, therefore; 
(i) If S then NSR. 
(ii) If not S then not NSR. 
(iii) That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied S.  
(iv) That there is not NSR necessarily implies that we have not applied S. 
 
In resolving complex cases of global justice, if C were at once unnecessary and insufficient, 
therefore; 
(i) That we have applied C does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. 
(ii) That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied C. 
(iii) That we have not applied C does not necessarily imply that we do not have 
NSR.  
(iv) That we do not have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have not applied 
C. 
 
So also in resolving complex cases of global justice, if S were at once unnecessary and 
insufficient, therefore; 
(i) That we have applied S does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. 
(ii) That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied S. 
(iii) That we have not applied S does not necessarily imply that we do not have 
NSR.  
(iv) That we do not have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have not applied 
S. 
 
In resolving complex cases of global justice, if C were unnecessary but sufficient, therefore; 
(i) If C then NSR. 
(ii) That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied C. For we 
can also have NSR by applying S (assuming that C and S are the only 
applicable perspectives). 
 
So also in resolving complex cases of global justice, if S were unnecessary but sufficient, 
therefore; 
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(i) If S then NSR. 
(ii) That we have NSR does not necessarily imply that we have applied S. For we 
can also have NSR by applying C (assuming that S and C are the only 
applicable perspectives). 
 
Since in resolving complex cases of global justice, C is necessary but insufficient, therefore:  
(i) That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied C. 
(ii) That we have applied C does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. Apart 
from the application of C, we also need the application of S in order to have 
NSR (assuming that C and S are the only applicable perspectives). 
 
So also since in resolving complex cases of global justice, S is necessary but insufficient, 
therefore:  
(i) That we have NSR necessarily implies that we have applied S. 
(ii) That we have applied S does not necessarily imply that we have NSR. Apart 
from the application of S, we also need the application of C in order to have 
NSR (assuming that S and C are the only applicable perspectives). 
 
The situation with dealing with complex cases of global justice, as shown in the case of 
resource curse, is that while cosmopolitanism and statism are individually necessary but 
individually insufficient, they are at once jointly necessary and jointly sufficient. Although, 
things that are jointly necessary are not always jointly sufficient too, just as things that are 
jointly sufficient are not always jointly necessary too. Jointly necessary does not equal jointly 
sufficient, just as jointly sufficient does not equal jointly necessary.  
As shown on the levels of analysis and levels of causality and responsibility, 
cosmopolitanism and statism are at once jointly necessary and jointly sufficient because: 
cosmopolitanism is necessary for the individual and collective levels of analysis or levels of 
causality and responsibility, while statism is necessary for the corporate, the state and the 
global institutional order levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility; and they 
both suffice for these five levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility.  
Since this jointly necessary and jointly sufficient condition is arrived at through a fusion of 
horizons, fusion of horizons is deemed to be an appropriate solution to the individually 
necessary but insufficient condition of cosmopolitanism and statism respectively. Certainly, 
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there are arguments against fusion of horizons as I have used it on the different levels of 
analysis or levels of causality and responsibility chapter 4, chapter 5 and this subchapter 6.1. 
In other words, there are arguments against the fusion of the horizons of statism and 
cosmopolitanism in dealing with resource curse. Chief among the arguments are mutual 
exclusivity, incompatibility, relativism, neutrality, and aerial view.  
 
6.2.1.   The Mutual Exclusivity Argument 
There are two categories of critics who hold the mutual exclusivity banner. The first category 
is those who argue that statism and cosmopolitanism are mutually exclusive. They do so 
because they misconstrue statism (as understood in political philosophy – as a perspective on 
global justice) to be political realism (as understood in International Relations (IR) – as a 
theory of IR). The above argument is rebuttable in two ways. The first way is to show that 
statism is not political realism. The second way is to show that even if statism were political 
realism; there are elements within political realism itself, as William E. Scheuerman has 
shown, that are not absolutely anti-cosmopolitan. The second category is those who argue 
that statism is the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism, hence they are mutually exclusive. 
The first category of critics are easily misled because they focus on the similarities between 
statism and realism without giving due consideration to the differences between the two. On 
the one hand they compare the hierarchical structure of domestic politics with the basic 
structure of the state, and focus on the similarities in the comparison. On the other hand they 
contrast the above with the anarchical structure of the international system and the absence of 
(or the presence of only partial) basic structure at the global arena and focus on the 
differences in the contrast. Then they are led to think that statism is political realism and 
political realism is statism. 
The strongest singular similarity between statism and political realism is that generally both 
can be said to deny morality in general, and justice in particular, a place in the international 
system. Nevertheless, a brief overview of political realism will show, evidently, that despite 
this general similarity, statism and political realism are based on different principles.  
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Political realism has no canonical form.
638
 There have been different distinctions of political 
realism; some are historical and others are thematic. Such divisions include classical realism, 
neo-realism or structural realism, defensive realism and offensive realism, descriptive realism 
and prescriptive realism, and even global reformist or progressive realism. Nevertheless, 
Beitz outlines three elements or tenets of political realism as it has been conceived in the last 
century.  
First, political realism is a sceptic of the role of moral principles in international relations.
639
 
Second, political realism is “an analytic paradigm for international behaviour; it holds, 
roughly, that international events are best explained as outcomes of the strategic interactions 
of self-interested states.”640 Third, political realism is heuristic in that it promotes a cautious 
idea of the function or position that should be assigned to ethical deliberation in practical 
reasoning about international relations.
641
 At this juncture, let us turn to the various strands of 
realism namely, descriptive realism, prescriptive realism, classical realism, neo-classical 
realism or structural realism, progressive realism, etc. 
Having accepted the above tenets, descriptive realism says that ‘is’ how the international 
system ‘is’. In other words, it is the nature of the international system to embody the above 
tenets. While prescriptive realism says states ‘ought’ to be pursuing the above tenets. 
Classical realism, originally propounding the tenets, thinks that actually it is due to human 
nature that states act according to the tenets. Being governed by humans, and human nature 
always being aligned to or seeking the above tenets, condition states to behave in line with 
those tenets.  
In Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Kenneth Waltz argues that international 
conflicts are primarily neither due to man (human nature) nor the state; rather, international 
conflicts are primarily due to the international system. Furthermore, in neo-realism or 
structural realism which he propounded in Theory of International Politics, Waltz, having 
accepted the above tenets, provides a systemic explanation of the international system. He 
asserts that the international system determines systemically the behaviour, actions and 
reactions of states at the international system. For him, the only way states can ensure their 
security is by behaving, acting or reacting according to the dictates of the systemic structure 
                                                             
638
 Beitz, Charles R. Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1999: p. 185. 
639
 Ibid. pp. 185-186. 
640
 Ibid. p. 186. 
641 Ibid.  pp. 186-197. 
Page 222 of 252 
 
at the international system. Although Waltz actually clearly formulated this neo-realist or 
structural realist strand  in his  Theory of International Politics, a rudimentary form of it can 
be found in his earlier work Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. 
Defensive realism opines that international security is absolutely a zero-sum game; as state A 
increases its security, the security of state B correspondingly diminishes. State B, reacting to 
its diminishing security, increases its security which in turn diminishes the security of state A. 
This scenario of power-balancing which is on-going destabilizes the international system. 
Given the anarchical structure or nature of the international system, states fear for their 
security and hence see the maximisation of security as the primary aim of states.  
In opposition to defensive realism, offensive realism opines that the best way for a state to 
defend itself is by attacking its opponent in order to destroy the offensive capabilities of the 
latter. Offensive realism, like defensive realism, accepts the basic tenets of realism and 
believes that the buffering of a state’s security is necessary. However, it differs from 
defensive realism because it holds that offence rather than defence is the better security 
option for states. 
Thomas Hobbes’ description of international politics or relations as a state of nature seems to 
be the leading foundation for realism.  According to Hobbes:  
in all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, 
are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, 
and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their 
neighbours; which is a posture of war ....To this warre of every man against every 
man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and 
Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, 
there is no Law: where no law, no Injustice.
642
 
However, rather than Hobbes’s Leviathan, Thucydides’643 History of the Peloponnesian War 
(hereafter History) is considered to be the first scientific book on international relations in 
general and political realism in particular. Suffice it to say that History is still famous today 
not because it is the first scientific book on international relations but because it is the first 
                                                             
642
 Hobbes, Thomas.  Leviathan. London: Printed for Andrew Crooke, at the Green Dragon in St. Paul’s Church-
yard, 1651: ch. 13. 
643
 An Athenian historian and general who fought in the Peloponnesian war on the side of Athens against the 
Peloponnesians. Athens led the Delian League while Sparta led the Peloponnesian League. 
Page 223 of 252 
 
book on political realism. Hence, unsurprisingly, political realists revere it as their ‘holy 
book’ while liberals644 seem to abhor it.  
History documents the twenty-seven-year-war that was fought between the Athenians and the 
Peloponnesians in the late fifth century BC. Given that Thucydides narrates events of the war 
chronologically, the temptation is always to analyze History in a chronological order. 
However, I think analyzing it thematically is helpful since Thucydides was not interested in 
merely documenting the events of the war as  historical occurrences but he was much more 
interested in telling his readers why the war ‘actually’ happened and why future wars might 
happen.  
There are four themes that can be easily identified in History. The first is Thucydides’ 
juxtaposition of what can be referred to as the ‘official cause’ with the ‘real cause’ of the war. 
The second is the juxtaposition of power with right. The third is the juxtaposition of 
peace/security with justice. The fourth is coalition.  
In juxtaposing the official cause with the real cause of the war, Thucydides argues that 
official reasons given for fighting the war were actually not the reason why the war was 
fought. He described the violation of some legal codes and many other reasons which were 
cited for the reason for fighting the war; he argued that actually those reasons were neither 
necessary nor sufficient to fight the war.
645
 Such reasons were only given by the 
Peloponnesians because they wanted to appear, and be perceived as being, objective in their 
decision to fight their neighbour – Athens.  
For Thucydides, the war was actually waged by the Peloponnesians for a selfish reason. 
Hence the reason was concealed.  Having observed the non-ceasing growth of Athens, the 
Peloponnesians were afraid that someday Athens will grow so strong that it will be able to 
easily destroy the Peloponnesians if it wants. Hence the Peloponnesians decided to wage a 
preventive war – to fight Athenians now that Athens is still relatively weak rather than when 
it becomes too strong.
646
   
Note that Thucydides assumes poleis are rational and self-regarding. This can be seen in the 
case of the Peloponnesians who waged a preventive war. It can also be seen in the case of 
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Athens which ‘will attack’ the Peloponnesians when it is capable.  This is the first lesson that 
political realists learned from Thucydides – that states will always be rational and self-
regarding even to the detriment of other states. The issue that will always be debated is 
whether the Athenians would have actually attacked the Peloponnesians. However, being 
rational, Peloponnesians did not have to wait to see what the Athenians would actually do; 
they had to act fast. This leads us to the second theme. 
The second theme which is the juxtaposition of peace/security with justice can be seen in the 
Melian Dialogue.
647
 The strong Athens had come to take over the weak Melos.   The strong 
Athenians gave the Melians two options; either to surrender peacefully or put up a resistance 
and face being destroyed. The Athenians urged the Melians to opt for the former rather than 
the latter. But the Melians declined because they thought the Athenians were waging an 
unjust war against them. Furthermore, the Melians believed that if they were attacked, the 
gods would come to their aid because they were not the aggressors and they were only in 
justice resisting the Athenians.  
However, as it turned out, the Melians were destroyed without the gods coming to their aid. 
Political realists have drawn one conclusion from the above juxtaposition or theme. In the 
international system, peace and security should be preferred to justice. Taken over Melos was 
essential for the Athenians in order to have a chance of winning the war, and winning the war 
would ensure the peace and security of Athens. Hence, although it was unjust, the Athenians 
had to destroy Melos. For the Melians, opting for peace and security would have averted the 
destruction while opting for justice did nothing to help them.  
The third theme which is that of the juxtaposition of power and right is a continuation of the 
second theme which in turn is a continuation of the first theme. Put simply, it is an 
explication of the first and second themes. The Peloponnesians had no right to attack Athens, 
but they did because they had the power. So also Athens had no right to attack Melos, but it 
did because it had the power. Melos had the right to defend itself, but the right did not count; 
the only thing that counted was the power of Athens.  
The fourth theme is ‘coalition.’ In this theme, Athens - on the one hand - entered a coalition 
with a couple of poleis to form the Delian League which was led by Athens. The 
Peloponnesians, on the other hand, formed the Peloponnesian League which was led by 
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Sparta. The big lessons here for political realists are those of balance of power, 
bandwagoning and balancing.  
Although Thucydides - in the introductory pages
648
 - says he intended to write an objective 
book that will last forever, what he actually did was to propound the doctrine of political 
realism that may last forever. Giving the foregoing analysis, one might conclude that 
Thucydides and his fellow realists are either saying to states that when states set out to act on 
the international scene, they should not ask the ‘wrong’ question: What is the right thing to 
do? Rather they should ask the ‘right’ question: What is the rational thing to do? When the 
latter question is asked or the former question is not asked, justice is discounted. So, political 
realism is totally not concerned with justice.  
Although Thucydides is considered by many to be the founding father of international 
relations, Stanley Hoffman contends that Hans J. Morgenthau, if the discipline of 
international relations has a founding father, is the founding father.
649
 If Morgenthau who 
was a political realist is considered to be the founding father of international relations, then it 
follows that he can be considered to be the founding father of political realism while others 
will also contend that Thucydides is the founding father.  
Edward Hallett Carr had argued that “no ethical standards are applicable to relations between 
states.”650 Following suit, Morgenthau argues that “Universal moral principles cannot be 
applied to the actions of states.”651 For Morgenthau, political situations usually have a blend 
of good and evil on the one hand and wisdom and error on the other hand. This blend is so 
strong that we cannot extricate the good from the evil and wisdom from error in political 
situations. Hence to categorically deal with international political matters as purely moral or 
immoral or wise or wrong is at its best at once an inadequate way to deal with political 
situations and an injustice to political situations.
652
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Describing the history of American foreign policy as a realist one, Morgenthau says that is 
how every state behaves. The only thing that matters to states is their interest. When their 
interest is threatened they become utterly faithless, mean and crafty.
653
 For Morgenthau, our 
common moral principles are not the ultimate moral guide for the political actor. For the 
moral standards of politics are different from our common moral standards. The political 
actor acts according to the moral standards pertaining to politics.  
Hence the ultimate moral duty of the political actor is to be politically expedient – for that is 
what is demanded of him in politics. To fail to be politically expedient is to have morally 
failed politically.
654
 If because of moralistic contempt for the rules of politics a political actor 
fails to act expediently and as a result those in his or her charge and the interest of the state 
are endangered, such an actor is politically morally culpable.
655
   
Morgenthau says: 
it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both 
... moral excess and ... political folly. For if we look at all nations ... as political 
entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do 
justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge 
our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing 
policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting our 
own.
656
 
For Morgenthau, prudence is the core of political morality. Political actors ought to consider 
the political effects of their political actions, and must ensure that their actions and the effects 
serve the interests of their states. The national interest is the only standard, both morally and 
intellectually, that great nations have.
657
 National interest, as understood by Morgenthau, has 
three components namely the protection of the territory, political institutions and culture of 
the state.
658
 National interest, understood as national security or survival, cannot be 
compromised for anything. But after it, states should bring morality into consideration when 
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they act in the international arena. No wonder he argues that it is impossible for us to have a 
compromise between national interest and moral values in matters of foreign policy.
659
 
It is on the above grounds, one may argue, that he propounded six principles of political 
realism, namely: 
1. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective 
laws that have their roots in human nature. 
2. The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.  
3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective 
category that is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning 
that is fixed once and for all.  
4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action.  
5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with 
the moral laws that govern the universe.  
6. Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere.660 
 
However, Morgenthau seems to have contradicted himself if we look at some other passages 
of his writings. For instance, in The Machiavellian Utopia Morgenthau says our ordinary 
moral principles are not merely part of politics; rather they are the foundation of the political 
reality upon which a government is built.
661
 He says although states pursue their national 
interests in their international relations with other states and will only comply with 
international law if it helps further their national interests; regard for a few moral principles 
restrains states from violating the fundamental rights of other states, and it is to these few 
moral principles that the law of nations and Western civilization itself owe their existence.  
Then he admits that there is a contradiction between claiming on the one hand that states are 
only concerned with their national interest and on the other hand that there are few moral 
principles that guide states. But explains that these moral principles do not actually dictate to 
states the political actions they should take or not take at the international arena. Rather, the 
moral principles are so strong that they influence political actors to such an extent that 
political actors do not even entertain the thought of violating the fundamental rights of other 
states as a means of pursuing national interest.  
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In other words, the violation of the fundamental rights of other states as a means of pursuing 
national interest is already eliminated from international politics by these moral principles 
even before political actions are considered by political actors.
662
 According to Morgenthau: 
if we ask ourselves what state men and diplomats are capable of doing to further the 
power objectives of their respective nations and what they actually do, we realize that 
they do less than they probably could and less than they actually did in other periods 
of history. They refuse to consider certain ends and to use certain means, either 
altogether or under certain conditions, not because in the light of expediency 
impractical or unwise, but because certain moral rules interpose an absolute barrier. 
Moral rules do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of 
view of expediency.
663
  
Having asserted that “Moderation in politics cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral 
judgement”,664  Morgenthau admits that the moral boundaries of international politics have 
been negatively affected by national interest which results from the nature of modern warfare 
– given that advanced technology has changed the way wars are fought.665 Thus it is 
understandable while he opines that Hobbes’ characterization of international relations or 
politics as a state of nature misleads us to think that morality or norms have no effect on 
international politics.  
Nevertheless, on another contradictory note, Morgenthau would consider as profoundly true 
Hobbes’ assertion that it is the sovereign that gives birth to law and morality, or justice and 
injustice; hence outside a sovereign state there is no law and morality or justice and 
injustice.
666
 This leads us to the statists who, at least to a large extent and to different degrees, 
seem to have bought the idea of ‘outside the state there is no morality’ or ‘outside the state 
there is no justice.’ 
Evidently, as can be deduced from the foregoing overview of political realism, statism is not 
political realism. For it is political realism, and not statism, that is characterized by principles 
such as balancing or balance of power, bandwagonning, containment, detente, etc. and 
notions such as hegemon, challenger, etc. Even if statism were political realism, there are 
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political realists – namely progressive realists/global reformist realists - who are not 
absolutely anti-cosmopolitan.  
Convinced that the nation-state is outdated, progressive realists argue for an extensive reform 
of the international system.
667
 They think the only way to attain this reform is to have a world 
community or a supranational community. For them, any worthwhile, attractive and workable 
post-national or post-Westphalian system of governance must be based on parallel post-
national or post-Westphalian world that has the ability to carry out essential integrative roles 
similar to the essential integrative roles that viable states carry out.
668
  
Progressive realists go on to argue that the fact that a global state is presently unrealisable 
does not mean that it can never be achieved. In view of this fact, to keep on aspiring for a 
viable global state is a reasonable thing to do and the realisation of a global state remains a 
reasonable and feasible goal. 
669
 For this reason, progressive realists engage in the 
deconstruction, re-interpretation and re-conceptualisation of international politics, 
international justice and international morality.  Even more important is that they interpret the 
main tenets of political realism such as the balance of power, national interest, security 
dilemma, etc. in such a way that these terms allow ample room for reforms in the 
international system.
670
    
In the foregoing discussion, we have been dealing with the category of critics who hold the 
mutual exclusivity banner because they think that statism and cosmopolitanism are mutually 
exclusive based on their misconception of statism to be political realism. We rebutted such 
argument by showing that: statism is not political realism; even if statism were political 
realism, there are political realists that are not absolutely anti-cosmopolitan. Now, let us deal 
with the category of critics who hold the mutual exclusivity banner because they think that 
statism is the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism. 
I will argue that although statism is the logical opposite of cosmopolitanism, to say that 
statism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive is not a logical contradiction of 
identity. The first rule of logic says a thing must be identical to itself; a thing cannot be A and 
non-A at the same time – it is either A or non-A. The faulty reasoning is that since statism is 
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the “opposite” of cosmopolitanism, to say they are not mutually exclusive is to break the first 
rule of logic.  
However, to say statism and cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive is not to say that 
statism is cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanism is statism. Rather, it is to say that although 
both are “opposites,” they can still be moderately employed to work together. Moreover, 
“opposites” are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, man is the opposite of 
woman, yet both of them cooperate in many ways including bringing into existence other 
men and women. 
 
6.2.2. The Incompatibility, Relativism, Neutrality and Aerial View Arguments. 
The mutual exclusivity argument is radical. Its moderate form is the incompatibility argument 
which holds that statism and cosmopolitanism are incompatible hence their horizons cannot 
be fused. For instance, referring to cosmopolitanism and statism, Nagel says, “I find the 
choice between these two incompatible moral conceptions difficult.”671 However, why I 
agree that there are specific tenets of cosmopolitanism and statism that are incompatible, 
generally statism and cosmopolitanism are not incompatible.  
As we have seen on our levels of analysis or levels of causality and responsibility: in some 
cases we employed statism as the primary tool of analysis and cosmopolitanism as the 
secondary tool of analysis; and in other cases we employed cosmopolitanism as the primary 
tool of analysis and statism as the secondary tool of analysis. Moreover, for instance we saw 
that resource curse is neither caused only by states nor only by individuals. Among other 
factors, these two factors combine to cause resource curse. Hence, statism can be employed 
as we did to look at the statist factor, and cosmopolitanism can be employed as we did to look 
at the individual factor.   
In view of the Husserlian temporal horizon and the Heideggerian time horizon as presented in 
sub-sub-chapter 1.2.4, we might opine that ‘it is just a matter of time’ before statism opens up 
to global justice. Before the Westphalian system, there were no states as we understand them 
today. Although the Greek city-states had existed, and there were other monarchies, 
sovereignties, or some sort of administrative entities that might claim some sort of statehood, 
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they were not states as we understand states today. Perhaps, some would even say likely, in 
the near future, even if in the far future, or just in the future, we might not have states 
anymore and we may have state-like entities or some entities totally different form states. If 
such entities look more and more like the world of the cosmopolitans, then perhaps statists 
might welcome a fusion of horizons with the cosmopolitans. Now that our world is still very 
“statist”, perhaps the cosmopolitans can fuse their horizons with the statists. 
The relativism argument holds that fusion of horizons falls into relativism in which the truth 
of global justice is relative to each perspective; the statist position is true for the statist and 
the cosmopolitan position is true for the cosmopolitans. Consequently, there is no such thing 
as objective ‘global justice’; global justice is what the statists and cosmopolitans subjectively 
say it is. However, by fusing horizons, we are not falling into relativism, we are merely 
avoiding universalism. Moreover, if we were favouring relativism: first, we would have no 
need for fusion of horizons; and second, even if we were to fuse the horizons of statism and 
cosmopolitanism, we would totally accept every argument, or the whole position, of both 
perspectives.  
The neutrality argument holds that having been presented with two options, namely statism 
and cosmopolitanism, fusion of horizons opted for a safe and easy escape by being neutral 
rather than committing to either statism or cosmopolitanism. However, to argue that we ought 
to have chosen either statism or cosmopolitanism over the other is to argue that things are 
always either/or. Things are not always either/or.  
Things are either/or if the options are A and non-A; that is if one is necessarily correct, the 
other being the opposite, must be necessarily wrong. But if the options are A, B; they can be 
neither/nor if both are wrong; but it can also be A and B if both are right. Furthermore, either 
of them can be fully or partially right or wrong. So things can also be partially A and partially 
B, partially A and fully B, or fully A and partially B. Therefore we can be right to see the 
answer to the problem of global justice as partially statist and partially cosmopolitan. Fusion 
of horizons does not seek any safe or easy way out of the statist/cosmopolitan dilemma. 
Rather it painstakingly assesses the merits and demerits of each perspective, upholds the 
merits on both sides and criticises the demerits on both sides.  
The aerial view argument holds that fusion of horizons captures the whole picture without 
concrete details. That is, fusion of horizons lumps all the properties of statism and 
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cosmopolitanism together without exploring the details of each individual property. In other 
words, fusion of horizons does not respect the separatedness between statism and 
cosmopolitanism and the differences between the tenets of the two perspectives.  
However, the aerial view argument is false on the following grounds. I did not start my 
analysis with fusing the horizons of statism and cosmopolitanism together. I started with 
resource curse and then explored various ways in which cosmopolitanism and statism can be 
applied to it. I actually dealt with five different levels, and dealt with two different possible 
applications, namely primary and secondary, of statism and cosmopolitanism to those levels. 
By so doing, I addressed the problem of details and differences, before turning to the solution 
of fusion of horizons. 
 
6.2.3.    Fusion of Horizons Accommodates the Complexity of Resource Curse 
In the course of this discourse, global justice was construed as the way in which fundamental 
rights and duties are distributed globally and how the division of advantages from global 
cooperation are determined. Furthermore, taking resource curse as a complex case of global 
justice, we defined resource curse as a situation whereby some states, despite being endowed 
with abundant natural resources, are poor and their poverty is directly or indirectly linked 
with their natural resources endowment.  
Juxtaposing the construal of global justice with the definition of resource curse, we might not 
be able to directly deduce what makes resource curse a global justice issue. But deducing 
from the entire analyses of global justice and resource curse in the foregoing discussion, what 
make resource curse a global justice issue are the following: 
(1) There are rights and duties involved in resource curse. 
(2) The rights and duties in (1) are not only domestically distributed, but are also globally 
distributed. 
(3) Hence there is global cooperation involved in resource curse. 
(4) There are advantages resulting from the global cooperation in (3). 
(5) The advantages in (3) are not only domestically divided, but are also globally divided. 
(6) The division in (5) are not only domestically determined, but are also globally 
determined. 
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In other words, the agents linked with the poverty of the resource-cursed states are both 
domestic and global. The agents are not only domestic and global, but are also interactional 
and institutional. Broadly put, as seen in chapter three in the cases of Nigeria, Angola and 
DRC, the agents are individuals, collectives, corporations, the state (or its various 
governments), and the global institutional order – including foreign states, global institutions, 
etc.  
Looking at the multiple and complex factors responsible for resource curse, we see that, on 
the one hand, some factors are interactional, and other factors are institutional. The 
interactional factors are the individual and collective agents, while the institutional factors are 
the corporations, state (governments), and the global institutional order.  Also, on the other 
hand, some factors are local or domestic and other factors are international, transnational or 
global. Some individuals, collective agents and corporations act only on the domestic level, 
some act only on the global level, and others act both on the domestic and global level.  
Therefore, we have:  
(1a) interactional domestic individual agents;  
(1b) interactional global individual agents;  
(1c) interactional domestic and global individual agents;  
(2a) interactional domestic collective agents;  
(2b) interactional global collective agents;  
(2c) interactional domestic and global collective agents; 
(3a) institutional domestic corporations; 
(3b) institutional global corporations;  
(3c) institutional domestic and global corporations; 
(4) institutional state (government);  
(5) global institutional order.  
 
The combination of different agents as interactional and institutional, and as domestic and 
global, means the agents are just as complex as they are multiple. As G.H. von Wright says, 
“in normal scientific practice we have to reckon with plurality rather than singularity, and 
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with complexity rather than simplicity of conditions.”672 As seen in chapters 4 and 5, a 
singular perspective proves inadequate to deal with the aforementioned multiplicity and a 
simple perspective proves inadequate to deal with the aforementioned complexity. For this 
reason, we turn to fusion of horizons. In a nutshell, fusion of horizons helps us to avoid 
Almighty Formula, cope with limitedness, accommodate systemic structures and take 
advantage of systemness.  
Almighty Formula sees everything from the cosmopolitan lenses or statist lenses alone; it 
sees each perspective as if it were a silver bullet to solve every global justice problem. In 
terms of limitedness, we see that even on one level, cosmopolitanism or statism does not even 
tell the whole story; it needs the other for secondary support. Regarding fusion of horizons’ 
capacity to accommodate systemic structures, in terms of accommodating systemic structures 
the factors of resource curse put together become systemic and needs to be seen as a system 
rather than seen from ‘myopic’ cosmopolitan lenses or ‘myopic’ statist lenses. When all the 
agents, factors and facets of resource curse are joined together they become greater and even 
different from the mere sum of each of them; cosmopolitanism alone on its own and statism 
alone on its own fail to capture this. 
Finally, fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism together helps us to take 
advantage of systemness. Systemness is defined as “the state, quality or condition of a 
complex system, that is, of a set, a whole, exhibiting behaviour distinct from the behaviour of 
the parts.”673 In other words, systemness is “the coordination of multiple components that, 
when working together, create a network of activity that is more powerful than any action of 
individual parts on their own.”674 Fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism 
together is much more effective, than cosmopolitanism or statism alone, in dealing with 
systemic structures.  
Just as when all the agents, factors and facets of resource curse are joined together they 
become greater and even different from the mere sum of each of them; so also when the 
cosmopolitan and statist perspectives or horizons are fused together they become a greater 
“perspective” or a broader ‘horizon’ and even different from the mere sum of each of them. 
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Hence fusion of horizons provides a systemic solution to a systemic problem. Surely, the 
systemic complexity of resource curse calls for systemness which fusion of horizons offers. 
 
*** 
This chapter reviewed my hypothesis, recapitulated the key issues in the dissertation and 
summarised the benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism. It discussed 
the plausibilities and implausibilities of fusion of horizons. Firstly, it examined the arguments 
for implausibility namely mutual exclusivity, incompatibility, relativism, neutrality and aerial 
view. Then secondly it presented the argument for plausibility which says that fusion of 
horizons accommodates the complexity of resource curse. In other words, this chapter 
examined possible arguments against my attempt to fuse the horizons of cosmopolitanism 
and statism.  
Following this chapter is the concluding part of the dissertation. In view of the review of my 
hypothesis, recapitulation of the key issues in the dissertation and the summarisation of the 
benefits of fusing the horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism which I did in this chapter, the 
following concluding part will make one further and final clarification. This clarification is 
aimed at resolving a possible misconception. There might be a possible misconception that 
my adopted fusion of horizons is a new perspective on global justice that negates 
cosmopolitanism and statism. But the concluding part of the dissertation disclaims the notion 
that my adopted fusion of horizons is a new perspective on global justice that negates 
cosmopolitanism and statism. Finally, it reiterates my position on the subject matter of the 
dissertation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Fusion of Horizons: A New Perspective on Global Justice that Negates
675
 
Cosmopolitanism and Statism? 
Fusion of horizons, meaning the way it is applied in this dissertation, is not a negation of 
cosmopolitanism and statism. It is not a new perspective on global justice that has come to 
negate, displace or replace the old ones. It is a mere attempt at bridging perspectives! It is 
only an observation about the existing perspectives and an attempt to correct the apparent 
limitations of the existing perspectives as observed.  
So, fusion of horizons is only possible because of the existing perspectives. Without the 
existing perspectives there will be no fusion of horizons; because there will simply be no 
horizons to fuse together. Fusion of horizons at once owes its possibility and actuality to the 
existence (and the observed strengths and weaknesses) of the existing perspectives. 
Given the limitations of cosmopolitanism and statism, and the way fusion of horizons 
compensates for those limitations, one might be tempted to see fusion of horizons as general 
perspective on global justice while seeing cosmopolitanism and statism as special 
perspectives on global justice. In this case, cosmopolitanism will be seen as special 
perspective for interactional analysis while statism will be seen as special perspective for 
institutional analysis. Then fusion of horizons will be seen as general perspective for both 
interactional and institutional analyses.  
Or cosmopolitanism will be seen as special perspective applicable to the individual and the 
collective levels while statism will be seen as special perspective applicable to the corporate, 
the state and the global institutional order levels. Then fusion of horizons will be seen as 
general perspective applicable to all levels. To reiterate, fusion of horizons is a mere attempt 
at bridging the cosmopolitan and statist perspectives!  
The adjectives general and special or the phrases general perspective and special perspective 
bring to mind Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity and general theory of relativity. 
Nevertheless, our proper analogues are not Einstein’s theories of relativity. Our proper 
analogues are to be found in John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory of Employment, 
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Interest and Money. In reaction to the works of classical economists as typified and pioneered 
by Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Keynes 
asserts that his own theory is fit for general application while that of the classical economists 
is only fit for special application.  
According to Keynes: 
I have called this book the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
placing the emphasis on the prefix general. The object of such a title is to contrast the 
character of my arguments and conclusions with those of the classical theory of the 
subject, upon which I was brought up and which dominates the economic thought, 
both practical and theoretical, of the governing and academic classes of this 
generation, as it has for a hundred years past. I shall argue that the postulates of the 
classical theory are applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the 
situation which it assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of 
equilibrium. Moreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the classical 
theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with 
the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the 
facts of experience.
676
  
In what follows, I shall emphasise the differences between Keynes’ objective and that of 
fusion of horizons. Keynes aimed at contrasting his theory with the classical economic 
theory. So also fusion of horizons is aimed at showing the limitations of the cosmopolitan and 
statist perspectives. But fusion of horizons is also aimed at showing the strengths of 
cosmopolitanism and statism. Fusion of horizons goes further to use the strengths of 
cosmopolitanism to compensate for the weaknesses of statism and vice versa.  
Just as Keynes was brought up in classical economic theory, so also I am being brought up in 
cosmopolitan and statist perspectives on global justice. Just as classical economic theory 
dominated the economic thought of Keynes’ generation, so also cosmopolitan and statist 
perspectives dominate the global justice thought of my generation. Just as Keynes argued that 
classical economic theory is only fit for special application, so also I argue that: the 
cosmopolitan perspective is primarily fit for interactional analysis and primarily applicable to 
the individual and collective levels; and the statist perspective is primarily fit for institutional 
analysis and primarily applicable to the corporate, the state, and (although with serious 
caution) the global institutional order levels.  
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But I also argue that: while cosmopolitanism is not primarily applicable to institutional 
analysis, it can be secondarily used for institutional analysis and secondarily applied to the 
corporate, the state and the global institutional order levels; and while statism is not primarily 
applicable to interactional analysis, it can be secondarily used for interactional analysis and 
secondarily applied to the individual and collective levels. 
While Keynes totally argued that all the characteristics of classical economic theory are not 
those of the society in which ‘we’ live, I only partially argue that some of the tenets of the 
cosmopolitan perspective on the one hand and the statist perspective on the other hand blur 
our vision of multiple and complex global (in)justice cases. Finally, while Keynes argued that 
classical economic theory “is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts 
of experience,”677 I observe that although the cosmopolitan perspective on the one hand and 
the statist perspective on the other hand are limited (hence their insufficient conditions), they 
also have merits (hence their necessary conditions). 
Using Keynes as an analogy, as I did above, shows us the following. It shows how fusion of 
horizons would have approached the global justice debate if the aim was to create a new 
perspective on global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. By definition, fusion 
of horizons implies that there are already existing horizons, and these already existing 
horizons are insufficient on their own, but are necessary to form a new horizon and may be 
jointly sufficient when fused together as a new horizon. So, comparing and contrasting fusion 
of horizons with Keynes, as done in the above analogy, makes it evident that fusion of 
horizons does not negate, displace or replace cosmopolitanism and statism unlike Keynes 
who aimed his economics to negate, displace or replace classical economics.   
In view of the above analogy, fusion of horizons is neither general perspective on global 
justice nor a new perspective on global justice that negates cosmopolitanism and statism. In 
fact, it is not an original perspective on global justice: for it is not the result of a lofty 
ambition but the work of a humble and, hopefully, careful observation. Moreover, as 
mentioned in sub-sub-chapter 1.2.4, fusion of horizons - at least as applied here - is not 
Hegelian dialectics of: being + nothingness = becoming; or thesis + antithesis = synthesis; 
and this synthesis is itself a new thesis, a different thesis, or in short, a thesis.  
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Having already said that fusion of horizons, as I used it, 'is neither an original perspective nor 
general perspective' but a mere attempt to bridge the perspectives of cosmopolitanism and 
statism because fusion of horizons comes from cosmopolitanism and statism; it would appear 
that both cosmopolitanism and statism are still separate even after fusing their horizons. 
Consequently, in other words, the two perspectives have not been reduced to a singular 
perspective. Nevertheless, I am not using ‘fusion’ in the literal sense that when two things are 
fused they become inseparable, or in the sense that when two things are fused they become a 
new singular thing in which the original parts are no longer distinguishable. I am using fusion 
of horizons in the sense of a ‘combination’, ‘joining’ or ‘merging’ of the cosmopolitan and 
statist perspectives.
678
 
 
Fusion of horizons, as used in this dissertation, is rather analogous (I use the word analogous 
cautiously) to Maffettone’s liberal internationalism. Ab initio I share Maffettone’s concern 
with ‘absolute poverty’ and ‘sufficientarian’ arguments for ‘positive duties’ and ‘basic rights’ 
or ‘meta-rights.’ But I go further to ask: what, if any, are the contributory roles of individuals, 
collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in resource curse?; 
and given the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and 
the global institutional order in resource curse, what, if any, are their responsibilities in 
resource curse? 
 
Therefore, fusion of horizons is at once in various ways ‘similar’ to, and ‘different’ from, 
Maffettone’s liberal internationalism. In one notable way, it is ‘similar’ to Maffettone’s 
‘juxtaposition’ of cosmopolitanism and statism. According to Maffettone, “one can play 
cosmopolitan in combination with statist features and vice versa. This is not because either 
cosmopolitans or statists are right. The intention is rather to avoid the pitfalls of both statism 
and cosmopolitanism by presenting a fresh start under the label of liberal 
internationalism.”679 Similarly, fusion of horizons tries to avoid the pitfalls of 
cosmopolitanism and statism. It is for this reason that it uses the strength of the one to 
compensate for the weaknesses of the other and vice versa. In short, it accounts for both the 
strengths and weaknesses of cosmopolitanism and statism.  
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In another notable way in which we can talk about ‘similarity,’ Maffettone seeks a middle 
point on the spectrum between cosmopolitanism and statism. He thinks “This intermediate 
option creates a kind of continuity between ‘0’ global justice and ‘1’ global justice.”680 In 
fact, he at once seeks a middle point between, and an alternative to, cosmopolitanism and 
statism.  He maintains that there is a third possible alternative which is at once more realistic 
or practical than the cosmopolitan alternative and more theoretical or utopian than the statist 
alternative.
681
 Similarly, I seek a position that is ‘moderate’ compared to the ‘radical’ 
positions that cosmopolitans and statists argue for. And I seek an ‘intermediate’ position 
rather than the ‘extreme’ positions that cosmopolitans and statists argue for. But my position 
is the fusion of horizons of cosmopolitanism and statism.  
 
One notable ‘difference’ is that Maffettone emphasizes positive duty. While I, like Pogge, 
emphasize negative duty. Another notable ‘difference’ is that Maffettone emphasizes basic 
rights or meta-rights. While I, like Pogge, emphasize contributory roles. It is for these reasons 
that having shared Maffettone’s concern with ‘absolute poverty’ and ‘sufficientarian’ 
arguments for ‘positive duties’ and ‘basic rights’ or ‘meta-rights’, I went further to ask: what, 
if any, are the contributory roles of individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and 
the global institutional order in resource curse?; and given the contributory roles of 
individuals, collective agents, corporations, the state and the global institutional order in 
resource curse, what, if any, are their responsibilities in resource curse? 
Another notable way in which my position is different from Maffettone’s position is the 
different phenomena we use, and how we use them, for our different positions. While 
Maffettone uses regionalism, I use resource curse. By using regionalism, Maffettone’s 
argument seems to be geographical and geopolitical concentric circles of three circles. 
Cosmopolitanism is the largest and outermost geographical and geopolitical circle. Statism is 
the smallest and innermost geographical and geopolitical circle. Regionalism is the medium 
and intermediate geographical and geopolitical circle. When regionalism contracts towards 
statism: the more our world looks like the statist’s world; and the less it looks like the 
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cosmopolitan’s world. But when regionalism expands towards cosmopolitanism: the more 
our world looks like the cosmopolitan’s world; and the less it looks like the statist’s world.  
Rather than using a phenomenon like regionalism, I am concerned generally with complex 
cases of global justice. Resource curse is only a particular example of complex cases of 
global justice. So the resource curse phenomenon can be substituted with other complex case 
phenomena of global justice. But regionalism, the way Maffettone uses it, seems not to be 
substitutable the way resource curse is.  
 
To reiterate the fundamental differences between my position and those of Rawls, Nagel, 
Beitz and Pogge; my position is an intermediate position while their positions are extremes. 
Rawls and Nagel are at the statist extreme of my intermediary position while Beitz and Pogge 
are at the cosmopolitan extreme of my intermediary position. Although Rawls and Nagel also 
allow room for some cosmopolitan claims, Rawls creates room for only peoples at the 
international realm while Nagel even goes further to assert that only humanitarian duty or 
duty of charity exists on the global level. Unlike Rawls’ position, my position also has room 
for individuals on the global level. Also, my position, unlike Nagel’s position, has room for 
duties of justice on the global level. Furthermore, although my position accommodates some, 
but rejects other, claims made by Beitz and Pogge, while they see cosmopolitanism as 
sufficient to deal with complex cases of global justice, I argue that it is necessary but not 
sufficient.  
 
Finally, fusion of horizons, as adopted here, is not consistent with a monist view of value; 
rather, it is consistent with a pluralist view of value. On the one hand, monist views of value - 
for example eudaemonism, rational eudaemonism, rational deontologism,  utilitarianism, etc -  
argue that there is a summum bonum which we can reduce every value to. On the other hand, 
generally pluralist views of value argue that there is no summum bonum which we can reduce 
every value to. My view is pluralist in the sense that I argue that neither cosmopolitanism nor 
statism alone is sufficient to deal with complex cases of global justice or global injustice; 
hence we need a pluralist account, that is, the use of both cosmopolitanism and statism in 
order to deal with complex cases of global justice or global injustice. 
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